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The dramatic events of 2011 in the context of the European 
Union have forced analysts and scholars to reflect on what 
kind of entity will be in the next decade. Simultaneously, 
regional political integration and cooperation have been de-
veloping at a fast pace around the globe, creating great ex-
pectations and much confusion. The latest decisions of the 
EU Council have opened the door to an unknown chapter of 
European history. Consequently, the EU model or reference 
has suffered the impact of these factors and presents today 
a different face than decades ago and offers somewhat dif-
ferent challenges to be met. A set of questions dominates 
the news scene:
•	 What	is	the	state	of	the	Union(s)?	
•	 Which	direction	is	the	EU	going	to	take?	
•	 How	does	the	rest	of	the	world	understand	regional	
integration?	
•	 What	are	the	consequences	and	impact	of	the	current	
EU	crisis	on	international	business?	
•	 Is	the	EU	model,	along	normative	and	“soft”	power,	
still	valid?	
•	 What	standard	or	new	theories	can	best	be	applied	to	
explain	new	realities?	
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EU-US Partnership: More Relevant than Ever? 
 
 
 
 
João Vale de Almeida 
 
 
 
At a time when our global awareness and connectivity is unprecedented, when 
countries like China, India, Brazil and others are emerging or re-emerging, it is 
natural to wonder what the implications are for the transatlantic relationship. Is 
the EU-US partnership more or less relevant than ever? Have we become passé? 
 
I believe the EU-US partnership is more relevant than ever because: 
 
 •    It is a partnership, not an on-again off-again relationship, developed over fif-
ty years;  
 •    It is vital to the health of the world economy (emerging from a brutal shock 
to the financial system and adapting to new players).  
 •    It is effective in dealing with foreign policy challenges (for example Syria, 
Iran, North Korea)  
 •    We have the obligation and the wherewithal, particularly if working jointly, 
to deal with threats to our societies and humanity from cyber-terrorism, terror-
ism, WMDs, climate change, energy security and poverty. 
  
Perhaps we need to start thinking of EU-US relations as a 'Special Partnership' 
because it is like no other in the world in range and depth. In my own career, I 
have seen it endure and deepen through thick and thin, forged by common val-
ues, strategic objectives, but also by experience, by having been 'in the trenches' 
together in our response to the collapse of communism, to 9/11, to the financial 
crisis, the Arab Spring, Libya, Iran, North Korea, and now Syria.  
  
Economic & Financial Reasons  
 
No other economic relationship in the world is as integrated as the transatlantic 
economy. We still account for about half the world's GDP and about one third of 
all trade flows. We still define the shape of the global economy because either 
the US or the EU is the biggest trade and investment partner for almost all other 
countries in the world. Even if weakened by recession and challenged by new 
powerhouses that for the moment enjoy high growth rates, high employment and 
lower labor cost, the US and the EU are still the driving force behind innovation 
with most advances coming from science performed in our territories. Competi- 
 
2    Vale de Almeida 
 
tiveness is a challenge we both face, and we need to ensure that our efforts to 
curb public spending do not cut into the research and access to quality education 
that we need to remain in the game.  
  In Europe, we are tackling our jobs and growth issues on a variety of 
fronts including the Europe 2020 program, cross border educational exchanges, 
and of course through the post financial crisis measures to put our economies 
back on a growth trajectory.  
   In the EU-US context, the Transatlantic Economic Council remains an 
important instrument in achieving higher regulatory convergence and reducing 
red  tape.  The  High  Level  Growth  &  Jobs  initiative  launched  by  Presidents 
Obama, Barroso and Van Rompuy last autumn is also extremely good news. 
However, for this to become more than an initiative with promise, it needs the 
sustained support of politicians and of business leaders on both sides of the At-
lantic to truly make a difference. I am encouraged that things have got off to a 
running start as far as official contacts are concerned. 
  Multilaterally, there is still much to be gained from continued EU-US 
partnership. We need to ensure that our standards and approach to rule and policy 
making remain at the heart of the international system.  
 
A word about the financial crisis: 
 
The financial crisis has illustrated in a way no speech or op-ed could the level of 
integration of the EU-US economy. What began as a subprime mortgage crisis in 
California  eventually  sparked  off  the  crises  in  Greece,  Ireland  and  Portugal, 
threatening the core EU countries and our reputation and standing in the world. 
Over the past 18 months, I have had to explain to audiences all around the United 
States how and why it affected the weaker EU peripheral countries, the steps Eu-
rope is taking to deal with crisis and prevent a future one, and, the EU's commit-
ment to the euro and Greece. In a nutshell, I have tried to explain why dramatic 
headlines one day don't mean the end of the euro the next.  
  
From these encounters, it is clear that regular people still need to be reassured 
that the EU and the US will do all in their power to rein in the kind of behavior 
by governments and financial institutions that led to a full blown crisis. We owe 
it to our citizens, some of whom are living through harsh austerity measures, to 
make sure that it doesn't happen again. This means acting on both sides of the 
Atlantic to make sure our financial sectors are properly regulated, that we have 
effective oversight of our banks, and that our governments practice sound budg-
etary policy. In Europe we have made painful progress to put our house in order. 
We are not out of the woods yet. Shocks from other parts of the world would still 
be destabilizing, and we count on all our partners to help us in this effort.  
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 Foreign Policy 
 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the External Action Service of the EU is little over 
a year old, I think the EU-US partnership has stepped up its capacity to deal with 
several crises unfolding at the same time thanks to the strong engagement of 
HRVP Ashton and Secretary Clinton. 
 
  •    The Arab Spring: the EU and the US have worked extremely closely to nur-
ture the new impetus for democracy in several countries after decades of auto-
cratic regimes. Our leaders and our special envoys - Bernardino Leon (for the 
EU) and William Taylor (for the US) - continue to work together effectively and 
cohesively.  Particularly  in  Libya,  the  EU  and  its  member  states  have  shown 
strong leadership, commitment – even daring - and the United States has sup-
ported us in this effort.  
 •    Syria: with the UN estimating that more than 7,500 people have lost their 
lives, what is unfolding in Syria is a humanitarian disaster. Our sanctions against 
individuals and organizations appear to be working judging by defections from 
the regime. Whether or when to intervene as we did in Libya is a topic of some 
debate, though the differences between the two cases are obvious. We are urging 
President Assad to withdraw Syrian forces from besieged towns, to engage in a 
peaceful transition, and to allow immediate and unhindered access to those in 
need. Even though there is some speculation as to the extent of his control over 
the regime, international pressure is mounting for him to step aside and face the 
consequences for the brutal attacks on civilians by the Syrian regime. There must 
be a full investigation of what appears to be a gross violation of human rights and 
no lenience toward the perpetrators.  
 •    Iran: our tightening of sanctions on Iran is an example of the determination 
and solidarity of the EU and the United States to put an end to the nuclear ambi-
tions of Iran and the threat it poses in the region. The EU's oil embargo, and 
SWIFT's recent action to take away important life lines from the regime are sig-
nificant developments and an incentive to Iran to come back to the table. We 
must do everything in our power to ensure that upcoming negotiations with Iran 
achieve our shared objective and that tensions between Israel and Iran do not es-
calate.  
 •    Afghanistan: recent setbacks in the NATO mission in Afghanistan do not 
alter the fact that the EU and US remain essential partners in ongoing efforts to 
ensure a safe, democratic, self-sufficient and self-sustainable Afghan State, capa-
ble of exercising its sovereignty and protecting its citizens.  
 •    Balkans: our cooperation is as strong and as vital as ever. We are both com-
mitted to increased stability in the region and fostering closer ties with the EU. 
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 Global Challenges 
  
 •    Climate change: while the EU and the US do not always see eye to eye on 
this issue , for all the differences real and perceived, it is clear to me that there is 
a broad understanding among our populations that climatic conditions are chang-
ing and having devastating effects at home and in some parts of the globe. Even 
among climate change skeptics I still find openness to discuss the issue, particu-
larly if it is put in terms of water, development of clean energy and jobs. Nobody 
disputes that we have only one planet, with limited resources. This matter is 
hugely important to the EU. If we want to make progress at the global level, I 
believe the EU and US need to work together and that we need to show flexibil-
ity and practical leadership so we can move forward in a win-win kind of way.  
•    Counterterrorism: this is an area of intense cooperation which got underway 
right after and because of 9/11. Over the course of 10 years, we have achieved an 
extraordinary level of coordination, and our joint efforts have undoubtedly led to 
a safer world while still protecting the privacy and rights of EU citizens. The bot-
tom line is that EU-US objectives are clear, and our partnership in this area has 
definitely paid off.  
 •    Nuclear proliferation: the attempts to acquire nuclear capability among na-
tions not signatories to the NPT raise concern because of the potential of these 
weapons to destabilize. We are working closely to prevent Iran developing nu-
clear capability for military purposes and are extremely concerned about North 
Korea's planned satellite launch which we see as a violation of its international 
obligations. We join the US in urging North Korea to refrain from the launch as it 
would undermine ongoing diplomatic efforts to create an environment conducive 
for the resumption of the Six Party talks.  
 •    Human Rights: the EU and US we remain the champions of human rights in 
the world. Our joint approach and engagement has been particularly strong in 
supporting change in Burma and Belarus. Sadly, the abuse of human rights is a 
reality that we may never eradicate, and it will take ongoing vigilance, courage 
and determination from the United States and Europe to prevent it from debasing 
the lives of millions of people around the world. We must also continue to work 
together to eradicate poverty which prevents millions of people from living out 
their lives with dignity. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Though we are not at war, and relative to earlier generations have more comfort, 
freedom and security than they could have imagined, people here and in the US 
fear that the pace of global change is accelerating and the implications of it are 
unclear and out of their control. A war in one country can mean a wave of asy-
lum seekers in another. In an era of budget constraints, these kinds of issues need 
to be handled fairly and forthrightly. In our rapidly changing world, new chal-
lenges emerging everyday require the EU-US partnership to continue to grow.  
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I think it is important to remember that we are not entitled to world leadership 
because of our present economic size, but rather obligated by our common values 
and belief in democracy, the rule of law and human rights.  Only the United 
States and Europe have the experience, maturity and value set to cope with these 
challenges in a way that is beneficial not just for our bilateral interests, but also 
for the world. 
 
On our side, the EU will have to ensure that we give our new service the tools it 
needs to do the job, and do more to pool defense and security resources. We need 
to use all the tools at our disposal, bilaterally and multilaterally, to provide the 
leadership this world so badly needs.  
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The European Union Today: 
Crises, Hope and the Impact of Regional Integration 
   
Joaquín Roy 
 
Europe and Latin America are currently experiencing difficult times in regards to 
regional integration. Both regions are seeking to retrace their respective founda-
tions of inter-state cooperation of different degree and function during the past 
decades.  Such  milestones  are  the  Latin  American  Association  of  Free  Trade 
(ALALC in Spanish, 1960) and the Schuman Declaration of 1950, the birth of 
the European Cold and Steel Community (ECSC). However, both regional enti-
ties and institutional bodies have taken different paths and have produced much 
different results. Europe has made spectacular progress when one historically 
compares expansion, enlargement and its most important achievement, the Euro-
pean Union.  Meanwhile, Latin America has gone through a slow evolutionary 
process of its sub regional systems without a solid global initiative to include all 
countries south of the Rio Grande and Miami. 
  Today, both regions are immersed in uncertainty and doubt in terms of 
integration and economic development. The European Union (EU) is facing a 
major financial crisis which threatens its political spectrum. In Latin America, in 
addition  to  historically  installed  and  legally  respected  sub  regional  systems 
(MERCOSUR, CAN, SICA, CARICOM), there have been other proposals (AL-
BA,  UNASUR)  with  an integrative  purpose that  aim  for  different  objectives.  
Furthermore, some countries have joined free trade areas (such as Venezuela’s 
joining of MERCOSUR) both with the United States and with Europe.  The fail-
ure of ALCA, the risky mission led by the United States in 1995, as an apparent 
widening of the North American Free Trade Agreement (TLCAN-NAFTA), sug-
gested that Washington had opted for individual or limited territorial strategies 
(named “alquitas”).  In the face of uncertainty of its own autochthonous systems, 
some Latin American countries such as Perú and Colombia opted for taking the 
North American route. They also rushed to make alliances with the European 
Union, following the example of Chile.  
  In this setting, the European process is being questioned both internally 
and externally, due to economic uncertainty. However, it is important to note 
that, although the Treaty of Paris (1951) initiated the ECSC and based itself on 
economic goals of a common market with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, founding 
the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC)  and  the  European  Community  of 
Atomic Energy (EUROATOM), the main objective was always a political union. 
Today, the weakness and instability of the Eurozone threatens the EU as a whole.  
  Latin American integration has faltered since its inception due to its in-
grained  weaknesses,  which  are  difficult  to  overcome.    Nationalism  and 
presidentialism as a juridical method of government remain under the impact of a 
strong populism. From independence to the modern day, the majority of Latin  
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American countries have not met the challenge of nation building, thinking that 
the state would fulfill that function accordingly. The problem is that national 
identity, an inclusive project in the Renan concept of the “daily plebiscite”, is an 
elusive  goal,  still  an  object  of  study  for  intellectuals.  The  feeling  of  non-
membership to the national project by a majority of the population of many coun-
tries impedes the integration of the states themselves. Hence, Latin American 
identity remains an elusive dream, albeit necessary for a rigorous integration; 
furthermore, it is not a priority for citizens or governments.  
   
Europe at a Crossroads 
 
A rough overview of the front covers of major European and American newspa-
pers and news broadcasts over the past two years, and especially the past few 
months, provides a truly spectacular and alarming mosaic. The recent panorama 
is dominated by the financial crisis of Greece, with its labor strikes and institu-
tional paralysis, the threat of bankruptcy and its negative effect on the euro. It has 
been alarmingly estimated that the common currency would not survive if the 
crisis continued. This would in turn cause the EU to become a divided Europe, 
similar to the division of the Roman Empire. The dream founded in 1950 would 
disappear. 
  Historical and traditional political parties with a strong presence in the 
European Parliament (EP) have been unable to meet the demands of the unem-
ployed, whose retirement lies in the distant future, and, worse yet, recent highly 
qualified university graduates face an uncertain future. Thousands have taken to 
the streets and squares of various European capitals, following the example of 
Madrid and Barcelona (whom some mistakenly compare to the movement which 
overthrew Mubarak in Cairo). As an alternative, new ultra-right movements with 
messages reminiscent of the Nazi-Fascist regimes of Germany and Italy have 
developed in place of the leftist movement gaining force, as was the norm in the 
first half of the Twentieth Century. 
  Meanwhile, a series of uncontrolled and unstoppable mass migrations 
has been triggered due to the deterioration of the political changes on the south-
ern slope of the Mediterranean. EU Member States have responded with drastic 
measures. They have called for the urgent closure of borders, which presents the 
possibility of having the Schengen agreement become a vague footnote in the 
unfortunate new phase of European history. Moreover, the strengthening of na-
tional legislation would mean a rebirth of the worst European demons: national-
ism, racism, discrimination and retaliation against minorities. According to the 
(exaggerated) predictions of some observers, new continental wars were to have 
been triggered. 
  No country from the Algarve region to Athens (and beyond, to Istanbul) 
is safe from the threat of serious disaster. Successive bank collapses are occur-
ring, with stratospheric private and governmental debt piling up, an unsustainable 
deficit, an alarming rise in unemployment, and noticeable dangerous reactions of 
a nationalist and racist nature. In short, the process of European integration is  
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being seriously questioned. The area of the Mediterranean, divided since the de-
mise of the Roman "Mare Nostrum", is showing signs of a paradoxical consen-
sus.  Some  southern  countries  are  experiencing  seismic  political  changes;  the 
northern countries are suffering a serious crisis which threatens to affect the rest 
of the Union. Changes in the South have already left a mark on the political fu-
ture of the neighbors to the North. 
  The current situation of the EU is reminiscent of the long period of what 
was called "Eurosclerosis" and "Europessimism" of the 1970s, and more recent-
ly, the rejection of the European Constitution. The halt to the process of integra-
tion was brilliantly overcome by the adoption and implementation of the Single 
European Act (SEA) of 1986, under the effective leadership of the president of 
the European Commission Jacques Delors, and the constitutional impasse result-
ed in the elaboration of the Treaty of Lisbon, in effect a miniature "Constitution”. 
The current crises are now more elaborate, among other reasons because of the 
notable effect of globalization and the irresponsible financial conduct of the first 
world power, the United States. 
  A dangerous group of symptoms, which threatens to become a chronic 
disease, has affected the most powerful economies of the EU, including two of its 
key states, France and Germany. The economic distress has challenged the lead-
ership of both countries, unable to take the reins of the EU, as had historically 
occurred. Depending on the vote of their ideological sectors, as in the rest of the 
European Union, decisions have been made (or not) in Paris and Berlin which 
have contributed few solutions to the crisis and have failed to produce clear signs 
of improvement. On the contrary, ambivalence and contradictions, in addition to 
simple populist discourse, has alarmed EU observers and leaders who believe 
that, at the moment, the worst solution for the EU is re-nationalization. 
  It is true that the Arab socio-political explosion on the southern slope of 
the Mediterranean has surprised leaders and analysts, although many experts had 
already warned in the past of the unsustainability of the status quo. Also, circum-
stances have forced the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and the United King-
dom (as well as other countries according to their abilities, as it is the case of 
Spain) to make sensitive decisions. The truth remains that the strength of the up-
risings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have revealed that the European powers are 
guilty of willingly being blackmailed for decades by autocrats of the southern 
slope, in exchange for ensuring stability. What remains to be seen is whether the 
reaction of each of the Governments was proper according to the emergency. The 
implementation of measures taken for internal solutions is also questionable. 
  The current situation shows that the European Union, through its institu-
tions, is seen as a distant entity, unable to meet the daily needs and demands of 
its citizens. The consolidation of the common market, which was the promise of 
the  Treaty  of  Rome  of  1957  and  then  legally  executed  with  the  SEA,  and 
strengthened by successive documents since Maastricht, has been evaluated as an 
unfulfilled mission that has not produced day to day benefits. The rise of the cost 
of living and the current financial crisis are attributed to the adoption of the euro.  
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It has been the preferred scapegoat, mostly due to banking interests, which has 
protected them from the ire of citizens.  
  Overall, it seems that what was once possible with the SEA is no longer 
convenient  for  EU  states,  and  is  explained  by  the  theory  of  "liberal 
intergovernamentalism". Governments are torn between the stark realities of the 
conditions of membership of the EU and its benefits. It seems that Europe is 
again  experiencing  an  era  that  can  be  explained  by  Hoffman’s 
“governmentalism”. It is said often that the so-called “Monnet method” has been 
exhausted. David Mitrany’s functionalism and Ernst Haars’ neofunctionalism are 
a thing of the past. The theory of an economic and social sector “spill-over” 
seems to make no sense in a materially globalized planet, when the contrary 
should currently be the norm. 
 
II 
 
Causes of Distrust toward the European Process 
 
The current unrest in Europe and the lack of effective responses to tackle the 
economic, social and political crisis hides a confusing web of causes and hypo-
thetical explanations. First, the apparent deterioration in the functioning of the 
EU, reflected in the gradually low participation in elections to the Parliament has 
several roots, each worthy of separate analysis. Above all, it should be noted that 
the memory of war has been fading. This sentiment is most evident in the heart of 
the founding countries that were responsible for the outbreak of conflict (Germa-
ny), those which suffered occupation (BENELUX) and those who had experi-
enced the humiliation of invasion, internal betrayal, and collaboration (France 
and Italy). 
  The tragedy and consequences that surrounded the founding fathers of 
the EU inspired in them the need to find an effective remedy to "make war some-
thing unthinkable and materially impossible" (according to the Schuman Declara-
tion). New generations only identify World War II as a chapter in a distant past 
history. It is inserted in volumes collecting dust on the shelves of libraries and is 
merely revived in documentaries regularly generated by television stations or in a 
handful of films (primarily of Hollywood origin). The thought of war is no longer 
the engine of integration. 
This aspect is so pronounced in the German case that it can be consid-
ered the nucleus of new symbols of identity that lie between the faults of the past 
and the present reality, moving toward a future free of repentance and continuous 
redemption. A current majority opinion considers that the tragedies of the past 
are unrelated to the issue of the new generations that are not identified with the 
mistakes of their parents and grandparents. They consider that the payment paid 
by the Division during the cold war and the efforts in the reconstruction of their 
own society and the contribution to the European process have met more than the 
demands of the victorious powers and neighbors who were victims of the Nazi 
madness. These sectors, not necessarily identified with some distinguishable so- 
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cio-economic strata, are now wondering if they should subsidize the financial 
mistakes of other countries, while resisting the dilution of a rebuilt national iden-
tity by immigration. In sum, Germany has fulfilled more than its EU quota, and it 
is because of this that there exist doubts about whether or not to shore up to the 
euro and at what cost. 
  On the other hand, just as the so-called "German miracle" was in its time 
the  motor  of  the  EU,  the  organization  of  EU  integration  has  nothing  to  be 
ashamed of in its balance of achievements. Paradoxically, while being chastised 
for its alleged failure, the EU has achieved more than its share of primary objec-
tives. In its subsequent institutional transformations, accumulation of skills, and 
increase in the number of members, the EU has eliminated territorial wars, alt-
hough in its outskirts (former Yugoslavia) there have been bloody confrontations, 
and there remain a number of open wounds. The plague of homegrown terrorism 
is on its way to being completely eliminated. After the demise of the Irish Repub-
lican Army (IRA) years ago, the criminal violence of Basque ETA has come to a 
permanent ceasefire and is expected to end. This panorama encourages some to 
believe that the EU is no longer necessary, a parallel reasoning that was once ap-
plied to NATO –its founding reason (the Soviet threat) ceased to exist. 
  While many sectors of the economy and integrated community life are 
classified as effective, their benefits are now taken for granted. It seems that a 
bureaucratic model is not necessary in order to support what is considered nor-
mal. This is another achievement of the welfare state, such as paid leave, unem-
ployment benefits, affordable public transport, and a decent retirement pension. 
Finally, the EU would have died of success, when it barely exceed the age of six-
ty, less than the current life expectancy in Europe. This logic, however, ends up 
reducing the signs of the welfare state and progressive ideology to a mere eco-
nomic conquest, such as monetary entitlements. 
 
The Institutional Framework 
 
Meanwhile, on the surface the main institutions of the EU continue to function as 
if almost nothing had happened. A walk through Brussels does not inspire a con-
templation of battles between the staff of the Commission and the Council. There 
are no science fiction images, such as the ruins of the Berlaymont building or the 
Caprice des Dieux, as the people of Strasbourg call the Parliament Louise Weiss 
building, due to it resembling a Camembert cheese package. The only alterca-
tions are caused by periodic protests by farmers who claim the continuation of 
aid of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the human rights activists on 
the outskirts of the EU or in underdeveloped regions. Meanwhile, the almost 
20,000 lobbyists continue their similar tenacious labor of observation and influ-
ence on a number of officials and legislators. Now, however, more sound demon-
strations by members of the expansionist movement of the 15-M, founded in 
Madrid and Barcelona, have been duplicated in squares around the world. 
  The institutions based in Luxembourg (primarily the Court of Justice) 
continue their role as systematically and quietly as in the past, as if they were still  
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awaiting the accompaniment of the rest, as initially planned. In Strasbourg, voic-
es of alarm about the future of the EU are only heard during the three or four 
days monthly devoted to plenary meetings, but the real decisions are left to Brus-
sels. Ultimately, all remain faithful keepers of the maxima of Jean Monnet, in-
spired by the Swiss philosopher Frederic Amiel. "All is possible by the action of 
men, but nothing is permanent without the work of the institutions…the pillars of 
civilization”.  
  The EU continues to be the combination of laws and the institutions that 
have put them into effect. At the moment, those that make up the political and 
legal constitutional framework have avoided becoming mere bureaucracies, as is 
the unfortunate and frequent case of other organizations. The difference, follow-
ing Monnet logic, is that the necessary minimum of independence and autonomy 
has been conserved, and they have been equipped with appropriate budgets need-
ed in order to continue fulfilling its functions.  In spite of the erroneous reputa-
tions and the high salaries of personnel, the cost of EU maintenance is less than 
what it costs to run an average European city. It costs more to run Hamburg, 
Manchester, Valencia, Lyon or Gothenburg than it does to run the EU. This is a 
positive fact, especially if one considers that the majority of laws that are ap-
proved in EU countries originally stem from EU community legislation.   
  However, a deeper analysis of the functioning of the institutions at a per-
sonal level reveals that the EU is going through a phase of disturbing pessimism, 
especially at those levels which have existed long enough to have a comparative 
perspective. That generation which is approaching retirement level longingly re-
members the energy and feeling of autonomy that existed at the end of the 1980s 
and almost the rest of the previous century. The end of the Santer Commission 
can be identified as the beginning of a new era. The apparent rise of the Parlia-
ment could be considered a victory for the legislative branch; in reality, the win-
ner of the crisis was the Council. It was time for the counterattack executed by 
inter-governmentalism.  Only  the  implementation  of  the  Constitution  project 
brought about a fresh air of federalism. But with the failure of the adoption of the 
text and the tortuous drafting of the Treaty of Lisbon, everything went back as it 
was. The EU was not going through the best moments of its history. 
 
European DNA under Scrutiny 
 
All of these problems and current gaps occur at a time when there had been a 
confluence of European identity signs that made the continent stand out from the 
rest, with which, however, it shares universal values, in the general sense of the 
term. The accusations coming from abroad which state that Europe does not exist 
and that its boundaries are unknown have no foundation and can be refuted with 
the opposite argument: Europeans are sure of what they are not. They do not ac-
cept as their own those customs which are considered foreign and harmful to 
shared beliefs and their own myths. These differences exist even in comparison  
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with those countries that form part of the so-called Western world (most of the 
Americas and Oceania).  
  For example, it is clear that Europeans are more inclined towards the 
achievement of collective projects instead of accepting the primacy of individual 
success, as is the symptomatic case of the United States. The priority given to the 
benefits of the welfare state is not challenged. When governments have experi-
mented with restrictive measures they have failed. This quality is not only per-
ceptible in Southern Europe, a region that is accused of taking advantage of the 
benefits of protecting the State, but also remains strong in Germany. In the Nor-
dic countries, the social support system is strong and willingly accepts the tax 
burden due to the benefits attached: good schools, safe public transport, excellent 
healthcare, and generous financial coverage in case of work related injury or re-
tirement. The chosen path, if there are options, is optimally protection from birth 
to death, ratified by elections in which no party dares to suggest its dismantling, 
  In another area of shared values, Europe as a reflection of its cultural 
diversity, which is considered a positive legacy, leans toward cosmopolitanism 
and tends to avoid provincialism. External trends and fashions have been incor-
porated in addition to the local customs, as was the case during the Roman Em-
pire. As a counterpart, the spirit of modern Europe has considered it an obligation 
to spread artistic and literary, economic, and political leanings to the rest of hu-
manity. The civilizing mission, despite decolonization, is still very much alive.  
  Far beyond the mere separation of church and state, secularism has be-
come a creed in a continent where religion has historically been inherent to polit-
ical evolution. While in other regions religion has become an irreplaceable ingre-
dient (Middle East) or has had a more noticeable influence (United States), in 
Europe there is a (alarming for many) decline in the practical canon of beliefs. 
Religion is being reduced to a historical relic. The papal message of the decline 
of religious practice in certain countries (Spain, notoriously) and the unfortunate 
loss of religious vocations clashes in many countries (with some exceptions, such 
as Poland) and has been damaged by the discovery of sexual abuses committed 
by a minority of the clergy. The questioning by religious experts about what is 
considered the right wing shift in doctrine has raised doubts in the members of 
the Catholic Church, a trend that explains the failure of the Vatican insisting on 
the inclusion of Christianity as an explicit reference of European legacy in the 
text of the Constitutional project. 
  Finally, as a result of the initial momentum to curb the European wars, 
EU States have been gradually affected by the reduction of military expenditures, 
a trend that has alarmed the United States. The last two decades, after the end of 
the Cold War, Washington has noticed the reluctance of European governments 
to  increase  the  budgets for  defense.  Interestingly,  with the  threat  of Moscow 
gone, NATO has been looking for a way to renew itself. The goal has shifted to 
maintain a conventional and nuclear umbrella over the Western half of Europe, 
but to provide resources that are broadly labeled "defense". While the United 
States has managed to maintain a fully voluntary and professional armed forces 
(for the displeasure of some politicians and military ranks), the progressive dis- 
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appearance of conscription in Europe and the adjustment of budgets have called 
into question the military  capability of most countries (with the exception of 
United Kingdom and France). 
  As a result, analysts looking for innovative theses have proposed that 
there is something inherent in the behavior and political psyche of both conti-
nents  which  clearly  contrasts,  makes  the  confluence  of  criteria  difficult,  and 
sometimes impedes the building of coalitions, as in the case of NATO and opera-
tions in Iraq. In a Copernican switch, Europe decided to opt for another alterna-
tive in place of trying to resolve all conflicts and disagreements with military 
force, but a number of countries have given in to the demands of Washington. 
This has led to the belief that Europeans hail from Venus, while the Americans 
with a Realist and Hobbesian vision are from Mars. 
  In contrast to the support for collective projects and an aversion toward 
the primacy of the individual, signs of governmental and individual selfishness 
have been emerging in recent years. At the state level, there is the temptation of 
abandoning the practice of subsidiaries, the hallmark of the EU system. There 
have been cracks in the division of labor and at all government levels (local, na-
tional, European). The Christian Democratic notion of charity has been ques-
tioned in a continent that has been historically affected by inequality, hatred and 
mistrust. The idea that charity begins at home is now favored, and which can be 
seen in German taxpayers’ frustration with the practice of subsidizing reckless 
and irresponsible states (extreme case of Greece). 
In that context, the negative nationalist reactions to the impact of the cri-
sis and internal tensions in some states were examined with care, and also some 
haste, when searching for reasons to justify the new restrictive measures in order 
to expand and further the integration process. During the effective incorporation 
of ten new states (eight of them under the Soviet yoke for four long decades), a 
certain remorse for the hastening of the EU enlargement process was being de-
tected. What was justified at the time as being a way to correct what was consid-
ered a historical injustice (the division of Europe by the Berlin wall and the iron 
curtain), the spectacular growth from 18 member states to 27 became the scape-
goat for explaining the internal problems of the EU. Although the incorporation 
of the "neutrals" (Sweden, Austria, Finland) did not represent a problem, since 
their economic level and political development were on par with the rest of the 
Union of 15 (if not more), the digestion of several former members of the War-
saw Pact was difficult to digest. This is why Romania and Bulgaria had to wait 
for effective membership, which is still questioned today, among other economic 
reasons because of the high levels of corruption that have shaken the political 
systems.  
 
This volume 
 
The papers included in this volume are the edited result of a seminar held at the 
University of Miami, under the rubric of the title of this compilation:  “The State 
of the Union (s): Comparative regional integration and the EU model”, held on  
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February 24, 2012, in the setting of the University of Miami School of Business, 
under the co-sponsorship of its Center for International Business Education and 
Research (CIBER). The seminar was sponsored and organized by the Miami-
Florida European Union Center of Excellence (MFEUCE), a consortium of Flor-
ida International University and the University of Miami, and the Jean Monnet 
Chair of the University of Miami. Other co-sponsors were the Miller Center for 
Contemporary Judaic Studies, the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS), 
and the American Jewish Committee (AJC). 
The proceedings were inaugurated by opening remarks offered by João 
Vale de Almeida, Ambassador of the European Union to the United States, who 
was welcomed by Manuel Santos (head of the Economics Department) and Le-
onidas Bachas (Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences). Rebecca Friedman 
(Florida  International  University,  co-director  of  MFEUCE),  and  Ambler  H. 
Moss, Jr. (professor of International Studies), Haim Shaked (head of the Miller 
Center), and Ariel Armony (Director of the Center for Latin American Studies, 
University of Miami) acted as chairs of the sessions, channeling questions and 
comments. The logistics of the seminar were effectively coordinated by Maxime 
Larivé (Jean Monnet Fellow, 2011-12), Alfonso Camiñas-Muiña (Robert Schu-
man Fellow, 2011-2012), and Dina Moulioukova (Ph. D. Graduate Assistant). 
Luis Vidal, James Aggrey and Jonathan Wirch (the staff of the Technical Support 
Unit of the College of Arts and Sciences) provided their customary irreplaceable 
services before, during and after the seminar, and most especially in the editing 
process.      
The general theme of the seminar and this volume is that the dramatic 
events of 2011 in the context of the European Union have forced analysts and 
scholars to reflect on what kind of entity the EU will become in the next decade. 
Simultaneously, regional political integration and cooperation have been devel-
oping at a fast pace around the globe, creating great expectations and much con-
fusion. The latest decisions of the EU Council have opened the door to an un-
known chapter of European history. Consequently, the EU model or reference 
has suffered the impact of these factors and presents today a different face than 
decades ago, and offers somewhat different challenges to be met. A set of ques-
tions dominates the news scene: What is the state of the Union(s)? Which direc-
tion is the EU going to take? How does the rest of the world understand regional 
integration?  What are the consequences and impact of the current EU crisis on 
international business? Is the EU model, along normative and “soft” power, still 
valid? What standard or new theories can best be applied to explain new reali-
ties?  The papers of this volume aim at addressing these and other questions in 
four thematic blocs.  
The first part is dedicated to the interrelated questions of what the EU is, 
what it does, and what it wants to do to meet the present challenges. Markus 
Thiel addresses the fundamental issue of European identity in the new century, in 
which he proposes that the entity has been moving from “external marker to in-
ternalized  practice.”  He  reviews  the  current  conceptualizations  of  ‘European 
identity’, provides a practice-based account of transnational identity development  
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anchored in solidarity, and problematizes an internally-focused identity in light 
of the current geopolitical challenges. John McCormick asks in a rather ironic 
sense, “What has the EU ever done for us?”, a question of humorous resonances. 
In his paper he reflects on some of the achievements of integration, the dynamics 
of the public debate on integration and possible future scenarios, and asks wheth-
er the present crisis represents a structural and policy failure or a failure to truly 
understand the character and possibilities of regional integration. In a paper that 
functions as a hinge with the next euro-related chapters, Manuel Porto analyzes 
the Strategy Europe 2020 as a means to meet the challenge of globalization, as 
well as two other “long-term challenges”: “pressure on resources” and “aging 
population”.  He  notes  that  the  Strategy  establishes  three  priorities:  “smart 
growth”, “sustainable growth” and “inclusive growth”. In a realist way, there is 
also a concentration in a small number of feasible targets, a higher commitment 
of EU institutions (in particular of the Council), and of all levels of intervention 
in each country. The Strategy is strongly based on the markets, an aspect special-
ly stressed by “a stronger, deeper, extended single market vital for growth and 
job creation”. It is not a protectionist strategy because “global growth will open 
up new opportunities for Europe´s exports and competitive access to vital mar-
kets”.  
Alfred Tovias provides an introduction to the second bloc directly deal-
ing with the sensitive topic of the Eurozone. He rephrases in a critical way an old 
Spanish saying (“la unión hace la fuerza”). This wisdom only applies if there is 
solidarity between the members of the group, and if each member proves con-
stantly to the others that he is acting as agreed, and not simply using the others, 
as this would erode the sense of solidarity among members. This logic applies to 
the Eurozone because it is not an Optimum Currency Area (OCA). In conse-
quence, either the two conditions above are verified, or members that are not 
conforming to the OCA criteria exit the union, in which case there is no need for 
the two conditions to hold.  For their part, George Zestos and Tatiana Rizova 
tackle jointly the U.S. Subprime Mortgage crisis and the European Sovereign 
Debt. Their study identifies several factors that impede Europe’s recovery from 
the crisis --the treaties that established the European Union (EU) and the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the dynamic of the domestic electoral 
and coalition politics. María Lorca offers an SWOT analysis. She presents an 
evaluation of how this crisis has affected the Eurozone by studying the weak-
nesses and threats that the project is facing, as well as what opportunities and 
strengths this crisis might bring if politicians, society, and markets  work together 
to overcome this situation. In terms of strengths, she explains the role of the Eu-
ropean Central Bank. The main weakness during this crisis has been the attitude 
of society who has vented its fears as its purchasing power, and living standards 
have been jeopardized. Finally, Vivien Schmidt relates the Eurozone with the 
wider issue of democracy. Her main argument is that the Eurozone crisis is not 
only economic, but also political.  This affects EU governance, national govern-
ments, and the democratic legitimacy of both.  For the EU, the deepening of Eu-
rozone economic governance, in particular with the so-called ‘European semes- 
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ter’ (EU Commission vetting of national budgets), raises questions about the le-
gitimacy of this kind of ‘throughput’ process, which lacks ‘input’ legitimacy, and 
may not have any ‘output’ legitimacy either if continued budgetary austerity pro-
duces recession and no growth.  
The compilation then turns its focus into the external dimension of the 
current crisis. Joachim Koops considers the setting of the ample relationship of 
the EU with the wider scenario of the international organizations. His comments 
on the achievements, impact and limitations of the ‘The European Union as an 
Inter-organizational Actor’. The paper argues that despite intensified relations 
and institutionalized cooperation schemes, the EU has pursued a strategy of inter-
organizational cooperation that seems to have been more beneficial for the inter-
nal build-up of its CSDP and external visibility, and less aimed at reinforcing the 
partner organizations. There is a need for a more ‘genuine’ implementation of 
effective multilateralism, which would benefit both the impact and reputation of 
the EU as an international actor as well as the development of more coherent and 
effective  forms  of  global  governance.  Jolyon  Howorth  deals  with  the  ever-
present enigma of the role of the European Union as a model for regional re-
gimes. He notes that, since the end of the Cold War, there has been an emergence 
of more than fifty regional regimes of an increasingly political type. These blocs 
have generated a virtual explosion of academic analysis, developing a sub-field 
of ‘comparative regionalism’. One of the key debates is the extent to which the 
European Union is perceived around the world as a model to be emulated. The 
EU developed in response to European issues, challenges and conditions. Some 
of the processes it has generated may be replicable in other parts of the world. A 
theory of diffusion might argue that emulation has taken place. But when one 
examines precisely how the respective institutions actually function and what 
they represent within the entire system, the less possible it becomes to claim 
meaningful comparability. Astrid Boening’s paper shifts focus to the south of 
the EU in a region that has been building: the Mediterranean. The European Un-
ion’s (EU) foreign policy towards its southern neighbors is currently anchored in 
institutions such as the Union for the Mediterranean. The paper addresses how 
effectively the EU will be able to “manage” its southern neighborhood with soft 
power alone in the evolving de-stabilizations in North Africa and the Middle 
East, when security financing will likely be compromised in the future.  
Shifting attention to the Western Hemisphere, Finn Laursen tackles the 
issue  of  comparative  regional integration,  specifically  taking  into  account  the 
cases of NAFTA and MERCOSUR. His paper highlights the fact that the found-
ing fathers of the EU invented a new model which put emphasis on autonomous 
supranational institutions.  Laursen  then  takes  a look  at  how  other integration 
schemes, NAFTA and MERCOSUR in particular, have tried to secure ‘credible 
commitments’. The main variables discussed include: the degree of openness of 
the original  contract  to  start  an  integration  process,  the  degree  of  asymmetry 
among the main participants, the degree of pooling and delegation of authority, 
and the availability of leadership to overcome collective action problems. An-
drés Malamud points out the return of sovereignty to central stage, with the re- 
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sult  of  Latin  American  weakening  of  integration.  He  directly  claims  that 
MERCOSUR has failed to meet its goals. All other regionalist projects in Latin 
America fare even worse, and yet, they have ironically fostered domestic democ-
racy, economic reforms and the consolidation of regional security communities. 
In the midst of a growing gap between treaties and facts, regional elites have re-
sponded by signing additional protocols, building up powerless institutions and 
voicing rhetorical statements. The paper also evaluates MERCOSUR’s perfor-
mance in the context of Brazil’s global emergence to show how the strengthening 
of national sovereignty - as opposed to its pooling or delegation - is at the heart 
of all regionalist strategies.  
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Abstract 
 
In view of the overall political and economic crises that the European Union 
(EU) has found itself in the past few years, starting with the constitutional rejec-
tion and continuing with the Euro-crisis, the question of the existence of a com-
mon ‘European identity’ or better, of Europeanized national identities, has moved 
to the forefront. This is not only a self-referential or academic debate, but has 
deep repercussions for the future integration of Europe, and the potential model-
ing for other regional blocs. This essay reviews some of the current conceptuali-
zations of ‘European identity’, provides a practice-based account of transnational 
identity development anchored in the concept of solidarity, and problematizes an 
internally-focused identity in light of the geopolitical challenges of the early 21
st 
century. Particularly in times of crisis, transnational solidarity provides a more 
optimal, internalized understanding of ‘European identity’. 
 
 
 
Introduction: the (Ir)relevance of Identity for EU Integration 
 
There has never been such a lengthy and momentous crisis as the one that the EU 
finds itself in this period of (dis)integration, starting with the constitutional rejec-
tion and continuing with the Euro-crisis. Hence, the question of a common Euro-
pean identity – or, to be more specific, Europeanized transnational identities - has 
moved to the forefront. This has deep repercussions for the future integration of 
Europe, and the potential modeling effect on other regional blocs. Simultaneous-
ly,  identity-based  conceptualizations  of  the  common  polity  have  increasingly 
been debated, so that an assessment of theoretical approaches and empirical find- 
 
24    Thiel 
 
ings is more relevant than ever. A common, transnational identity is customarily 
conceptualized as being based on the EU’s integration policies. The EU, howev-
er, transformed only 20 years ago from an economic bloc to a political Union. 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which contained far-reaching po-
litical initiatives such as, for instance, the development of a Common Foreign & 
Security Policy, an internal Justice and Security pillar, concrete plans for the 
common currency and a (largely nominal) EU citizenship, many Europeans today 
experience a host of socio-political commonalities in the polity shaped by Brus-
sels. Politicians and academics alike refer to the EU’s harmonization of policies 
and  homogenization  of  living  conditions  as  bases  for  a  viable  feeling  of 
Europeanness, as the historical memory of the continent, despite its common cul-
tural connections and monarchial linkages, is tainted by the traumatic experienc-
es of the (World) wars. Considering contemporary internal tensions and geopolit-
ical external challenges, what are sustainable ways of creating and living ‘Euro-
pean identity’ in the future? In this essay, I review some of the current conceptu-
alizations of ‘European identity’, provide an alternative, practice-based account 
of transnational identity development anchored in the concept of solidarity, and 
problematize an internally-focused identity in light of the geopolitical challenges 
of the early 21
st century.  
  Aside  from  being  a  historic-cultural  and  contemporary  socio-political 
marker, ‘European identity’ has an important spatial function: the continent is 
crisscrossed with border-transcending rivers, lakes, and mountain chains, whose 
sovereignty was fought over and shared as well, and the close contiguity of the 
member states has developed into a tight-knit network of pan-European trade – 
and transport links, with corresponding political consequences. From a historical 
perspective, the territorial unification of Europe was largely completed by the 
culturally European, but politically estranged, countries of the former Warsaw 
Pact that joined the Union in the past decade. These accessions were politically 
instrumentalized and ambiguously depicted as a ‘return to Europe’, particularly 
because these countries always understood themselves as integral geographic and 
cultural parts of the continent, even when separated by the Iron Curtain. It be-
comes evident that such a primarily spatial-cultural comprehension of European 
identity is problematic, just as the appropriation of ‘Europe’ through the EU ap-
pears problematic: for one, a few states such as Switzerland or Norway con-
sciously decline the integration into the bloc, and on the other hand, the high-
lighting of geo-spatial characteristics and delimitations hides other, more politi-
cally contentious issues (such as the arguments used to rail against Turkish EU 
membership on the basis of culture, religion or territory). 
Such a spatially-defined notion focuses tendentiously and primarily on 
EU-internal commonalities  and  external  demarcations,  thereby  contributing  to 
the ideational reinforcement of the concept of ‘Fortress Europe’. It attempts to 
recreate an outdated imitation of national states that formed in the 18
th and 19
th 
centuries (and which is  polemically termed a ‘European Superstate’ by those 
fearing greater integration), despite the fact that the postwar continental identity 
was supposed to overcome the national divisions that led to both World Wars. In  
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practice, such fortification is achieved through institutionalized border and refu-
gee policies such as those coordinated by the Schengen agreement or the external 
border agency Frontex, or, more subtly, pursued through a communalization of 
the Common Agricultural Policy, which artificially prevents many food produc-
ers from outside the common market to enter it in the first place. An identity and 
integration process, viewed this way, perceives itself primarily as a Eurocentric 
buffer against the challenges of a globalized world, rather than an open, multilat-
erally oriented region. 
Historically, ‘European Identity’ as pronounced by the EU was in part 
stimulated by larger geopolitical tensions. Newer research interprets the initial 
1973 Declaration of European Identity as a reaction to the belittling position of 
the U.S., which saw itself as a preeminent global power that aimed at relegating 
Europe to a regional one (Gfeller 2010). According to this view, a common iden-
tity was posited based on common political values and norms, but in part also on 
geopolitical aspirations, and in largely French opposition to American hegemonic 
ambitions. A contemporary parallel was conjured up in 2003, when in opposition 
to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Europe’s most well-known social philosophers, Jür-
gen Habermas & Jacques Derrida pronounced a pacific European identity as op-
posing U.S. unilateral foreign policy; this ‘thin’, externally-referenced identity 
disappeared, however, quickly when in the aftermath of the military strike inner-
European differences emerged on how to react to this crisis, with some stressing 
transatlantic support, others neutrality, and others an independent European posi-
tion. In the past few years, similar tensions have become visible in the EU- and 
Schengen-accession  processes,  in  which  polarizing  statements  on  the 
Europeanness of candidate states were made, thus discursively creating in- and 
outsiders rather than a convergence and integration of candidate states into par-
ticipants. All of these incidents reinforce that the concept of European identity 
should not refer mainly to a constitutive quality, but to a creative process that is 
contingent  on  transnational  European  practices  which  generates  transnational 
identification, tolerance and cohesion. Such notion of identity avoids a static, 
endogenous application of the term in favor of continual internalization and so-
cialization. 
The first decade of the new century has shown that its geopolitical chal-
lenges require the EU to act simultaneously in a concerted manner, while con-
ducting a differentiated multilateral foreign policy cognizant of how external dip-
lomatic and economic relations impact upon the perception of the EU as global 
actor, and of how growing (im)migrant populations within the Union integrate 
their diasporic linkages and ties. Yet with the onset of the Eurocrisis, increasingly 
the internal relations of member states in the region are highlighted international-
ly, and intra-European variations in political culture (such as differences in atti-
tudes towards governance or economic competitiveness, to name a few) are used 
as explanatory variables for the larger macro-economic problem. Internally, the 
EU is already institutionally challenged and operates in-between existing supra-
national laws and policies and the guarded prerogatives of the member states (in 
addition to balancing out the different policy stances between governments them- 
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selves). Examples abound and are evident in EU-internal consensus-finding, as 
with the divergent approaches towards strengthening the financial and fiscal poli-
cies of the Eurozone, the confusing assignment of leadership in the Union, or the 
opaqueness of the external policy formulation, with the problem-ridden European 
External Action Service or the various across policy-sectors segmented neigh-
borhood  agreements and partnerships,  being  cases in  point.  Although  a  basic 
consensus on common values and interests is necessary for cohesive international 
action, and accordingly is formulated within the treaties, these remain fairly ab-
stract and general, just as the period of introspection following the failed EU-
Constitution appears futile in hindsight. At the same time, the Union’s integra-
tion-activism, in terms of both deepening of policies and widening of member-
ship, combined with a largely top-down engineered identification policy based on 
symbolism and elite exchanges, causes consternation and disorientation among 
EU publics. This is ever truer in the realm of the EU, where for centuries, fairly 
homogenous societies have oriented themselves towards the nation-state model – 
as evidenced in the Eurobarometer surveys according to which a consistent ma-
jority, while expressing a varying degree of affinity for the EU and Europe, pri-
marily relates to their country. 
The EU’s external identity in international relations is reflected to the 
degree to which existing and new member states become socialized and internal-
ize a stance of solidarity, acting in accordance to the European norms spelled out 
in the Treaty preambles and other major documents, such as the now legally 
binding Charter of Fundamental Rights. These common normative and increas-
ingly legal, references do not only constitute a self-referencing ideal, but also a 
significant challenge for the EU as global actor. The bloc, with the ongoing debt 
crisis  and  institutional  reform  attempts,  is  in  danger  of  becoming  irrelevant 
among the emerging powers from the Global South. Important policies are still 
preferably treated by many global powers in traditional bilateral ways, at times 
neglecting the Union and its laborious consensus-finding process, and the rise of 
the BRICS-states puts even more pressure on the Union to effectively be repre-
sented on the international stage. An added problem is that few partners have an 
understanding of the ways the EU functions, and they possess a sovereign per-
spective on many issues that the EU appropriates as communal in the European 
realm. No matter if one regards the U.S.’s suspicion of centralized or suprana-
tional governance, the anti-colonial attitudes expressed by many African or Asian 
countries, or the Middle Eastern criticism of the EU as secular-liberal and deca-
dent – the EU’s ideational appeal is universally contested. Yet, it also stands as 
an example of policy coordination for aspiring blocs such as the African Union 
or Mercosur, and could use its experiences to advance peaceful multilateralism if 
it survives the monetary crises. It is therefore essential to systematically analyze 
the substantive content of ‘European identity’, so as to draw meaningful conclu-
sions about its suggestive power. 
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Theoretical Perspectives:  
From Unitary Marker to Pluralist Transnationalism 
 
Just as there are different perspectives available on EU identity, there also exist 
different disciplinary approaches and methodologies towards studying and meas-
uring identity issues in the EU. Empirical studies have attempted to explore the 
extent of collective European identification through use of mass surveys such as 
Eurobarometer or the European Social Survey, or analyzed the impact of individ-
ual characteristics such as age, gender, religion, occupation and education, on it 
(McLaren 2006, Fligstein 2008). But in the past few years, critics have pointed 
out that on the one hand, such quantified studies may suffer from ecological fal-
lacy (whereby aggregate collective identities are viewed simply as the sum of its 
individual parts), and that they cannot adequately describe this complex transna-
tional phenomenon, in particular when the focus is less on phenomenological-
descriptive but rather, causal-foundational issues. I would add that the fluid and 
socially constructed nature of transnational identification also suffers from these 
rather static measurements. Responding to such criticism, social scientists have 
increasingly  looked  to  develop  conceptual  models  and  qualitatively  oriented 
case-studies (Katzenstein & Checkel 2009; Karolewski  2009; Thiel 2011). Fur-
thermore, these studies expanded the focus from the observable object to the 
larger, impacting context in which public spheres, discourse and media also play 
a significant role (Risse 2010; Diez-Medrano 2003). In addition, some normative 
and social-philosophical writings highlight more strongly a normative and teleo-
logical  view  of  European  identity  (Habermas  2008;  Nida-Ruemelin  & 
Weidenfels 2007). These authors base their argumentation not primarily on em-
pirical evidence, but on the necessity of post-national constitutional and socio-
legal integration. Such studies also emphasize the completeness or finality of the 
Union and, while they add to this burgeoning topic, they suffer somewhat from 
real-world applicability. 
More importantly, empirical social science has attested to the fact that 
despite common ideas and norms, no unitary ’European identity‘ exists, but ra-
ther a) a variety of domestically colored Europeanized identities persist (Risse 
2010), b) the term is largely devoid of any substantial value content (Delanty 
1999), and that c) the way Europe and the EU is framed by the domestic public 
spheres is decisive for the development of a transnational identity (Diez-Medrano 
2003; Thiel 2011). The EU thus resonates varyingly with national identities de-
pending on the specific socio-historical background and the complementarity of 
EU-advocated norms with the engrained collective identities prevalent in any 
given member state. Following this logic, despite the existence of shared values 
and  particular  socio-cultural  experiences  that  are  described  as  ‘Europeanism’ 
(McCormick 2010), many scholars doubt the presence of EU-particular values 
that would underpin a unitary identity. While the majority of Europeans consist-
ently express in Eurobarometer surveys that in their eyes, the EU stands for de-
mocracy, human rights and peace, these notions are not particular to the Union or 
Europe (with the exception of the volatile notion of ‘Euro’, or McCormick’s pro- 
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posed post-materialist and social-democratic value stance of Europeans). Rather, 
EU-advocated norms mix with the existing liberal-democratic national identitive 
markers  and  produce  domestic  variations  of  the  same  basic  idea  of  liberal-
democratic governance. National identities still reign preeminent and, except for 
small elites, there is no expansive transnational homogenization of societal iden-
tities occurring until now. Habermas (2008) points out that the new media, to-
gether with the augmentation of transnational forms of pluralism and political 
will-formation may change that and lead to mass-based post-national identities, 
but his idealistic view must be questioned in view of the commercialization of 
public spheres and the emergent neo-nationalism of recent times. Similarly, the 
EU’s own attempts at fostering transnational experiences through Erasmus stu-
dent exchanges or the creation of Europe-wide political initiatives reaches only 
the Europeanized elite with limited meaning for ordinary citizens. 
Any attempt to exhaustively define this multi-causal and complex phe-
nomenon is illusionary. Rather, it matters if one views it as empirical marker of a 
collective group, as part of an individual’s personality, or as an instrumentalized 
policy instrument to obtain cohesion. Despite these divergent perspectives, most 
scholars agree that it is socially based and continually constructed. Such socially 
anchored identity evolves out of the differentiation-function of collective identi-
ties: without the ‘other’, no ‘us’ can exist, and an individual cannot develop his 
identity without reference to and comparison with others. This applies to a pan-
European transnational identification with the EU, as well as to external appear-
ances of the EU in the global political system. In this sense, it is not only funda-
mentally social, but also constantly in flux, integrating certain components and 
delimiting  others,  and  the  constantly  evolving  institutional  architecture of the 
Union further adds to this imprecision. According to this understanding, Europe-
an identity has continually changed and thus is very different from the 1973 con-
ception, or even from the one propagated in 2003, and has involved and included 
aspects of the dominant states, such as the French identity extension via its ‘mis-
sion civilisatrice’ or the German enmeshment of national and EU-identity (Risse 
2003, 2010). A political sociology perspective on identity that is interested in the 
motivations and practices of acting European is better apt to capture the intrica-
cies  of the term.  Transnational  identity,  seen this  way,  is  internalized  on the 
background of a framework of somewhat shared ideas and norms, but constitutes 
itself in different forms, depending on the actions and practices by EU citizens 
and institutions (Friedman & Thiel 2012). In a thoroughly globalized and Euro-
peanized region such as the EU, the transformations in socio-economic as well as 
socio-cultural areas necessitate a performative conception of identity creation and 
active identification. This becomes ever more obvious during critical junctures, 
in which traditional forms of thinking and acting cannot suffice anymore– such 
as in the current stage of European integration and crisis. 
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Solidarity as a Practice-based Component of European Identity 
 
With the erosion of domestic variations of the European social model (and the 
realization of the abstract nature of broadly defined EU-values), the notion of 
solidarity among Europeans as a building bloc towards a sustainable identity has 
received more attention over the past few years, and increasingly searched for on 
the supranational EU-level. In fact, it is nowadays prevalent in much of the me-
dia and political discourse about the tensions within the Eurozone. For one, the 
decline of social democracy and the rise of neoliberal ideology across the conti-
nent have been questioned since the crisis adjustment programs have revealed an 
augmented inequality within and across member states. But solidarity should not 
be solely understood as a leftist objective of solidarity rights associated with so-
cial protection or equality; though it is located in the realm of politics as the term 
is absent in the discourse of competitive markets: Solidarity is theorized to en-
compass  notions  of  social  (based  on  societal  cohesion),  civic  (based  on 
redistributional orientations) and even political (directed against injustice) com-
mon values (Scholz 2007) – three different but interrelated notions that find their 
reflection in the pressing issues of the EU today. The notion of solidarity in the 
EU offers value on many levels, as recent research has pointed out that such dis-
course gives shape to otherwise direction-less cosmopolitan tendencies, and pro-
vides an alternative for other competing concepts, such as securitization or citi-
zenship (Ross & Borgmann-Prebil 2010). Solidarity as an applied part of Euro-
pean identity is today, under the influence of societal transformations effected by 
a common socio-economic space and the increase of diversity in the region, more 
important than ever, and can be found in different configurations depending on 
the level of governance (from local to regional to (supra-)national), not exclu-
sively in the realm of social affairs, but also transnationally in the allocation of 
EU cohesion funds, which account for over about 35% of the bloc’s budget – 
although the EU as neoliberal project, particularly in its current manifestation, is 
viewed as much as a creator as a solution to today’s problems. In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that the erosion of equality on a national level, in large part 
caused by regional economic and financial integration, provides an impetus for 
the search of solidary measures on an EU-wide level in order to combat exactly 
those externalities.  
But solidarity is also a theoretically significant basis for the development 
of  transnational  identity,  as  without  it,  no  fundamental  feeling  of  and  action 
based on cohesion can develop as prerequisite for further transnational identity 
dynamics. The EU, with its distinct, yet increasingly eroded social model, seems 
more than ideal to address solidarity in its policies – not only to increase cohe-
sion, but also to mitigate intra-European diversity and inequality. Regionally ex-
tended solidarity builds mutual trust among member states and thus adds another 
auxiliary variable for the development of transnational cohesion and identifica-
tion – particularly, as solidarity historically always contained a strong transna-
tional component from its pedigree in the international labor movement. Yet, the 
extension of solidarity challenges its provider to trust that solidary efforts on the  
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recipients’ behalf are eventually responded to reciprocally, thus building trust 
and cohesion over time. Empirically speaking, solidarity is a concept that EU 
citizens  overwhelmingly  embrace  (84%  of  respondents  in  EB  72/2009  had  a 
positive or very positive opinion of the term, and it was the number one priority 
across the bloc, alongside concerns for the environment); the EB report speaks 
for itself when addressing solidarity as a policy principle: “The European Union 
has more difficulty in personifying social values such as solidarity and equality, 
though these lie at the heart of the social demands of Europeans” (European 
Commission 2009, EB 72, p. 126). Lastly, while the solidarity provisions are 
most developed in the EU, other regional blocs can equally adapt solidarity prin-
ciples and policies, based on their basic social-democratic political (as in Latin 
America) or communitarian cultural (as in Africa or Asia) orientations. 
With regard to the EU system, solidarity fulfills a variety of supportive 
functions. On the macro-level, the question appears in how far solidarity with 
like-minded countries such as the U.S. is advised, in an age of mutual interde-
pendence,  particularly  under  the  impact  of  the  competitive  rise  of  other 
(semi)authoritarian  governance  and  development  models.  Liberal-democracy, 
however, may be too broad of a common denominator to meaningfully practice 
solidarity, and there is little incentive to foster common identification rather than 
coordination. Within the EU, solidarity between member states beyond the Lis-
bon Treaty’s ‘solidarity clause’ - stipulating mutual assistance in cases of terror-
ist attacks or disasters - is essential, as (a lack of) it is evident in the current Euro-
debt crisis. Such transnational feelings of cohesion necessitate tolerance for di-
verging political cultures and simultaneously, a respect for the overarching com-
munal priorities in the process of economic, fiscal and labor market policy har-
monization.  The  strongly  articulated  differences  between  Euro-creditor  and  –
debtor countries signify a lack of solidarity on both parts, in which primarily po-
litical differences are treated as cultural ones (in the form of national stereotyp-
ing) and the political discourse becomes poisoned by populist rhetoric, and re-
sponded to by many EU commissioners with recent solidarity-suggestions for all 
governments involved. The question of cohesion becomes also more pressing in 
the formulation of externally-related policies: for instance, the common European 
Asylum System, which aims at formulating a common stance on the reception of 
asylum seekers and refugees, is in an ongoing deadlock over the even distribution 
of those populations, in which Home Affairs Commissioner Malmström noted a 
lack of solidarity among member states as well. Another facet becomes obvious 
in the power relations among the EU multilevel governance agents: here, hori-
zontal solidarity between EU-Institutions and national governments, as well as 
vertically, between (supra) national governance institutions and civil societies, is 
essential. Such notion of solidarity accepts the liberal-democratic foundations of 
politics and discourages the playing up of populist-nationalist tendencies for do-
mestic  political  gains.  More  concretely,  this  means  that  efforts  to  reduce  the 
democratic deficit on a national level (Schmidt 2004) could be resolved through 
the stimulation of solidarity on a transnational level, be it through transnational 
bottom-up initiatives (such as the increased consultation of civil society in policy  
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formulation, as is occurring after the EU’s White Paper on Governance in 2001) 
or other basic democratic proposals (such as the European Citizens Initiative, 
which will take effect on April 1
st, 2012, and requires that the Commission con-
sider legislation if requested by at least one million citizens in seven member 
states). Scholars working on the Europeanization of transnational civil society 
have confirmed that “the identitarian vision of Europe predominates in civil soci-
ety; they also show an emerging critique not of ‘too much’ Europe, but of ‘not 
enough social Europe’” (DellaPorta & Caiani 2009, p. 119). Lastly, solidarity 
between individuals, in particular between ‘native’ EU-citizens and immigrants, 
should be realized with the recognition of a basic consensus on the maintenance 
of human rights and dignity, as well as tolerance towards and inclusion of social 
and ethnic minorities. Here, the EU can actually foster and more visibly promote 
inter-group solidarity (rather than focusing on the less pressing inter-generational 
solidarity), based on the now legally-binding civic and solidarity rights provi-
sions spelled out in the Fundamental Rights Charter. The Commission has only 
just begun to invoke the document in contentious cases such as the French expul-
sions of Roma or Hungary’s constitutional changes, but it is through the legal-
political assertion as well as through cooperation of civil society groups with the 
EU institutions and agencies that solidarity can be practically realized in the EU 
multilevel governance system. Seen this way, European solidarity is conceptual-
ized as a practiced testament of European identity, rather than some sort of insti-
tutionally propagated or political instrumentalized term.  
 
Conclusion 
 
While much of a recent Foreign Policy Magazine essay on the ‘myth of Europe’ 
is debatable, the assertion that “it is on the matters of diversity and solidarity, 
however, that the pan-European narrative falters most” (Harding 2012, p. 76) is 
further indication of the theory-practice gap underlying the manifold identity-
crises  in  the  Union  today.  The  process  of  how  solidarity,  particularly  during 
times of crisis, will be translated into policy practice, will to a large degree de-
termine the future of the region. 
On a societal level, practiced solidarity, whether in the treatment of per-
ceived ‘others’ or as principled stance of political stakeholders in the allocation 
of power and resources, promises a positive contribution to the development of 
sustainable European transnational identities. An affirmation of common soli-
darity through concrete political actions by the EU, the national governments, 
and citizens transcends narrow nationalism, sustains social peace and links soli-
dary action to the daily experiences of citizens – and thus provides a stronger 
instrument of common identification than the fairly abstract values promoted in 
EU preambles or in lofty identity-talk. Jean Monnet, the ideational architect of 
the European Union, is cited to have said that Europe “will not be made all at 
once or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements 
which first create a de facto solidarity" (Ash 2009). Such understanding of Euro-
pean cohesion provides for a more optimal comprehension of European identity,  
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rather  than  a  phrase  devoid  of  substantial  content,  or  a  politically 
instrumentalized concept. And acting in solidarity is neither confined to the polit-
ical instances, nor an expression of the Left aiming at an equality of living condi-
tions; rather, it asks of each institution, group and individual to realize solidarity 
in  ways  that  further  European  cohesion  and  oppose  injustice.  Luckily,  there 
seems to be sufficient room for improvement in this regard. 
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Abstract 
  
The problems of the Eurozone have presented the EU with the worst crisis in its 
history,  generating  much  speculation  about  its  broader  long-term  prospects. 
And yet  the  debate  has  been  unbalanced.  While  euroscepticism  has 
been attracting  growing media  and  academic  attention since the  early  1990s, 
much less has been said about the extent of support for integration, which does 
not even have a label. And yet Eurobarometer polls indicate that support for the 
EU has held steady at between 50-60 per cent over the past decade, while opposi-
tion to integration has languished in the range of 10-20 per cent. This paper re-
flects  on  the  dynamics  of  the  public  debate on  integration,  and  some  of  the 
achievements  of  integration,  and  asks  whether  the  present  crisis  represents  a 
structural and policy failure or a failure to truly understand the character and pos-
sibilities of regional integration. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At a time when the European Union is experiencing the most serious crisis in its 
history,  it  may  seem  both  foolish  and  futile  to  reflect  on  the  benefits  and 
achievements of European integration. But this is precisely the time to be doing 
as much, because the public debate over Europe has become distractingly unbal-
anced in favor of pessimism and skepticism. Criticism of the EU has been gain-
ing ground since the controversy over Maastricht in the early 1990s, and while it 
is not undeserved, constructive debate and the search for effective solutions to 
problems demands a more informed and thorough assessment. The doubts about 
Europe  have  become  so  prevalent  that  the  phenomenon  has  its  own  label  – 
euroscepticism  -  and  its  own  body  of  academic  literature  (see  Harmsen  and 
Spiering, 2004; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008). Meanwhile, support for integra-
tion lacks either a label or a literature, and yet Eurobarometer polls reveal that  
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public support for the EU outweighs opposition, the numbers mainly holding 
steady even as the Eurozone crisis has worsened.   
  This paper will reflect on the curious dynamics of the public debate on 
integration. In doing so, it will offer thoughts on the state of the EU, suggestions 
on the advantages of European integration and how it might be best understood 
as a model by the rest of the world, and conclusions regarding its wider signifi-
cance and future direction. It argues that while the present crisis in the Eurozone 
may be a structural and policy failure, it can be traced in large part to the inability 
of ordinary Europeans and their leaders to understand and agree the character and 
goals of regional integration. The debate over Europe is not just unbalanced but 
also often misinformed, with a troubling mismatch between the manner in which 
it is often portrayed by political leaders and media pundits, on the one hand, and 
yet still continues to be viewed favorably by most Europeans, on the other. The 
state of the union is – in short – unclear and uncertain.   
 
The Dynamics of the Debate on Integration 
 
The title of this paper is suggested by a scene in the Monty Python’s Life of Bri-
an, in which a group of conspirators plan to strike a blow against the “Roman 
imperialist state”, their leader beginning the discussion by asking  – in a dis-
missive fashion - what the Romans have ever done for them. Members of the 
group hesitantly offer suggestions, ranging from aqueducts to sanitation, roads, 
irrigation,  medicine,  education,  and  public  safety.  The  exasperated  leader  re-
sponds by conceding all these points, but still asks what the Romans have really 
done for them. 
It can often seem as though the EU suffers the same problem of a lack of 
acknowledgement and recognition. We hear often about its failings and its weak-
nesses, and have been repeatedly told by analysts that it is on the brink of col-
lapse. Jean Monnet predicted in his memoirs that ‘Europe would be built through 
crises, and ... would be the sum of their solutions’ (Monnet, 1978: 417), but also 
shrewdly noted that ‘people only accept change when they are faced with neces-
sity, and only recognize necessity when a crisis is upon them’ (Monnet, 1978: 
109). European integration has indeed witnessed many crises, from the collapse 
of plans for the European Defense Community in 1954 to the French veto of Brit-
ish membership in 1963, the empty chair crisis of 1965-66, the collapse of initial 
efforts in 1972 to prepare for monetary union, the Eurosclerosis of the 1980s, the 
foreign policy failures in the Gulf and the Balkans in 1991-92, the trials of the 
European Monetary System and the Danish rejection of Maastricht in 1992, the 
failure of the constitutional treaty in 2005, and the Irish vote on Lisbon in 2008.  
In spite of repeated claims that such events have marked the near-end of in-
tegration, the EU has survived and generally emerged stronger, reformed, and 
more conscious of its limitations. Furthermore, Eurobarometer polls indicate that 
most Europeans have continued to view the EU favorably even against a back-
ground of crisis: between 2006 and 2010, for example, those who saw the EU 
positively outnumbered those who saw it negatively by approximately three to  
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one (Eurobarometer 76, 2011: 20). In the period 2001-10, those who felt that 
their country had benefited from EU membership ranged between 46 and 59 per 
cent, a proportion that held steady during the collapse of the constitutional treaty 
and well into the Eurozone crisis (Eurobarometer 73, 2010:  132). A remarkable 
62 per cent of Europeans said that they felt like citizens of the EU even as the 
Eurozone crisis picked up speed in early 2011 (Eurobarometer 75, 2011: 52). 
And yet the process of integration has come to be typecast as a source of prob-
lems ranging from a lack of transparency to an absence of leadership, a shortage 
of democracy, a propensity to waste money, an increase in the bureaucratic bur-
den on Europeans, and a threat to the sovereignty of states. This is perhaps ex-
plained by four core problems. 
First, the debate over Europe has fallen foul of the dictum that bad news at-
tracts more attention than good news. The woes of the EU have often had the 
kind of dramatic qualities that beg for gloomy headlines, while the successes 
have been more gradual, less dramatic, and less newsworthy. The Eurozone crisis 
has been a prime opportunity for pundits and political leaders to issue dark warn-
ings of calamity, while the successes of integration have often taken longer to 
emerge and the results have taken time to show themselves. Headlines such as 
“Eurozone on the verge of collapse” will inevitably draw more attention than 
“EU regional policy declared a success”. So entrenched has the problem become 
that European Commission president Barroso was moved in a February 2010 
speech at the European Parliament to reflect on the “intellectual glamour of pes-
simism and constant denigration” that was doing so much harm to the EU and to 
Europe's image. 
Second, the debate has fallen foul of the complexity of the rules on the EU, 
which occasionally confuses even the experts. It lacks the kind of short and in-
spiring constitution that has for so long guided political discourse in the United 
States, and has instead relied on a series of treaties that are long, dull, mainly un-
inspiring, and have been periodically updated by technocrats before being placed 
before a confused and often apathetic public, most of which has had neither the 
time nor the inclination to read the details, relying instead on the media and pun-
dits to interpret the content of the treaties and selectively extract the major points. 
Meanwhile, academic scholars have made matters worse with their frequent ina-
bility to make Europe either real or relevant, regularly bemusing even the em-
ployees of the EU with their often arcane jargon and theories (see Puchala, 1975, 
for an illustrative anecdote). 
Third, the EU has fallen foul of an identity crisis. There is no agreement on 
what it is or what it should become, and without knowing whether or not it is on 
the right track, or even what track it should be on, it is difficult to make judg-
ments regarding its progress. In the 1950s and 1960s, the European Economic 
Community was little more than a conventional international organization, much 
like the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is clearly 
today much more, but it continues to be defined less by what it is than by what 
critics warn that it might become: a federal United States of Europe. Again, aca-
demic scholars have helped little, employing such expressions as actorness, sui  
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generis, and multi-level governance in their well-meaning but ultimately unsuc-
cessful attempts to give the EU some identity. Few have summarized the situa-
tion as neatly as Michael Burgess (2006: 245) when he notes that “the EU works 
in practice but not in theory”. 
Finally and most critically, however, the EU has fallen foul of what I call a 
knowledge deficit: most Europeans know little about how the EU works, which 
in turn makes it difficult for them to process or contextualize the news from Eu-
rope. The uninformed citizen has always been a reality of political life (Somin, 
2004), noted alike by such observers as Plato, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hume and 
Hegel, but confusion and apathy have been particularly evident in the case of the 
EU. Few Europeans follow the news on Europe with any regularity or attention, 
and most pay attention only when a new crisis breaks or when they are asked to 
vote in a national referendum. Several studies (for example, Sniderman, et al, 
1991; and Page and Shapiro, 1992; Popkin, 1994) have suggested that voters can 
use ‘information shortcuts’ such as party labels, elite endorsements, or cues from 
trusted sources to help them decide, even where they lack much knowledge about 
the issues at stake, thereby giving themselves the capacity for reasoned choice. 
The same argument is made in the case of national referendums on EU issues by 
Hobolt (2009: 140, 234-39). 
But Somin (2004) argues that cues can create at least as many difficulties as 
they solve: political activists often differ from the general population in socioec-
onomic terms, tend to be more partisan in their views, and by virtue of being 
opinion leaders may have interests that are different from those of voters. It is 
clear  from  Eurobarometer  polls  that  most  Europeans  admit  to  having  little 
knowledge of how the EU functions, and that they have significantly less under-
standing of the EU institutional structure than of national institutional structures. 
In Eurobarometer 75 (2011), for example, respondents were asked to comment 
on the statement ‘I understand how the European Union works’: 45 per cent 
tended to agree, while 49 per cent tended to disagree, and eight per cent did not 
know. Thus they have little independent understanding with which to arm them-
selves against the arguments and appeals of the partisans, a problem that feeds 
into the democratic deficit and the elitism of the European project. 
 
The Achievements of Integration 
 
The debate over Europe, then, is structurally flawed, suffering uncertainty over 
what Europe represents and compromised by the clear inability of most ordinary 
Europeans to understand or contextualize the work of the EU. We hear much 
about its problems, but the debate cannot be complete without consideration also 
of its benefits and achievements. While it would be impossible to list them all in 
a  short  paper  of  this  kind,  it  is  worth  considering  three  broad  sets  of  such 
achievements by way of illustration, viz. the roles of the EU as a peacemaker, as 
a global power, and as an institutional model. 
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Europe as a peacemaker 
 
The greatest achievement of European integration – so great, indeed, that it is 
often overlooked – has been to encourage a lasting general peace in a part of the 
world that was long a poster child for war and conflict. It is hard to imagine from 
our present vantage point the antagonism, doubt and foreignness with which Eu-
ropeans regarded each other in 1945. And yet so successful has been the reconcil-
iation of France and Germany (in particular) that the notion of European states 
going to war with one another again is unthinkable. So unthinkable, indeed, that 
we now take peace in Europe for granted; the region is living out Kant’s notion 
of perpetual peace, and while the credit cannot be laid entirely at the door of Eu-
ropean integration, its role has been essential.  
At the heart of its contribution lie the benefits of economic integration, and 
particularly of the European single market. This was a goal with which even the 
most hardened of eurosceptics could agree (Thatcher, 1993:556), and while the 
task is not yet complete, the EU today has the world’s largest and wealthiest 
capitalist marketplace. The speed with which this was achieved can be credited 
almost entirely to the European project, and even if the EU were to be closed 
down tomorrow, economic integration has created ties that would be near impos-
sible to unbind. 
The European project has also helped promote peace through its role in neu-
tralizing the more damaging effects of nationalism. Where nationalists once pro-
moted potentially dangerous political and strategic interests, they are today more 
interested in what Billig (1995) describes as “banal nationalism”, associated with 
symbols rather than demands for self-determination. We have seen the dual phe-
nomena of macro-integration and micro-disintegration at work, where Europe is 
coming together while there has also been greater recognition of national identi-
ties. (We are regularly told that European multiculturalism is dead (see Modood, 
2007, for example), but such arguments are based on a misapplication of this 
contentious term; Europe faces troubling racial and religious tensions, to be sure, 
but the region has long been multicultural.)  
Integration has also encouraged peace through its role in reducing state-
based  patriotism  and  promoting  broader  notions  of  citizenship  and  identity. 
Thanks in large part to integration, Europeans have become less foreign to one 
another and have come to realize how much they have in common. There is to-
day a distinctive Europeanist view of politics, economics and society, which goes 
beyond support for democracy, human rights, and free markets (a feature of all 
liberal democracies), and includes more distinctively European support for wel-
fare liberalism, cosmopolitanism (association with universal ideas), the collective 
society, sustainable development, secularism, and civilian and multilateral ap-
proaches to international relations (for more details see McCormick, 2010).    
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Europe as a global power 
 
The  second  major  achievement  of  the  European  project  has  been the  way  in 
which it has allowed European states to reassert themselves in the world. This 
may seem a hollow claim, given the EU’s many well-publicized shortcomings in 
foreign and security policy, or its repeated crises of leadership (or lack thereof), 
but if we look past the headlines and consider longer-term trends, we find sub-
stantial achievements. The EU has collectively developed a set of alternative ex-
planations for the causes of key international problems, it offers a new set of 
mainly civilian and soft prescriptions for the resolution of those problems, it rep-
resents the distinctive set of values listed above, its marketplace is both large and 
wealthy, it is the biggest source of - and magnet for - foreign direct investment in 
the world, it is by far the biggest provider of official development assistance, and 
while the Eurozone has had enormous problems since 2008, the euro is the first 
credible alternative to the US dollar since the latter displaced the pound sterling 
in the 1950s.  
The reach of the EU is routinely overlooked because of the tendency of 
scholars and political leaders to define influence according to military power, and 
the EU has been overlooked in the race to credit new global influence to China, 
and even possibly India and Brazil. But the transatlantic division over Iraq not 
only made public for the first time the long-simmering policy differences be-
tween Americans and Europeans, but also revealed the considerable extent of 
public support among Europeans for developing EU foreign policies independent 
of the United States. The EU response was widely interpreted as yet another cri-
sis, because of the divisions between EU governments opposed to and in favor of 
the invasion, but this analysis routinely overlooked the unity of public opinion, 
with polls finding 70-90 per cent opposition to the war in every EU member 
state.  
It is in none of our interests to live in a world dominated by one or two su-
perpowers, because to do so is to risk being subjected to the assertion of their 
political and economic agendas. The EU is the only effective channel through 
which Europeans can make their collective views heard, and it does this more 
often than we are led to believe. It has done it, for example, through a common 
trade policy in which all 27 of its states - representing 500 million of the wealthi-
est people in the world, and accounting for a bigger share of global imports and 
exports than any other trading bloc - act as one in dealings with the Americans, 
the Chinese, and the Indians. And on the foreign policy front, its abilities to 
speak as one continue to improve, aided most recently by the redesign of the of-
fice of high representative for foreign affairs and the creation of the European 
External Action Service. (Which have, it must be said, got off to a troubled start, 
but have been sailing relatively uncharted waters.) 
 
  
 
What has EU Done    41 
 
 
 
Europe as an institutional model 
 
The third major achievement of the European project lies in its institutional im-
pact: it offers the template for a new approach to ordering politics, economics 
and society that contrasts with the flawed and increasingly irrelevant model of 
the nation-state. The latter has not been with us long, and even in its relatively 
short  life  it  has  been  fraught  with  problems:  states  create  artificial  divisions 
among humans, they have often gone to war with one another, they regularly fail 
to deal with other states without building antagonistic alliances, and they often do 
a poor job of working with other states to address cross-border problems such as 
terrorism, pollution, illegal immigration, and the spread of disease (see discus-
sion in Camilleri and Falk, 1992, or Ohmae, 2005). Few of these charges can be 
leveled at the EU. It has helped Europeans rise above narrow interests, has en-
couraged them to coordinate their responses to shared or common problems, of-
fers them a means of pooling knowledge and expertise and of reducing duplica-
tion and overlap, and encourages them to take a more global view of the needs of 
human society. There have been problems along the way, to be sure, but exam-
ples of policy areas where cooperation has brought advantages include the fol-
lowing: 
 
  Environmental management, where many problems either have common 
sources or are shared by multiple states;  
  Competition,  where  the  EU  has  developed  the  most  stringent  anti-
monopoly laws in the world; 
  Mergers and acquisitions, where the single market has encouraged Euro-
pean corporations to reach across internal borders; 
  Education, where efforts to ensure the mobility of qualifications has gone 
hand in hand with efforts to encourage educational exchanges; 
  Justice and home affairs, where cross-border police and judicial coopera-
tion has been a vital addition to the set of tools used to fight crime; 
  Transport,  where  coordinated  European  investment  in  trans-European 
networks  has  helped  build  new  highways  and  railways  that  have  im-
proved links within the European marketplace. 
 
Arguably the greatest institutional achievement of the European project has 
been its role – through the legal and political demands it makes of its members or 
aspirant members – in expanding and solidifying European liberal democracy. 
This has made the EU the most effective force in the world today for the peaceful 
promotion of democracy and capitalism. It encouraged the six founding states 
(France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux states) to work together in the 
1950s and 1960s, it helped encourage the transition to democracy in Greece, 
Spain and Portugal in the 1980s, it went on to encourage democratic and free 
market change in post-Cold War Eastern Europe, and it continues today to spread  
 
42    McCormick 
 
democracy through the demands that it makes of its own members (such as Hun-
gary), neighboring states that have aspirations to join the EU, and other states 
that seek access to the European marketplace. 
And if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then we have only to look 
around the world at the other experiments in regional integration that have been 
inspired  by  the  European  case:  these  include  ASEAN  in  southeast  Asia, 
ECOWAS in West Africa, the Union of South American Nations, the Caribbean 
Community, NAFTA in North America, and the African Union. Their integrative 
potential (Nye, 1970) varies, to be sure, but clearly others think that integration is 
worthy of emulation, and there is almost no state that is not involved in at least 
one exercise in regional integration. If the EU is wrong, then so is almost every-
one else. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this volume has been to reflect on the state of the European Un-
ion in the context of the Eurozone crisis, and to ask what kind of entity it might 
become over the next decade. There is no question that the Eurozone crisis has 
been the most serious in the history of the EU, but it has by no means been the 
first and nor will it be the last. As noted earlier, the process of integration has 
been beset by problems and challenges over the years, some more serious than 
others.  However,  it  has  generally  learned  from  these  experiences  and  has 
emerged both chastened and reformed, even if it continues – like all systems of 
administration – to remain imperfect. This will almost certainly be the case, also, 
with the Eurozone crisis, the only difference being that the lessons and the result-
ing changes will be of a different scale. 
As noted in the introduction, there is a fundamental problem deriving from a 
failure to understand, inform and engage. The EU is associated more in the pub-
lic mind with problems than with achievements, suffering as it does from a cul-
ture of pessimism, a structural complexity, an identity crisis, and a knowledge 
deficit. And yet it has achieved a great deal, not least by way of its contribution 
to the building of a culture of peace in Europe, its role in helping European states 
to play a meaningful role on the global stage, and its possibilities as a political, 
economic, and social model. The state of the union continues to be mixed, as it 
has always been, but this is less a result of the flaws inherent to the European 
experiment than of the dynamics of the debate about Europe, which has become 
increasingly  pessimistic  but  also  often  abundantly  misinformed.  The  EU  will 
survive the crisis in the Eurozone, but the crisis offers the opportunity for a more 
balanced and informed review of the nature of European integration, which could 
in turn provide more certainty about its possibilities, both for Europeans and for 
experiments in integration in other parts of the world. To end with a return to the 
title of this piece, the European Union has done a great deal for all of us, and it is 
critical that this more clearly understood and appreciated. 
 
  
 
What has EU Done    43 
 
 
References 
 
 
Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. 
 
Burgess, Michael. 2006. Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice London: 
Routledge. 
 
Camilleri, Joseph A., and Jim Falk. 1992. The End of Sovereignty? Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar. 
 
European Commission. 2010. Eurobarometer 73, Spring.  
 
European Commission. 2011. Eurobarometer 75, Spring. 
 
European Commission. 2011. Eurobarometer 76, Autumn, first results. 
 
Harmsen, Robert, and Menno Spiering (eds). 2004. Euroscepticism: Party Poli-
tics, National Identity and European Integration (Amsterdam: Rodopi). 
 
Hobolt, Sara B. 2009. Europe in Question. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
McCormick, John. 2010. Europeanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Modood, Tariq. 2007. Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Monnet, Jean. 1978. Memoirs. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
 
Nye, Joseph S. 1970. ‘Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neofunctionalist 
Model’, in International Organization 24:4, Autumn, pp. 796-835. 
 
Ohmae, Kenichi. 2005. The Next Global Stage: Challenges and Opportunities in 
Our Borderless World. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Pub-
lishing.  
 
Page, Benjamin I., and Shapiro, Robert Y. 1992. The Rational Public: Fifty Years 
of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press. 
 
Popkin, Samuel L. 1994. The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion 
in Presidential Campaigns. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.  
 
Puchala, Donald J. 1975. ‘Domestic Politics and Regional Harmonization in the 
European Communities’, in World Politics 27:4, July, pp. 496-520.  
 
44    McCormick 
 
 
Sniderman, Paul M., Brody, Richard A., and Tetlock, Philip E. 1991. Reasoning 
and  Choice:  Explorations  in  Political  Psychology.  New  York:  Cam-
bridge University Press.  
 
Somin, Ilya. 2004. ‘Why ignorance isn’t bliss: How political ignorance threatens 
democracy’. Policy Analysis, 525, 22 September. 
 
Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szczerbiak (eds). 2008. Opposing Europe? The Com-
parative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Vols 1 and 2. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Thatcher, Margaret. 1993. The Downing Street Years. New York: Harper Collins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
All for One, One for All
1 
 
 
 
 
Alfred Tovias 
 
The Hebrew University 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
When several partners decide on a voluntary basis to go for unity or union, the 
common  wisdom  and  a  famous  Spanish  proverb  whereby  "Unity  Makes 
Strength" ("La union hace la fuerza") is only valid 1) if there is solidarity be-
tween the members of the group; 2) if each member proves constantly to the oth-
ers that he is acting as agreed and that he is not simply using the others, because 
this erodes the sense of solidarity among all of them. This also applies to the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union, namely the present Eurozone made up by 17 countries, 
and in particular because it is not an Optimum Currency Are (OCA). Thus one of 
two options arise: Either something is done so that the two conditions above are 
verified, or members that are not conforming to the OCA criteria exit the union, 
in which case there is no need for the two conditions to hold; otherwise the pre-
sent Eurozone of the 17 does not seem to be sustainable in the medium run.   
 
 
On Solidarity, Benevolent Hegemons and Godfathers 
 
It is improper to state, contrary to what we frequently hear, that the Eurozone is 
not working because of a lack of political leadership. This would only become 
important once the citizens of the 17 countries which are part of the Eurozone 
decide by a wide majority what they want in the last instance, either a political 
federation or simply a confederation. That is certainly a difficult question to an-
swer, even by informed voters. This is why federal unions materialize frequently 
when there is an external menace. The latter is likely to give a strong push to the 
federal project (as was the case of the United States of America or the Swiss 
Confederation), helping to focus the minds of undecided voters. It is the external 
menace  that  pushes  citizens  to  start  thinking  like  Alexander  Dumas’ 
"Mousquetaires": "All for one, one for all". In truth, EU institutions should be 
delighted if they could identify an external enemy right now. But there is none, 
                                                 
1 This chapter is an abridged version of a paper that will appear in the summer of 2012 in 
Spanish in a special issue of the Revista de Economía Mundial, number 30, dedicated to 
the Euro.  
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even less since the fall of the Soviet Union. Islamism, even of the virulent sort, is 
not perceived as a glooming menace for the immense majority of Europeans. 
Neither is there an internal menace of a renewal of the European Civil War of the 
XX century, as the memory of the First and Second World Wars and what led to 
them is receding and has lost galvanizing force among older generations, not to 
mention the younger generation, where it is nonexistent. What about selecting the 
US dollar as the enemy to justify the sacrifices needed to sustain a monetary un-
ion with a federal project, so as to compensate the power of the American cur-
rency? This is a non-starter, as we know that the US was prepared to act as a be-
nevolent hegemon between 1944 and 1971. Certainly things have changed since 
then, but not sufficiently as to make the US currency the enemy. With all that one 
can criticize US administrations since President Carter, the United States, since 
the demise of the Bretton Woods system, has never practiced a policy of "com-
petitive devaluation" as it could have done. It actually did it in the 1930s (by 
Franklin Roosevelt, a president considered paradoxically as very pro-European at 
the time). 
  In truth, a union (including a monetary one) does not increase the power 
of the group in itself, neither internally nor externally. If a Union is reached be-
tween different units on a voluntary and contractual basis (as in a marriage or for 
the matter as in the European Union of the 27), the Union is not likely to increase 
in power if on the one hand there is no solidarity among the different units (as 
with the Mousquetaires) but also on the other hand, if the different units do not 
constantly prove to the rest that they stand by what they agreed to and that they 
are not simply taking a free ride on the others, because this erodes precisely the 
sense of solidarity (think about the kibbutz principles). In order to minimize the 
temptation of a free ride, strong institutional structures are needed, as well as a 
system of legal sanctions that can be imposed from the Center, even if needed by 
force, hence the need to establish a Court of Justice and a federal police. After 
all, we know that a federal country cannot function like a huge kibbutz, which is 
based on a voluntary association among its members. One of the partner coun-
tries may be prepared to act as a benevolent hegemonic power or, in more graph-
ic terms, as a Godfather, or the Union is imposed by a non-benevolent power by 
force (e.g. the project of a European federation, as conceived by Napoleon, or the 
Warsaw Pact). 
 
 
Should Monetary Union Come Before or After Political Union? 
 
Such was, in a more or less explicit language, the message of the late Chancellor 
Kohl of Germany. He sustained openly that a Monetary Union was not possible 
without political union. It is also clear that he saw the latter not only as a must 
but, in his particular case, wished it to be so. On the contrary, it is not clear if at 
that time this was also the wish of the majority of German fellow citizens. Most 
professional economists were, curiously enough, in agreement with Kohl's thesis, 
particularly the German ones, but even more so, the Anglo-Saxons. The differ- 
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ence between the first group and those of British nationality was that the latter 
did not want Britain to be part of a political union which, like Chancellor Kohl, 
they saw as necessary, or together with their colleagues in the US, were skeptical 
about the will of continental European to engage in the big step that political un-
ion entails. 
  This clear-cut opinion was defended on the basis of the fact that a Euro-
zone of 15 or 20 sovereign states would not be, in any case, an Optimum Curren-
cy Area, a concept developed by Robert Mundell, a Nobel Prize winner in Eco-
nomics (Mundell 1961). It was inconceivable, so the argument went, that with 
such a large number and diverse countries it would be possible to manage a uni-
fied monetary policy which would suit each of the member states, unless all of 
them would adhere strictly to the theory of neoclassical economists and exclud-
ing monetary policy as a macroeconomic policy tool (i.e. that money is strictly a 
trade facilitator, like monetary gold in the past). 
  There were even professional economists, like Jacques L'Huillier (1998) 
in Switzerland or Jose Luis Oller (1997) in Spain, that argued that it was better to 
do as Switzerland did, first the political union and then the monetary union. This 
is so insofar as the latter depends on a previous agreement among the members 
on the degree or amount of fiscal solidarity in order for the monetary union to be 
sustainable. They both stressed that one cannot force things and that counting on 
the fact that, in the event of a monetary crisis, a rushed and improvised decision 
on fiscal solidarity taken under stress was not only unlikely, but unwise and full 
of political risks. At the other extreme, a minority opinion held mainly in France 
was openly defended by well-known economists, such as Jacques Rueff, a former 
President of the Banque de France, who sustained that "Europe will be done by 
money or it will not be done" .("L'Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera 
pas", quoted by Donges , 1998 , 10). 
  This last thesis is equivalent to saying that political will can achieve eve-
rything, including being prepared to pay the net economic cost of the move if 
necessary to maintain a dysfunctional Monetary Union that includes members 
which should not be included, and not including countries that should be includ-
ed, but are not (e.g. in the case of Switzerland and the Eurozone). Needless to 
say,  even  an  enthusiastic  pro-European  leader  and  French  economist  such  as 
Jacques Delors did not adhere to this extreme view. He must have been aware of 
what the famous MacDougall Report of 1977 had argued, namely that a Mone-
tary Union would require a strong centralization of fiscal policy. However, he 
and the group of experts drawing the Delors Report later on in 1989 followed 
their political instincts, not their economic ones. They reflected the lack of enthu-
siasm among European leaders of the time for fiscal union and stated quite a dif-
ferent approach than the MacDougall report. What had to be done was to apply a 
fiscal discipline on all the member states of the monetary union and not adopt a 
Keynesian perspective of fine tuning economies. Delors was aware that if the 
centralized monetary policy was to be inspired by the German neoclassical views 
(see above), strictly devoted to feed the Eurozone with enough liquidity so as not 
to have neither inflation nor deflation, it was absolutely necessary to leave to the  
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member states a margin of maneuver in fiscal policy so as to use it to stabilize the 
domestic economy of an individual member state in case of need, but within 
some limits. It was mysteriously said that fiscal policies had to be coordinated 
without being specific about how this would be achieved. 
 
 
Is a Currency Area Feasible Without Fiscal Union? 
 
From what was said in the preceding section, it becomes clear that it was politi-
cally impossible in the 1990s to imagine an EU budget contemplating public ex-
penditure of the order of magnitude requested by the MacDougall Report. The 
latter was inspired by what was being practiced in existing federal or confederal 
unions in the world, namely expenditure reaching more than 15 percent of GDP, 
contrasting with EU expenditure turning around 1 percent only. Summing up, 
fiscal policy remained in the hands of member states. The EU budget was too 
small to exert a solidarity function. As is well known, the educational, health, 
social security and defense systems are in the hands of EU member states and it 
is the latter  which  absorb  the  immense  majority  of  expenditure  in  a national 
budget. Take note that the distribution of expenditure for the different items just 
mentioned reflects national preferences. This in turn reflects widely different cul-
tures, something that does not happen in the United States, Canada or Switzer-
land. In these countries there is a wide consensus about education, health and 
defense matters. Not only is there no overlap among EU member states of public 
expenditure structures, but fiscal systems are widely apart from one member state 
to the other (e.g., income tax, corporate taxes, and so on). And each member state 
decides on its own how much it wants to tax its own citizens. 
  The  idea  was  that  countries  would  have  to  respect  the  Stability  and 
Growth Pact once they became part of the Eurozone. It was actually a very light 
fiscal discipline regime because France was opposed to automatic sanctions be-
ing used against countries that violated rules regarding excess deficits. Any sanc-
tion  was  to be  decided  by  ECOFIN,  a  political  non-technocratic  body;  when 
France and Germany flouted the rules they did not sanction themselves…  
  It was known since the start that the initial Eurozone of 11 member states 
was much wider than an Optimum Currency Area. In passing, it was clear to all 
that the German Mark area (the old "Snake" of the 1970s) was closer to an OCA 
than the Eurozone of the 11. It was thus clear that the ECB would face a very 
difficult task. It was possible, however, to justify the existence of the Eurozone 
by arguing that the microeconomic benefits of having a common currency were 
very large (contrary to the opinion of neoclassical economists which always said 
that money is a veil; in other words, it is a simple trade facilitator). We know 
now in hindsight that these expected benefits have been widely exaggerated.  In 
two recent research papers (Sadeh & Verdun 2009; Sadeh 2011), it has been am-
ply proven that trade due to the creation of the euro increased at most by 15 per-
cent in the first five years of its existence. The United Kingdom has not lost 
trade-wise from not being part of the Eurozone. Neither has the financial perfor- 
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mance of London decreased, as predicted at the time. The problems confronted 
by Switzerland regarding tax evasion are not due to the creation of the euro nor 
of the ECB. Among the principal actors in the operation against Switzerland are 
the United States and the United Kingdom, apart from Germany and France. But 
Brussels and Frankfurt do not count for the matter. It can even be argued that the 
OECD takes more a lead in this issue than the EU or the ECB. 
  Furthermore, Sadeh (2011) brilliantly proves that, after the creation of 
the euro, there has been increasing economic divergence between the German 
business cycle and one of the PIIGS, Malta, Cyprus, and also Denmark, France 
and  the  Netherlands.  According  to  different  recent  empirical  research  papers 
there has been price convergence in the Eurozone for traded goods, but this is 
due more to the creation of the Single Market than to the creation of the euro. 
What  is  more  revealing  is  that  neither  the  EMU  nor  the  Single  market  has 
achieved price convergence of non-traded goods; on the contrary, there has been 
divergence. And in another empirical work, Sadeh (2009) shows that the member 
states of the Eurozone have diverged in their degree of backing of domestic mi-
croeconomic reforms. 
  In other words, the economic divergence among Eurozone member states 
has been (using language drawn from psychology) more substantial than the con-
vergence leading to a certain degree of schizophrenia that did not prevail in 1999, 
and, thus, leading to an identity problem. Who represents the typical member 
state of the Eurozone? It goes without saying that by raising the number of Euro-
zone members from 11 to 17 only made the monetary union even more dysfunc-
tional than at the creation in 1999, and it becomes increasingly more hazardous to 
pinpoint the typical Eurozone member state. 
 
 
The Present Eurozone Crisis:  
Distinguishing the Short Term from the Long Term 
 
The focus of this paper is not on the short term problems facing the Eurozone in 
early 2012, such as the debt and banking crisis; they are amply treated by the 
press, other media and academic work, and therefore well known to the wide 
public. But the more critical problem in the medium and long run is largely ig-
nored by the media, the Eurozone member states’ governments, and of course 
Brussels, namely the lack of competitiveness in a series of member states when 
compared to Germany. The excuse for not addressing this problem is that the 
debt and banking crisis must be solved first. This is a wrong approach because 
markets understand the underlying problem of competitiveness. It is obvious that 
some, if not all, of the PIIGS, if staying inside the Eurozone, are going to have a 
quasi-permanent problem of competitiveness, unless they are willing to take the 
risk of deflation. Taking into account that some of the PIIGS are among the less 
open economies in the Eurozone (e.g. Greece), it seems evident that belonging to 
the Eurozone is of second order of importance for service firms supplying local 
consumers and the State, plus all non-exporting SMEs. This applies as well to the  
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increasing number of poor consumers that do not travel abroad to other European 
countries for leisure or shopping. Add to this that, for some of the PIIGS gov-
ernments, the possibility of obtaining resources at short notice imposing an infla-
tion tax (i.e. by printing money) appears a tempting proposition in a case of ur-
gency, particularly acute if the government has no more capacity to obtain loans 
or is unable to impose more taxes, apart from the inflation tax just mentioned. At 
times, inflation is "the tax of last resort".  Finally, factor in the equation that what 
is more important to low-and medium-technology firms, prevailing in most of the 
PIIGS, is that the government recuperates the possibility of doing competitive 
devaluations, even if they know that this is only a short term solution. It is a way 
to  do  deflation  without  generating  unemployment  and  which  is  based  on  the 
monetary illusion of a large majority of the population. This mechanism is well 
known to Italian, Greek, Portuguese and Spanish entrepreneurs. In passing, it has 
been proven that deflation per se rarely reestablishes competitiveness. This is 
why it appears at some stage that it is better to exit the Monetary Union and de-
valuate. The demise of the Gold Standard and the Gold-Exchange Standard are 
due  to  this  sort  of  logic  process.  Devaluing  to  gain  competitiveness  requires 
strong monetary illusion by workers and consumers only if there is no terms of 
trade deterioration, or if we assume a very open and small economy, such as the 
Netherlands. On the contrary, devaluation tends to be more effective in very large 
and non-open economies (such as the US in 1933 or the Spain of the 1960s). We 
can reasonably expect that Greece and Portugal are in the first case. It is already 
more difficult to assume that Spain , Italy and Cyprus are non-open economies, 
but the first two have the advantage of very large domestic markets, something 
making the option of exiting the monetary club very tempting.     
 
 
Exiting the Eurozone: Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
Does this mean that leaving the Eurozone would be easy for any of the PIIGS? 
Clearly not. Entry into the Eurozone required assuming a series of short term 
fixed costs, increasingly higher in the era of the computer. It is for this reason 
that leaving the Eurozone would also have fixed costs, even more devastating if 
the cost of entering the euro has not yet been covered. After all, it took three 
years from the creation of the new currency in 1999 to the issuing of paper mon-
ey in 2002. These costs, however, are once-and-for all and should not be con-
fused with other costs related to default, as indicated below. 
The political cost of exit can also be devastating. But once a country has 
left (say Greece), other members would be tempted to do the same. A "domino 
effect" would take place, in the opposite direction than the one taking place when 
there is an EU enlargement, which always incites those who did not want to be 
part of the EU to ask for membership. For instance, the exit of Greece would cre-
ate discomfort, if not havoc, in countries already marked by faltering financial 
markets, like Cyprus or Portugal. On the other hand, Germany or the Netherlands  
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would see the move in a positive light, as they would consider this a necessary 
trimming of the Eurozone’s lawn. 
  In view of the above, other Eurozone countries could try to prevent wa-
vering members from leaving (e.g. Portugal, Cyprus, Italy), either by sanctioning 
them or by buying them. The first scenario is the famous one of preventing se-
cession popularized at the time by the economist Martin Feldstein, at the time 
Chairman of the NBER. This scenario was badly interpreted in Europe believing 
that, when he said in 1997 that the creation of the euro would lead to war, he was 
referring to a war between the EU and the US, when he was referring actually to 
the US Civil War (1861-65). It is assumed, then, that Eurozone member countries 
will not let a total disorderly Greek default to happen because it would be detri-
mental to some French and German banks, and due to the threat of a "domino 
effect". However, the temptation of Greece to declare an open default increases 
with time because of the competitiveness problem above mentioned. Kenneth 
Rogoff has argued in a recent paper that economic history shows that countries 
reduce the weight of external debt as a share of GDP by defaulting, and not by 
growing more rapidly than average, nor by reimbursing debt. If they are countries 
with their own currency, they can attempt to get rid of external debt by surprise 
inflation. Obviously, this option does not exist for members of a Monetary Un-
ion. 
One must take into account that if there is default without leaving the Eu-
rozone, the political and social costs do occur immediately after default, thus 
making it a much less costly divorce because the cost in terms of havoc and wel-
fare have already been largely paid (e.g. a run on the banks), and now after the 
divorce, devaluation is a possibility, making brighter the future of all citizens. 
Default is somehow a bad dream while exiting the monetary union (i.e. the Euro-
zone), as in a divorce. Argentina's experience in 2001-2002 is a case in point. In 
this context, it is easy to contemplate that after France and Germany realize that 
some of the PIIGS want to leave the Eurozone and try to deter them from doing 
that for fear of contagion, they will capitulate and see exit as something not only 
inevitable but positive. In the opinion of the author, as indicated above, Germany 
and the Netherlands might see such a move as a necessary trimming of bad herbs 
(and not as is currently argued by those against secession as punishment, revenge 
or sanction of bad pupils). In this context, it is evident that as long as the second 
indispensable country in the Monetary Union, namely France, accepts the Ger-
man outlook, the Eurozone has a guaranteed life. Another matter would be if 
Germany shows no further interest in holding on to it, but this does not seem to 
be a realistic outcome for the coming two decades.   
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Conclusion 
 
If the creation and perpetuation of a Monetary Union imposed by force and/or 
based  on conquering  and  occupation  (e.g.  Napoleon/Hitler) is  excluded,  as it 
should be, in the case of the Eurozone, the only benevolent hegemon that comes 
to mind is present-day unified Germany.  But it is legitimate to have doubts about 
this, given its relatively small economic size compared to the rest of Euroland 
(not to mention the EU at large). More to the point, given the weight of the past, 
Germany could not assume this role even if it wanted to, if one or more members 
of the Eurozone refuse to accept this voluntarily. It is not likely either that the 
German parliament would be prepared to consider the idea even if all the other 
16 Eurozone members beg it to play this role, because it would run against the 
whole idea of the European Union ( a union among equals). Thus, a real mone-
tary union must be based on solidarity when the chips are down, not only in one 
direction from Germany outwards but among all the 17 member states. Are the 
16 other members prepared to help Germany when in need? Would these coun-
tries have considered coming to the help of Western Germany when it had to en-
gage in the immense task of economically stabilizing Eastern Germany? Food for 
thought…   
  The issue of solidarity is linked to the issue of actual membership of the 
present Eurozone. In other words, the real problem of the Eurozone is not its sur-
vival, but its present composition. Going back to the discussions that took place 
before the Werner Plan was adopted in 1970; it is worthwhile remembering what 
was said at the time, that to guarantee the success of the Plan, serious thoughts 
should be given to the number of countries that would enter, apart from Germany 
and France (and then the EEC was made up of only six countries!). It was argued 
that a small monetary union, leaving aside Italy, would be more compact and 
lasting as it would be less heterogeneous, even if it were politically less accepta-
ble and would have created many tensions between insiders and outsiders. On the 
basis of this criteria, it was said that Italy should be included, knowing, however, 
that, sooner or later, there would be some asymmetric shock that would test the 
amount of solidarity among the Six. 
  Today, the leaders of the Eurozone are faced with exactly the same di-
lemma, but the conflict rarely rises to the surface in discussions at the European 
Council  level.  In  the  mid-1990s,  many  academic  experts  said  that  the  future 
EMU decided upon in Maastricht could be established under the circumstances 
of the moment, but that in the medium and long run it would not be sustainable 
without some type of federal structure or political union, because of asymmetric 
shocks. This was due to the heterogeneity of economic structures of the members 
and different habits in the management of economic policy. Apparently, the ar-
chitects of the Maastricht Treaty then and the ECB now, not to mention the pre-
sent discussions around the euro crisis, all did and have continued to ignore at 
their own peril the importance of the principle of solidarity when divergence of 
competitiveness levels take place.  
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Abstract 
 
Following the responses to other challenges, the process of European integration 
has one main challenge in the 21st century: globalization with increasing compe-
tition from previously less developed countries. 
The Strategy Europe 2020 is to a great extent supposed to correspond to this 
challenge,  as  well  as  to  two  other  “long-term  challenges”:  “pressure  on  re-
sources” and the “aging population”. 
  To  correspond  to  these  and  other  challenges,  the  Strategy  establishes 
three  priorities  which  are  mutually  reinforcing:  “smart  growth”,  “sustainable 
growth” and “inclusive growth”. In the first case, there is the purpose of “devel-
oping an economy based on knowledge and innovation”; in the second case, the 
purpose of “promoting a more efficient, greener and more competitive econo-
my”; and in the third case, “fostering a high-employment economy delivering 
economic, social and territorial cohesion”. 
  In a realist way, unlike the Lisbon Strategy, there is  concentration in  a 
small number of feasible targets and a higher commitment of the institutions (the 
EU Council in particular) and of all levels of intervention in each country. 
  Finally, it is a Strategy strongly based on the markets.  It is specially 
stressed that “a stronger, deeper, extended single market is vital for growth and 
job creation. A protectionist strategy is excluded, taking into account that “global 
growth will open up new opportunities for Europe´s exports and competitive ac-
cess to vital markets”.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Along the years, the process of European integration has been taking place in 
response to different challenges: in the beginning, there was the challenge of 
peace;  afterwards,  there  occurred  the  challenge  of  efficiency,  which  required 
changes in the decisional procedures; and more recently, the challenge of en-
largement  by  the  inclusion  of  a  significant  number  of  previously  communist 
countries. In the 21st century, it is clear that one main challenge is the challenge 
of globalization. It is not a new challenge, but it has now new features, requiring 
reinforced answers. 
 
 
A new map of the world 
 
Over the span of five centuries, beginning with the Portuguese discoveries, Euro-
pean countries dominated the world. The situation changed in the 20th century, 
particularly after the Second World War. The United States and the Soviet Union 
had political and military prevalence all over the world; economically, there was 
the prevalence of the so-called “triad” formed by Europe, the United States and 
Japan. 
It is, however, clear that we will have (we already have) a new map of the world 
for the  21
st century,  and with  new  world  powers,  with the emergence  of  the 
BRICs in particular, Brazil, Russia, India and China. We therefore face a difficult 
challenge: in a world which Europe cannot ignore or avoid, we can either adopt a 
protectionist attitude by “closing” the borders or we can see the world as a place 
with new opportunities for enlargement. 
 
2. The Institutional Responses 
 
New challenges often require institutional responses. Such was the case of the 
challenge of inefficiency, requiring the first revision of the Treaty of Rome and 
the Single European Act, which eliminated the need in most of the cases to have 
the approval of Community legislation unanimity. It was also the case of the 
more recent enlargements requiring more flexibility in institutions, what with the 
participation of 27 countries. Recently, the approval of the Treaty of Lisbon had, 
to a great extent, the purpose of corresponding to the new challenge of globaliza-
tion. 
 
The High Representative for External Policy and Security  
 
The purpose of this figure with increased powers is to have somebody specifical-
ly responsible for those areas; however, doubts arise with the division of respon-
sibilities among different entities. In the new framework, the President of the 
Commission  rightly  retains  important  responsibilities  in  external  affairs;  im- 
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portant responsibilities in the external area are given to a totally new entity creat-
ed by the Lisbon Treaty, the permanent President of the Council. 
With this framework, it is, of course, difficult to avoid the duplication of inter-
ventions (or the lack of intervention), in some cases being unclear as to who 
should intervene. From the outside (for third countries) it is not clear who repre-
sents the Union. It is not solved; on the contrary, it has become more difficult to 
answer  the  question posed  by  former  US  Secretary of  State  Henry  Kissinger 
when he asked, “Which telephone number should we use to talk to the European 
Community (now the EU)?     
 
Increased Efficiency, Assuring the Approval and Avoiding the Postponement of 
Required Decisions 
 
 In no previous case had there been such a significant increase in the dimension 
of the EU Community, going now from 15 to 27 countries (28 in the coming year 
with the integration of Croatia).We should therefore be afraid of difficulties and 
delays in the approval of important and urgent  decisions.  Steps should be taken 
to facilitate the decisional procedures. A specific mention can be made to the re-
inforcement of the procedure of enhanced cooperation, promoting greater flexi-
bility with the Lisbon Treaty through article 20 of the Treaty of the European 
Union and articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. 
 
3. The Answer with the Establishment of Strategies 
 
Keeping well in mind the new challenges, a great effort is being made with the 
establishment of European strategies. One of them is already at the end, but it is 
worth considering, especially when approving and implementing a new strategy. 
 
a). The Lisbon Strategy 
 
For the beginning of the new millennium, a strategy was approved by the Portu-
guese presidency on March 24, 2000, at the Lisbon Summit. The initiative was 
made keeping in mind the loss of Europe’s relative position to the United States, 
in the rates of growth and employment, and in particular in the area of the so-
called “new economy” (based on information and communication technology).  
It was stated that the European Union should be in 2010 “the world’s most com-
petitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy, being able to guarantee a dura-
ble economic growth, together with a quantitative and qualitative improvement in 
employment, and greater social cohesion, while respecting the environment”. 
There was, however, one very critical evaluation made by the commis-
sion chaired by former Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok. The Kok report (2004) 
criticizes the number and the dispersion of objectives and instruments, trying to 
intervene in too many areas: “Lisbon is about everything and therefore nothing”.  
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As Ardy (2007) has rightly stressed, the Lisbon Strategy has achieved by bring-
ing together previous policies “into a high-profile package which would demon-
strate the Union´s determination to embrace a radical and comprehensive reform 
agenda to meet challenges posed by globalization, the e-revolution and the de-
mographic shift in Europe´s population”; and it was a step forward, with the use 
of the procedure of the enhanced method of cooperation. With the Lisbon Strate-
gy, having given some contributions and having been an interesting experience 
(with positive and negative indications), it was clear that a new initiative should 
be taken. 
 
3.2 The Strategy Europe 2020 
 
A few years later, the challenges would not be much different. With special rele-
vance, we have now the confirmation of the world role played by other countries, 
in particular by the BRICs, and we have a crisis, to which a quick and effective 
solution must be found. The new crisis is strongly harming previously rich coun-
tries, but not the newly emerging ones, particularly China and India, which have 
had a sustainable yearly growth of 7 to 8 percent over the past two decades; in 
some years, China had a two digit growth. 
With their enormous internal market of more than one third of the world 
population, China and India could compensate some reduction in the exports to 
the previously industrialized countries with an increased internal demand, made 
by hundreds millions of people. With the increasing role of these and other coun-
tries, a protectionist EU response was feared. A new strategy was proposed on 
March 3, 2010: COM 2020, with the title “Strategy for a smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth”. 
 
 
The Long-run Challenges 
 
In the words of COM 2020, after acknowledging   that” the world is moving 
fast”, it is stated that   “the EU must now take charge of its future”, with respons-
es to the “long-term challenges”: “globalization, pressure on resources, aging 
population”. In the 21
st century, European world predominance is over. As men-
tioned before, it was a predominance shared with other powers; politically and 
militarily there was a bi-polar world, with the USA and the Soviet Union). It is, 
however, clear that we will have in the 21st century a new world, a multipolar 
world, in which  Europe will go on having an important economic role, but in 
which, together with the “tríade”, there will be other important powers (BRICs 
and other emerging countries). 
There has been an interesting evolution in regards to natural resources. 
The Malthusian pessimism, on the overall sufficiency of the world resources, is 
passed (despite the enormous increase of the world population in the 20
th centu-
ry), but with the hope that the world population will be stabilized at around 9 to 
10 billion inhabitants. Concerns about the sufficiency of oil and perhaps other  
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natural resources also exist. Required precautions must be taken in regards to 
CO2 emissions and forestry devastation. 
Finally, there is a big problem with the aging population in Europe as 
well as China. In some cases, we already have a decrease in the overall number 
of inhabitants, in some rich countries attenuated or even avoided with the inflow 
of immigrants. In general, we have a high increase of older people, with a high 
burden on social security systems, which are paid by a decreasing number of em-
ployed people.   
 
 
Priorities 
 
It is having in mind the worries just mentioned that the Strategy Europe 2020 
establishes the three priorities, which “are mutually reinforcing”: smart growth, 
sustainable growth and inclusive growth. In the first case there is the purpose of 
“developing an economy based on knowledge and innovation” (the comparative 
advantage of Europe cannot be in other factors, as geographic localization or the 
price of capital, not to mention the cost of labor). In the second case, there is the 
purpose of “promoting a more resource efficient, greener and more competitive 
economy”; of course, with an increasing attention given to the environmental 
conditions.  In  the  third  case,  there  is  the  purpose  of  “fostering  a  high-
employment economy delivering economic, social and territorial cohesion” (the 
“inclusion” of the citizens is both an opportunity for them to rightly fulfill their 
personal “dreams” and of having a fuller use of all capacities of the countries and 
of the regions). 
 
 
 
Are there Reasons for a Realistic Hope? 
 
In another section, with the title “Europe can succeed” (p.7), “many strengths of 
Europe are mentioned. These are strengths mentioned also in the Preface, written 
by the President of the Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso. It is the case of 
“a talented workforce”, of “a powerful technological and industrial base”, of “an 
internal market and a single currency that have successfully helped us resist the 
worst” and of “a tried and tested social market economy”. 
But even with the acknowledgement of these potentialities, can we be sure about 
the accomplishment  of  the  purposes  stated  in  the COM?  Should  we  not  fear 
something similar to what happened with the Lisbon Strategy? Benefitting from 
the experience acquired, three ways are established.  
The first way is the concentration of attentions and means, avoiding the 
temptation of trying to intervene in all areas. It is a concentration which has sup-
port in the principle of subsidiarity (reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty ), according  
to which should go the European Union level only what cannot be better made at 
a level closer to the citizens: by the countries or even by the regions , the local  
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authorities  or  other participants in the society, including the citizens, with their 
initiatives, but also the short and decreasing  dimension (in percentage of the 
GDP) of the EU budget leads us to the need for  the efforts made by  the coun-
tries being increased. 
  A second way is a stronger institutional commitment, including, in a re-
alistic way, the compromise of the countries, through the European Council.  
In the words of COM 2020 (p.4), “the European Council will have full ownership 
and be the focal point of the new strategy. The Commission will monitor pro-
gress towards the targets, facilitate policy exchange and make the necessary pro-
posals to steer action and advance the EU flagship initiatives. The European Par-
liament will be a driving force to mobilize citizens and act as co-legislator on key 
initiatives. This partnership approach should extend to EU Committees, to na-
tional parliaments and national, local and regional authorities, to social partners 
and to stakeholders and civil society so that everyone is involved in delivering on 
the vision”. And a greater concretization, for each institution (and other entities) 
of the European Union, as well on the participation of national, regional and local 
entities, is made in section 5.2, with the title “Who does what?” 
  So, COM 2020 is quite clear, calling the attention to the responsibilities 
of each European and national entity, in a process in which main responsibilities 
are attributed to the countries, which cannot avoid their responsibilities. We can 
be in agreement or not (we personally do agree), but in the European Union the 
countries remain with great powers. As stressed in the document (p. 27), “contra-
ry to the present situation where the European Council is the last element in the 
decision-making process of the strategy, the European Council should steer the 
strategy, as it is the body which ensures the integration of policies and manages 
the interdependence between Member States and the EU”. 
  One third way is of course the use of the budget. The EU budget is, how-
ever, a very small budget, which cannot be compared to a federal budget. Fur-
thermore, it is not increasing relatively to the GNP of the Union; on the contrary, 
along the years it is losing position. According to the first proposals for the com-
ing  financial  perspectives,  for  the  period  2014-20  (COM(2011)398  final  and  
COM(2011)final, both  of the 29.6.2011), it will  represent along the years (from 
2014 to 2020) only 1.05 % of the EU GDP .In fact, the issue open is not the di-
mension of the budget, it is only the question of its  adequacy  to the established 
priorities. It is a budget which of course cannot be used to promote counter-
cyclical policies or income redistribution in the European space. With its limita-
tion, it has mainly the aim of contributing to a better use of the potentialities of 
the Union, with an allocation purpose (see for example Porto, 2007). But even 
this purpose can only be more relevant with an additional strategy, the European 
funds not covering the total expenditures made. 
 
 
4. The Reinforcement of the Confidence in the Internal and External  
Markets 
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As mentioned, with the present challenges, in particular with the challenge of 
globalization, we could fear from Europe a protectionist response. 
Having in mind competition from countries not only with lower labor costs but 
also with important stocks of capital and improving technologies, it would be   
the way of preserving our firms and our jobs. It is a strategy which could be 
feared, notwithstanding the lessons of theory and of experience, showing very 
clearly the best results of openness. The history shows, however, that in society 
there are forces, in particular forces of organized groups, which frequently lead to 
protectionist policies (see for example Porto, 2009, pp. 171-91). 
However, this was not the line of COM (2010)2020, stressing in section 3, with 
the title “Missing links and bottlenecks”, that “the Commission intends to en-
hance key policies and instruments as the single market, the budget and the EU´s 
external economic agenda”. 
 
4.1. A Single Market for the 21st Century 
 
This is exactly the title of section 3 of the COM that we are analyzing, And the 
initial words of this section could not be clearer, stating that “a stronger, deeper, 
extended single market is vital for growth and job creation”. In this line, having 
well in mind the effects already obtained with the “1993 single market”, other 
steps are being given. It was the case in 1997 of an initiative of the Commission, 
“The Action Plan for the Single Market”, in 2000 of the Lisbon Strategy and in 
2010 of the Monti Report “A New Strategy for the Single Market”; with Presi-
dent Barroso stating, in the letter through which this report was demanded, that 
“the single market is, and will go on being the “angular stone for European inte-
gration and sustainable growth”. 
However, COM 2020 is well aware that much is still left to be done. In section 3, 
after the first sentence, quoted above, reference is made to the risk arisen from 
the present crises: “the crisis has added temptations of economic nationalism”. 
And having in mind this risk it is strongly underlined that “a new momentum – a 
genuine political commitment – is needed to re-launch the single market”.  
It must be so with the acknowledgement that “often, businesses and citizens still 
need to deal with 27 different legal systems for one of the same transaction. 
Whilst our companies are still confronted with the day-to-day reality of fragmen-
tation and diverging rules, their competitors from China, the USA or Japan can 
draw from their large home markets”, acknowledging the need to maintain and 
even  to reinforce the  single market. 
Special attention is given to the new opportunities offered with “the arrival of 
internet”, in particular to the need for the creation of “a single services market”, 
based on the “Services Directive”; being added that “the full implementation of 
the Services Directive could increase trade in commercial services by 45 % and 
Foreign Direct Investment by 25 %, bringing an increase of between 0.5 % and 
1.5 % increase in GDP”. 
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Section 3.3 of COM 2020, with the title “Deploying our external policy instru-
ments”, is quite clear on the response of the European Union to the challenge of 
globalization. We can remember again that world competition, mainly from the 
new emerging countries, could lead to the protectionist temptation. The response 
of Strategy Europe 2020, however, is totally different, seeing globalization not as 
a threat, but as a way of having larger opportunities. The beginning of the section 
(p. 21) is quite clear, stating that “global growth will open up new opportunities 
for Europe´s exporters and competitive access to vital imports”. It states, after 
mentioning the pressure of emerging countries (p.6), that “every threat is also an 
opportunity”;  and  it  was  acknowledged  (p.12)  that  “the  EU  has  prospered 
through trade, exporting around the world and importing inputs as well as fin-
ished goods. Faced with intense pressure on export markets and for a growing 
range of inputs, we must improve our competitiveness vis-à-vis our main trading 
partners through higher productivity”. Along this line, it is added in section 3.3 
(p. 21) that “all instruments of external economic policy need to be deployed to 
foster  European  growth  through  our  participation  in  open  and  fair  markets 
worldwide”. This is an idea reinforced three lines later with the statement that 
“an open Europe, operating within a rules-based international framework, is the 
best route to exploit the benefits of globalization that will boost growth and em-
ployment”. The text could not be clearer, seeing globalization much more as an 
opportunity than a threat. 
While very often we see the growth of emerging economies in a negative 
light, with the possibility of bad consequences for our firms and our jobs de-
stroyed, COM 2020 stresses (p. 21) that as “a part of the growth that Europe 
needs to generate over the next decade will need to come from the emerging 
economies  as  their  middle  classes  develop  and  import  goods  and  services  in 
which the European Union has a comparative advantage. As the biggest trading 
bloc in the world, the EU prospers by being open to the world and paying close 
attention to what other developed economies are doing to anticipate or adapt to 
future trends”. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Nothing is said about avoiding the emerging markets. On the contrary, the need 
to participate in these markets is strongly stressed, but  participation in world 
markets requires a clear definition and the fulfillment of the “rules of the game”. 
“Free trade” must be “fair trade”. It must be so in particular with the participation 
in world organizations, with requirements on all areas (for example in the social 
and in the environmental areas) which can have implications on international 
trade. As stated in COM 2020, action should be taken “within the WTO and bi-
laterally  in  order  to  secure  better  market  access  for  EU  business,  including 
SMEs”; and attention must be given to “new areas such as climate and green 
growth”, in the WTO and in other (specialized) organizations. With these re- 
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quirements,  we  are  defending  our  workers and our entrepreneurs  from  unfair 
competition from countries which do not follow the same rules; but we are also 
defending the citizens, in particular the workers, of those countries: favored with 
better social and environmental conditions that their authorities are in this way 
forced to adopt. 
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Abstract 
 
The European sovereign debt crisis has not been resolved yet despite the unprec-
edented and massive bailout rescue packages given by the EU and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) to the most afflicted countries – Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal.   The  study  identifies  several  factors  that  impede  Europe’s recovery 
from the crisis – the treaties that established the EU and the Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU), their governing system, the complex dynamic of the domestic 
electoral and coalition politics in the seventeen Eurozone states, and Germany in 
particular. Tackling this and future economic crises in the region will require 
bold permanent regulatory and governance reforms rather than the chaotic and 
half-hearted measures undertaken to date. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Nearly four years have elapsed since the eruption of the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis and its spread to the European Union. Nevertheless, the survival of the Eu-
ropean common currency is still in jeopardy. The purpose of this paper is to ad-
dress three important issues  – (1) the causal link between the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, (2) the asymmetric ef-
fects of the crisis on two sub-groups of EU countries and its origins in the most 
vulnerable EU economies, and (3) the distressing absence of a much needed Eu-
ropean political solution to the crisis. 
The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis constitutes the most serious recession 
after the Great Depression in the U.S.  It caused millions of Americans to lose 
their homes and jobs, and still threatens the U.S. economy.  The crisis, which  
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spread abroad quickly, was created after a U.S. housing market bubble burst in 
2007.  One of the factors that played a major role in the formation of the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis was the adoption of an extremely expansionary mone-
tary policy during the recession of 2001-2003.   
The repeal of the Glass-Stegall Act by President Clinton’s administration 
and its replacement with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 radically changed 
the structure of the U.S. financial and banking system. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act, also known as the Modernization Act of 1999, liberalized the U.S. financial 
and banking system.  This was a major reversal of the financial and banking reg-
ulatory regime that had prevailed in the U.S. after the Great Depression.  Finan-
cial deregulation allowed the proliferation of many structural products (financial 
derivatives).  Home mortgages were the most important underlying assets for 
these novel financial derivatives.  After 1999, banks and other U.S. depository 
institutions relaxed their lending standards and extended home loans (mortgages) 
to many unqualified applicants.  Banks engaged in such imprudent lending prac-
tices because they were no longer required to keep their loans on their balance 
sheets.  Under the new financial and banking regime, home lending institutions 
could sell their mortgages as soon as they signed them.  Investment banks began 
purchasing home loans since they were able to finance such purchases by issuing 
mortgage backed securities (MBS).  It is widely recognized that poor lending 
practices encouraged by the new securitization lending business model were at 
least partially responsible for the U.S. financial crisis
1.  Wall Street bankers com-
bined mortgage-backed securities with other financial assets and created many 
novel financial structural synthetic products by dividing the combined bundles of 
assets into tranches (slices)
2.  One of the most notorious derivatives is called a 
Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO).  Investment banks ranked these new secu-
rities according to the credit ratings of their underlying assets and the priority of 
payments of interest and principal to the investors.  These complicated financial 
derivatives were often re-bundled with other securities and divided again to cre-
ate second and even third-layer types of securities which became known as CDO² 
and CDO³.
3  Investment banks flooded the U.S. market and also sold these secu-
rities abroad.  Many investors found them attractive because they paid a high rate 
of return.
4 The complexity of these products confused the markets, which failed 
to price them correctly.  The suspicion, however, was that a great percentage of 
these exotic new financial products were based on bad home loa ns; thus these 
securities were very risky and became known as toxic assets. 
 
 
                                                 
1Wray, L. R. (2007) 
2 See Acharya (2009)  
3 Such an approach was intended to increase the share of AAA-rated securities.  Howev-
er, it resulted in an increase in the amount of low-quality synthetic securities. 
4 International trade liberalization and financial integration policies which started under 
the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the 1980s contributed to the spread of the 
crisis abroad.  
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The Crisis Spreads to Europe 
 
Large amounts of toxic assets were sold in Europe and other parts of the world.  
Financial institutions in the UK, Ireland and Spain unknowingly invested in toxic 
securities more than any other European countries.  This is how the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage crisis initially entered Europe.  There are two groups of Europe-
an countries that were affected by the European financial crisis. The first group 
constitutes those countries that had experienced chronic fiscal instability by gen-
erating large public deficits and high debt-to-GDP ratios and the second those EU 
member states that were afflicted by low and chronic international competitive-
ness.  Relatively large trade and current account (CA) deficits are caused by 
countries’ low international competitiveness. EU countries that are presently at 
risk are those with both large and negative external and internal (private and pub-
lic) balances.  Over the past decade these countries also generated low national 
saving rates.  Public debt-to-GDP ratios in a few Eurozone countries are close to 
being unsustainable.
5  This scenario brought the Southern EU countries close to 
default in the last few months of 2011 and the beginning of 2012. Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal were the first group of Eurozone countries to be affected by the cri-
sis.
6 These three countries received rescue packages jointly provided by the EU 
and the IMF. 
The first signs of contagion rippled through  Europe when the U.S. sub-
prime mortgage crisis threatened several Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEECs); these countries were exposed to financial risk because their banks had 
borrowed large amounts from some EU  member countries’ banks.  Hungary, 
Ukraine and Latvia suffered the most.  The EU and the IMF responded promptly 
by providing relatively small rescue packages, which proved to be very effective.  
Unlike the three Eastern European cases, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal received 
large rescue packages of unprecedented amounts from the EU and the IMF.  De-
spite the high expectations for a reversal of the crisis, the recession is still deeply 
rooted in some European countries.  It now seriously threatens two large Euro-
zone economies (Italy and Spain), the rest of Europe, and the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).  
 
                                                 
5 Even after it received its first rescue loan, Greece still has an unsustainable debt-to-GDP 
ratio.  It is now negotiating its second rescue program with the EU, the IMF, the ECB, 
and the private bond owners who hold Greek government bonds.  These negotiations aim 
to restructure the Greek debt, allowing a partial write-down (haircut) of the values of the 
private bonds.  An agreement between the Greek government representatives and those of 
the bond holders, who are headed by Charles Dallara of the Institute for International 
Finance, is expected to bring the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio down to 120%.  The IMF fore-
casts that if such an agreement is reached, the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio will become sus-
tainable again. 
6 Southern EU countries include Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Ireland is also includ-
ed in this group although it is not a Southern country.  
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The asymmetric effects of the crisis on the Southern EU countries in re-
lation to the Northern Eurozone member states is revealed by the rising spreads 
of these countries’ interest rates versus the German 10-year government bond 
interest rate.  Interest rates began rising at the end of 2009 when the crisis started 
spreading rapidly in Europe.  No such interest rate increases were observed in 
Northern European countries. 
The countries that experienced the largest interest rate increases were 
Greece,  Ireland,  and  Portugal.    They  received joint  EU/IMF  rescue  packages 
when it became evident that they were unable to finance their public debts by 
borrowing from the market.  It is a common belief that the Southern Eurozone 
countries increased their public debt because they were able to borrow at low 
interest rates after the adoption of the euro. As figure 1 in the Appendix shows, 
however, three Eurozone countries had already accumulated high debt before the 
euro was launched in 1999.  Excessive public debt-to-GDP ratios in Greece, Ita-
ly, and Belgium made it necessary for EU leaders to bend the Maastricht conver-
gence criterion that no country’s public debt-to-GDP ratio should exceed 60%.
7  
It is evident from figure 1 that Southern Eurozone countries experienced rising 
public debt-to-GDP ratios starting in 2009, the year the crisis spread in Europe.  
Contrary  to  Southern  countries,  Northern  Eurozone  countries’  public  debt-to-
GDP ratio hardly increased.  
It all started in Athens, Greece. After Greek Prime Minister George Pa-
pandreou of the PASOK party won the elections in October 2009, he reported to 
the EU Commission that the preceding government had misrepresented data on 
the Greek public deficit.  He stated that the projected Greek public deficit for 
2009 would be 12.7% of GDP rather than 5.7% as the previous Greek govern-
ment had reported.  The news did not sit well with European Union leaders and 
particularly with the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) which started downgrading 
the Greek government bonds. Meanwhile the crisis started spreading to other 
countries such as Ireland and Portugal and to a lesser degree to Italy and Spain.  
The Northern EU countries, however, were not affected by the crisis to the same 
extent.  Consequently, the Eurozone is experiencing its first asymmetric shock 
after its establishment in 1999.
8 
 
 
The Formation of the EMU 
 
In this section we focus on specific deficiencies that may hinder the restoration of 
stability in the Eurozone and pose a threat to the very existence of the euro, the 
Eurozone, and the EU. Countries that had joined the EMU and adopted the euro 
gave up their monetary and exchange rate policies but, for the most part, main-
tained control over their national fiscal policies.  This arrangement turned out to 
                                                 
7 This shows that the launch of the EMU was a political decision. 
8 For first time in the history of the Eurozone two groups of Eurozone countries were 
affected differently.  This constitutes an asymmetric shock.   
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be detrimental to a few Eurozone countries, and now constitutes the most im-
portant challenge to the euro. 
Eurozone countries also lost their exchange rate policy.  Prior to joining 
the EMU, countries that were in recession could devalue their currencies to im-
prove their trade balance, and thus ease their economies out of the recession.  The 
only way for countries that joined the euro to improve their trade balance is 
through an internal devaluation.  This requires a reduction in real wages that is 
tantamount to a decline in the standard of living.  In an attempt to resolve the cur-
rent crisis, the EU and the IMF put together rescue packages that required gov-
ernments to adopt austerity programs including public and private wage and pen-
sion cuts, reduction of public sector employment, and privatization of public en-
terprises. 
EU countries that adopted the euro were required to meet the Maastricht 
convergence fiscal criteria.  EMU candidate countries had to keep their public 
deficit-to-GDP ratio below 3% and the public debt-to-GDP ratio below 60% to 
qualify for EMU membership. 
At the insistence of Germany, whose leaders wanted to make sure that 
EMU countries respect the two fiscal Maastricht criteria regarding public deficits 
and debts after the introduction of the euro, member countries signed the Stabil-
ity and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997.  However, the SGP was violated repeatedly 
by many countries and its provisions were enforced selectively.  When small EU 
countries such as Portugal and the Netherlands violated the pact, they were re-
quired to comply.  When the large countries such as France, Germany and Italy 
violated it in 2003, they convinced the other Eurozone members to freeze the 
mechanics of the Pact and thus they avoided penalties.  After two years of dis-
putes among the EU Commission and EU countries, the SGP was revised to fit 
the preferences of the larger countries.  As a result, the SGP lost all its credibility.  
When the crisis began spreading in 2008, the EU, the G20, the IMF, and the 
OECD urged countries to adopt expansionary coordinated fiscal and monetary 
plans to avoid a recession.  Since then, most of the EU countries have violated 
the SGP.  As the financial crisis escalated, the southern Eurozone countries and 
Ireland were still experiencing stagnation, while most Northern EU countries re-
turned to positive growth. 
The EMU was launched despite reservations by several economists that 
the candidate countries do not constitute an Optimum Currency Area (OCA)
9. 
The formation of the EMU received strong support by Jacques Delors, the cha r-
ismatic president of the EU Commission and EU country leaders.  European uni-
fication  was  a  political  project  inspired  by  daring  visionaries  like  Richard 
Coudenhove Kalergi and Jean Monnet.  The integration of Europe was a gradual 
process; disagreements and internal crises always existed and were the norm r a-
ther than the exception in the EU decision making process for many years.  All 
major and minor crises in the past were resolved fas ter than the present crisis.  
                                                 
9 For an extended discussion of OCA, see McKinnon (2004), Mundell (1973), and  
Zestos (2006).  
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EU  country  leaders  had  repeatedly  demonstrated  an  amazing  ability  to  reach 
agreements after tough and difficult negotiations. 
The political situation in Europe has now changed dramatically.  The 
great visionaries of the Pan-European movement for a United Europe have been 
eclipsed.  Gone is the generation of charismatic pro-European leaders who creat-
ed the European Union.  Contemporary European politics are mainly dominated 
by neo-liberal pro-business parties that focus mostly on international competi-
tiveness and job creation at home.  Most often, job creation at home is at the ex-
pense of their workers’ compensation, social cohesion or other EU countries’ 
workers and businesses.  EU leaders seek re-election and hence promote econom-
ic policies and programs that appeal to voters. Neo-liberal nationalists and even 
Eurosceptic political parties are present in every EU country, either as governing 
parties, coalition members or as parliamentary opposition.  Pro-European leaders 
and political parties do still exist, but they are not presently in power.  This is one 
of the reasons the crisis has not been resolved yet.  If pro-European parties do not 
emerge to power and become more influential, it is possible for a devastating 
recession to paralyze the European economy and end the European project. 
   
Germany’s Adamant Position 
 
Chancellor  Merkel,  the  leader  of  the  German  Christian  Democratic  Union 
(CDU), consistently demonstrated that the preservation of European unity is a 
low priority.  She has managed to block every proposed program to save the euro 
and the EMU.  If the euro becomes the victim of this crisis along with a battered 
European economy, this will be the second time that Germany refused to help the 
rest of Europe at a very critical moment.  Germany is the largest and strongest 
EU economy, and received more benefits than any other EU country.  Thus, it 
was expected to take a leading role in resolving the crisis.  As a matter of fact, 
German  leaders’  indecision  and  a  continuous  flow  of  conflicting  information 
coming from various levels of the German government frustrated the markets and 
undermined any hope in the possibility of a quick political European solution. 
German  politicians  definitely  face  some  political  constraints.    Angela 
Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and its junior coalition partner – the Free 
Democrats – did suffer significant electoral setbacks in most of the 7 state elec-
tions held in 2011.  These electoral results delivered bitter losses not only to the 
governing coalition, but also to the European project.  The results signified that 
German voters were hardly pleased with the way the German government was 
handling the European crisis and the implication that German tax payers would 
have to shoulder some of the financial burden of the Greek, and possibly other 
countries’, sovereign debt. 
One must also think carefully about the electoral results of the two coali-
tion partners – the CDU and the Free Democrats.  Both parties suffered substan-
tial setbacks in the regional elections held in 2011.  The CDU suffered losses in 
the states of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Bremen, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Saxo-
ny-Anhalt, and Hamburg.  The Free Democrats suffered losses in 6 out of the 7  
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regional elections.  Their overall level of support in four of the states was so poor 
that the party lost its representation in their state assemblies.  Though many Ger-
man voters oppose the idea of paying other countries’ sovereign debts, their re-
luctance to do so should not be used as a convenient excuse to act resolutely in 
dealing with the European sovereign debt crisis. 
The first victims of a possible domino effect in this crisis will be interna-
tional trade and foreign investment.  In the long run, the standard of living of 
every European country will drastically decline.  If these pessimistic predictions 
turn out to be correct, then for a second time within the last two decades, Germa-
ny will be responsible for a major setback in European integration.  The Central 
Bank of Germany (Bundesbank) was considered primarily responsible for the 
1992-1993  European  exchange  rate  crisis  because  it  placed  German  interests 
above European ones.
10  The collapse of the ERM caused massive losses to the 
EMS member countries’ resources due to speculative attacks against several Eu-
ropean  countries’  currencies.    Economists  pointed  to  the  hegemonic,  non-
compromising, and inflexible stance of the Bundesbank as the cause of the EMS 
collapse.   
The Bundesbank has now been replaced by the ECB, which is expected 
to support European interests.  Upon Germany’s insistence, however, the ECB 
was created in the image of the Bundesbank.  The ECB is bound by the European 
treaties to pursue only price stability.  If the EMU collapses in the near future, the 
German government and Chancellor Merkel will probably be criticized for their 
hegemonic, uncooperative, and anti-European stance.  Chancellor Merkel and her 
government have given greater priority to perceived German interests than Euro-
pean unity, as they followed policies that would appeal to the German taxpayers.  
Price stability is a necessary prerequisite for economic growth.  Several studies 
have shown that countries which have rendered independence to their central 
bank were the most successful in attaining both price stability and high economic 
growth.
11 
In the present situation, however, attaining price stability at the cost of 
massive unemployment in several European countries and the risk of the breakup 
of the EMU should not be the first priority of European leaders.  Many econ o-
mists agree that the U.S. Federal Reserve model, which allows the Fed to pursue 
both price stability and economic growth is superior the ECB’s model.  This is 
especially correct, if the U.S. model is evaluated based on the performance of the 
U.S. economy during and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
  The  U.S.  Fed  adopted  expansionary  monetary  policy  during  the  U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis that so far has not triggered increases in the price level.  
According to many analysts, the Fed contributed to the low U.S. unemployment 
rate by providing easy credit that has helped pull the U.S. economy out of the 
Great Recession. During the last four years, the Fed always maintained its federal 
funds interest rate lower than the ECB’s repo rate.  In addition, the Fed embarked 
                                                 
10 Paul DeGrauwe (2007) 
11 See Alesina and Summers (1993)  
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on a new monetary policy after it drove its federal funds rate down to zero. The 
Fed purchased a variety of private and public securities that increased its mone-
tary base by 3.2 trillion dollars.  The ECB did begin to buy government securities 
of the most affected Eurozone countries.  Opponents of this policy claimed that it 
would violate the “no bailout” clause, and therefore the ECB has now slowed 
down in pursuing this program.  
Several northern European countries are also responsible for not been 
willing to make an adequate contribution to the effort to save the euro, the Euro-
zone, and the EU.  These countries, like Germany, are big beneficiaries of their 
participation in the EU and EMU.  They have been generating CA surpluses for a 
long  time,  while  Southern  European  countries  sustained  CA  deficits,  this  is 
shown in figure 2 in the Appendix.  These asymmetries constitute the core issue 
of the current crisis and unless European leaders recognize that they are a major 
problem, the crisis will not be resolved. 
 
 
Austerity Plans Alone Cannot Save Countries 
 
Chronic large government deficits that lead to excessive indebtedness can cause 
contractionary effects on the economy.  Some authors show that government def-
icit reductions can increase real GDP.  Levy (2001) has provided evidence from 
the United States that the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, also known as the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1993, which introduced spending cuts and tax increases 
on high income earners, successfully reduced the U.S. deficit.  This policy gener-
ated a sequence of government surpluses in the late 1990’s under the presidency 
of Bill Clinton.  A group of models that examine fiscal contraction adopted as a 
response to severe economic or fiscal crises show that large fiscal consolidation 
for high deficit countries can raise consumption and output.
12 
The idea of fiscal consolidation and permanent reduction in public def i-
cits and debt for Greece is unavoidable and necessary in order for the country to 
return to normalcy.  However, restoration of fiscal stability will not be a panacea 
for all of Greece’s problems.  It is imperative for Greece to reduce employment 
in  the  public  sector,  which  politicians  eagerly  created  to  gain  popularity  and 
votes.  Though unpopular, such a decision will not only make the public sector 
more efficient but will also help Greece to gain fiscal stability and avoid a disor-
derly default. 
The austerity programs imposed on Greece, Ireland, and Portugal also 
require the opening-up of several protected occupations.  Such programs were 
expected to introduce efficiency that would lead to price reductions, and hence 
benefit consumers.  This policy is necessary and important but if it is introduced 
abruptly, it will have detrimental effects on the welfare of these people. Most 
economists know that the painful austerity programs imposed by the EU/IMF are 
not a solution to the European debt crisis.  A reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
                                                 
12 See Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Perotti (1999)  
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requires economic growth.  Simple arithmetic knowledge of ratios confirms that. 
One way for highly indebted countries to pursue growth is to differentiate be-
tween public consumption and public investment.  In this case highly indebted 
Eurozone countries must apply Draconian austerity measures only on public con-
sumption.  For example, increased wasteful public consumption in Greece be-
came an impediment to stability and economic growth. On the contrary, public 
investment must be encouraged because spending on advanced technology, infra-
structure,  education, job training,  and  promoting  a  green  economy  will  boost 
economic growth and enhance international competitiveness and human capital 
development. Furthermore, whereas it is imperative for a few countries to restore 
fiscal imbalances, that does not mean it is necessary for every country to reduce 
public spending simply to comply with Germany’s obsession with fiscal austerity 
in the middle of a recession. 
 
 
Lack of EU Leaders’ Determination 
 
If the heavily indebted countries that received rescue packages had requested as-
sistance earlier and had the Northern EU countries responded earlier without IMF 
participation, the crisis would not have reached its current dimensions. Perhaps 
no one summarized the quintessence of the Eurozone’s predicament than Chris-
tine Lagarde: “If we had been able to address it [the euro crisis] right from the 
start, say in February [2010], I think we would have been able to prevent it from 
snowballing the way that it did.”
13  Had European Union politicians acted deci-
sively to stem the crisis early in 2010, they would have convinced markets that 
the European currency is backed by unwavering political will.   
Eurozone and EU countries have demonstrated little determination to do 
what it takes to save the euro and the Eurozone.  The markets learned that quick-
ly, and thus reacted negatively to every rescue plan proposed by European coun-
try leaders to date.  Furthermore, the initial terms of the rescue packages were 
unfavorable and could not help the countries out of the crisis. 
  The interest rates on the rescue loans that Greece, Ireland, and Portugal 
agreed to pay exceeded their respective growth rates.  Therefore, if lending terms 
do not change and economic growth does not improve, these countries will be 
unable to reduce their national debts. 
  On January 31, 2012, an EU summit in Brussels 25 EU countries agreed 
on a new treaty to establish a fiscal compact.  According to the treaty, contracting 
members will respect government deficit limits.  Countries that violate the fiscal 
ceilings will be penalized and the treaty will be enforced by the European Court 
of Justice and the European Commission. 
                                                 
13 Howard Schneider and Anthony Faiola, “Hesitation by leaders drove cost of Europe’s 
crisis higher” The Washington Post, June 16, 2010. Available: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/15/AR2010061505598.html Accessed January 27, 2012  
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  It is unlikely that this treaty will ever be ratified.  The SGP experience 
has repeatedly proved that rigid rules are violated and threats are not the best way 
to convince countries to cooperate.  The fiscal compact treaty includes both pri-
vate sector involvement (PSI) and collective action clauses (CACs) in future res-
cue programs of countries at risk.  It was, again, Germany that persuaded the 25 
EU  countries  to  include  both  PSI  and  CACs  although  their  importance  was 
downplayed in the agreed treaty.  It was stated that they will be a possibility in 
rare cases.  Chancellor Merkel has been campaigning to introduce PSI and CACs 
in every future rescue program to alleviate the burden of tax payers and discour-
age bond holders from investing in countries based on the belief that their in-
vestments are protected by bailout packages.  This arrangement was expected to 
solve the moral hazard problem.  Many analysts are convinced that the PSI pro-
grams are one of the reasons that the sovereign debt crisis has not been resolved 
yet. Bond owners have withdrawn massive amounts of funding from all Southern 
European countries and Ireland because of the fear of haircuts.  For example, al-
most a year ago Mohammed El-Erian, CEO of the largest bond company in the 
United States PIMCO, pulled all investments out of Greece, Portugal, and Ire-
land.  Many others followed suit.  Presently, only Greece is negotiating a PSI 
program with its bond holders and the negotiations have been prolonged increas-
ing the risk of a credit event.
14  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We argued that European country leaders have failed to respond promptly and 
decisively to the European sovereign debt crisis. EU leaders intended to teach 
candidate  Eurozone  countries that  any  forthcoming  bailouts  would  be  neither 
automatic nor easy to obtain. Such an approach was meant to address the moral 
hazard problem and also made politicians popular among the electorate. The cri-
sis began in the U.S. and entered Europe via contagion as a result of economic 
and  financial  integration.  Consequently,  the  U.S.  bears  some  responsibility. 
Greek politicians deserve severe criticism for following imprudent economic pol-
icies. This situation led their country to the brink of bankruptcy and the loss of 
the country’s sovereignty.  Reports by Greek government officials to the EU 
Commission that their predecessors had hidden and misrepresented the Greek 
fiscal  statistics  opened  Pandora’s  Box.  When  this  information  became  public 
knowledge, it triggered a sequence of downgrades of the sovereign bonds of sev-
eral EU countries. This led to rising interest rates and massive capital outflows 
from Southern Eurozone countries. 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) were criticized for failing to signal the 
U.S. Subprime mortgage crisis and Greece’s excessive debt, which allowed it to 
borrow beyond sustainability. Once CRAs began downgrading European coun-
tries’ public debt, they were exceptionally aggressive to the extent that they en-
                                                 
14 See Zestos and Rizova Ekathimerini (January 9, 2012)  
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couraged short selling of sovereign bonds.  These actions allowed speculators to 
profit from Eurozone countries while they were bringing these countries close to 
bankruptcy. Both the U.S. and the EU have been very slow in regulating CRAs, 
which still maintain an almost oligopolistic global position. It is estimated that 
there are about 600 trillion over-the-counter securities that are not registered in 
any official exchange.  Total world GDP is approximately 65 trillion dollars.  
Hedge funds, credit default swaps, (CDSs), CDOs, MBCs, and other financial 
derivatives all contributed to the crisis.  Such an immense amount of liquidity 
that moves around the world in search for profit and high rates of return is desta-
bilizing.  The structure of the international financial system is inherently unstable 
and can threaten any country. 
It is, however, clear that all possible reasons suggested above would not 
have prolonged the crisis, if the EMU had not been designed and launched as an 
incomplete and imperfect structure.  We suggest that this is the appropriate time 
for the EU countries to accept the challenge and complete the unfinished Europe-
an Project, or run the risk of disintegration.   
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Figure 1 
Gross Public Debt as Percentage of GDP 
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Figure 2 
Current Account as a Percentage of GDP 
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The Eurozone and the Economic Crisis:  
An Innovative SWOT Analysis 
 
“Never was so much owed by so many to so few.”
1 
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Abstract 
 
The euro area debt crisis, which began in early 2010 in Greece, will become a 
reality in 2012, since unemployment is reaching new highs and business and con-
sumer confidences have worsened as recession fears looms. Whether the area and 
the common currency survive this crisis will be a matter of how the political class 
learns  to  cooperate  among  themselves,  how  society  deals  with  economic 
measures, and if the markets stop being shortsighted and focus on the long-term. 
The purpose of this paper is to use a SWOT analysis to present how this crisis 
has affected the Eurozone by studying the weaknesses and threats that the project 
is facing, as well as which opportunities and strengths this crisis might bring if 
politicians, society, and markets work together to overcome the situation. 
This paper will highlight that the main strength of the project rests on the 
attitude of society that is, up to this point, silently coping with a very difficult 
economic situation and tough restructuring measures that are negatively affecting 
their purchasing power and living standards. The paper will also elaborate on 
how the role of the European Central Bank is the Eurozone’s main weakness. 
This crisis has shown that there are plenty of opportunities for the Eurozone to 
become the political and economic power that the founding fathers envisioned, if 
the fiscal pact is implemented and governments improve their finances. However, 
there are a number of threats, the most important being the high price of oil, 
which may hinder recovery. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Winston Churchill, August 20, 1940, in recognition of the Royal Air Force’s role in the 
Battle of Britain.  
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Introduction 
 
The euro is facing an economic crisis and its survival depends on a number of 
exogenous and endogenous factors. More importantly, the possibility of an eco-
nomic recovery is fading and the region is feeling the economic, social, and polit-
ical pains of recession. However, the Eurozone is not the only area suffering eco-
nomic sluggishness. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has announced a 
lower forecast for global growth in 2012 and it explains that  
 
“World  Economic  Outlook  (WEO)  projections  indicate  that 
global growth will moderate to about 4 percent through 2012, 
from over 5 percent in 2010. Real GDP in the advanced econo-
mies is projected to expand at an anemic pace of about 1½ per-
cent in 2011 and 2 percent in 2012, helped by a gradual unwind-
ing of the temporary forces that have held back activity during 
much of the second quarter of 2011.”
2 (2011, XV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  World Economic Outlook at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf (accessed February 2012).   
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Summary of Events 
1992 – Feb 7: Maastricht Treaty is signed  2010—March 18: Papandreu asks EU members 
to come up with a financial aid plan within a 
week 
1992  –  Sept  16:  The  European  Exchange 
Mechanism faces problems with the UK forced 
to leave 
2010—April 12: Eurozone member states agree 
to provide up to 30bn euros in loans to Greece 
for  the  next  year.  The  IMF  agrees to  provide 
additional 15bn euros in funds 
1996 – Dec 13: EU leaders agree on the Stabil-
ity Pact 
2010—April 21: Greece begins talks to receive 
financial help to face 8.5bn euros in bond re-
demptions due the following month  
1999 – Jan 1: The euro is created with 11 coun-
tries 
2010:  April  22:  Greece’s  budget  deficit  is 
13.6% of GDP – more than previously forecast-
ed 
2001- Jan 1: Greece enters the euro   2010:  April  23:  Greek  government  officially 
asks for a bailout from the EU and the IMF 
2003—Nov 24: Germany and France override 
EU budget rules for the third year 
2010—May 2: Greece is granted a 110bn euro 
rescue package for a 30 billion euro in austerity 
measures over the next 3 years 
2005—March  20:  The  Stability  and  Growth 
Pact is relaxed  
2010—May 9 &10: EU finance ministers agree 
to  set  up  a  750bn  euros  rescue  mechanism 
named the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF)/ The initial capital is of 440bn euros 
2008—Sept  15:  Lehman  Brothers  files  for 
bankruptcy  
2010--Nov 14: The Irish government says Ire-
land does not need a bailout 
2009—Oct  20:  Newly  elected  Greek  govern-
ment discovers that the deficit will be 12.5% of 
GDP  
2010—Nov 21: Ireland applies for a bailout 
2010—Jan 21: The Greek government explains 
Greece will not need a rescue package 
2010—Nov 24: Ireland gets 85bn euro bailout 
2010—Feb  2:  Greece  announces  its  austerity 
package  to  get  a  deficit  in  line  with  the  re-
quirements in 2012 
2011—March  21:  The  EU  finance  ministers 
agree on a permanent bailout mechanism—the 
European Stability Mechanism – with a lending 
capability of 500bn euros starting in 2013 
2010—Feb 11: EU leaders have an emergency 
meeting and agree to take actions to protect the 
financial stability of the euro 
2011—April 6: Portuguese Prime Minister re-
quests EU bailout which is granted on May 18 
for 78bn euros 
 
 
The Strength: Euro Skepticism and Social Unrest 
 
The scale and persistence of the economic crisis that is affecting the European 
Union for the past three years is taking a toll on European public opinion. Two 
main questions are at stake. First, how this economic crisis has affected public 
opinion on the role of the euro must be analyzed. Second, how the need for eco-
nomic reforms is affecting European public opinion on the project must also be 
looked at.   
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This section uses the findings of the Eurobarometer 75
3 (Spring 2011) to 
conclude that society is blaming the euro. The single currency is not perceived as 
a tool that has helped overcome the effects of the crisis. However, society agrees 
that the reforms undertaken by most of the countries and the reforms that are to 
come are very much needed in order to solve the current and future economic and 
fiscal problems. Most importantly, society understands that these measures are 
needed to put the countries on the path to recovery. This attitude shows that soci-
ety understands the problems and is ready to endure the painful reforms. This is 
the biggest strength of the European project.  
More than half the interviewees—51%--think that the euro has not cush-
ioned the effects of the economic crisis, while 37% defend the role of the single 
currency. The Eurobarometer shows that the residents of the Eurozone are much 
more likely to agree that the euro has had a cushioning effect (42%) than those 
outside of it (30%). It is interesting to point out that countries with economic 
problems such as Greece and Portugal believe that the euro has not been able to 
cushion the effects of the economic crisis. Also, the United Kingdom, due to its 
euro skepticism, disagrees with the view that the euro has cushioned the effects 
of the economic crisis quite significantly. 
 
 
Source: EUROBAROMETER .2011. Europeans, the European Union and the 
Crisis. No 75 (spring). 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_cri_en.pdf 
 
                                                 
3 Eurobarometer .2011. Europeans, the European Union and the Crisis. 75 (spring) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_cri_en.pdf (accessed February 
2012).   
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Some of the last Eurobarometers have shown that Europeans are very 
understanding of the fact that governments must make painful reforms in order to 
reduce public deficit and debt. In fact, the results show that in autumn 2010 more 
than three out of four Europeans agreed with and understood that there were cer-
tain measures needed to be taken in order to reduce the public deficit and debt of 
their country. More importantly, they understood that these reforms could not be 
delayed. It is also interesting to note that “respondents in the euro zone are more 
likely (79%, compared to 73% outside) to think that the measures to reduce the 
public deficit and debt of their country cannot be delayed.”
4 
It is important to mention that 63% of Europeans believe that the Euro-
pean Union has sufficient power and tools to face up to international economic 
competition. The autumn 2010 Standard Eurobarometer, aimed at establishing 
Europeans’ opinions on how to improve the performance of the European econ-
omy, shows that public concern lies in education and training, entrepreneurship, 
and restoring order to public finances. It is interesting that the results are almost 
the same in the three groups: EU27, Eurozone, and Non-Eurozone countries. 
 
                                                 
4 Eurobarometer .2011. Europeans, the European Union and the Crisis. 75 (spring) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_cri_en.pdf (accessed on Febru-
ary 2012).  
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Source: EUROBAROMETER. 2011. Europeans, the European Union and the 
Crisis.  No  75  (Spring). 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_cri_en.pdf. 
 
Despite the current economic crisis and the uncertainty that it causes, one 
third of respondents thought that their current economic situation does not enable 
them to make any plans for the future, while another third answered that they did 
not know what they will be doing in the next six months. Further, the percentage 
of people who believe that the current situation did not allow them to make any 
plans for the future remains almost the same: 35% of the people in the spring 
2009 compared to the 33% in the spring 2011 report. However, the percentage of 
people who knew what they will be doing in the next six months increased from 
29% in spring 2009 to 33% in spring 2011. Finally, 31% of Europeans have a 
long-term perspective on what their household will be in the next year or two, a 
percentage which has dropped to 30%. I believe that these variations are not sig-
nificant, given the current economic crisis and financial uproar that has shaken 
the foundations of the project. 
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Source: EUROBAROMETER. 2011. Europeans, the European Union and the 
Crisis.  No  75  (spring). 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_cri_en.pdf. 
 
European society is showing its “maturity”, as 80% of the respondents under-
stand that making excruciating reforms is a necessary measure that will benefit 
future generations. However, when the idea of reforms is expected to reduce the 
current living standards to guarantee the living standards of future generations, 
these measures are not that welcome and society is equally divided, as 50% sup-
port this statement and 45% disagree. However, the urgent reforms needed to 
help the country face current and future challenges are widely accepted (86%). 
 
The Weakness: The European Central Bank 
 
The Eurozone’s debt crisis is sending the area into a second recession and, as a 
result, the European Central Bank is taking action. The sudden collapse of eco-
nomic indicators, particularly of industrial activity and services, and the financial 
instability in Europe in the last quarter of 2011 induced the ECB to inject an un-
precedented amount of liquidity into the financial system in December 2011. The 
result was the expected; the liquidity has revived certain economic indicators  
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which are now suggesting that the Eurozone might be able to avoid the worst 
case scenario: the collapse of the banking system.  
However, this action might have two weak points. On the one hand, it 
shows that the only help the Eurozone is receiving is directed at the banking sys-
tem. In other words, the resources of the European economy are selectively con-
centrated in saving the banking sector hoping this will trickle down into society; 
so far, this has not been the case. This intervention does not tackle the need to 
implement a radical reform of the monetary and financial sector. Instead, these 
are just patches of dubious value that only allow the ECB to gain time, and that is 
costing a lot of money.  
The second weakness lies in the fact that the ECB is funded by member 
states. In other words, the capital used to intervene in the market “belongs” to 
member states. In more detailed fashion, “the capital of the ECB comes from the 
national  central  banks  (NCBs)  of  all  EU  Member  States.  It  amounts  to 
€10,760,652,402.58 (as of 29 December 2010) … the net profits and losses of the 
ECB are allocated among the euro area NCBs in accordance with Article 33 of 
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central 
Bank.”
5  Since the beginning of the Greek crisis up to August 2011, the European 
Central Bank has already spent 77,000 million euros to acquire sovereign debt 
from the Greek, the Portuguese, and the Irish in the secondary market and it is 
still actively buying securities to alleviate the pressure. If Greece, or any other 
country for that matter, defaults on its sovereign debt, the ECB will take a direct 
heavy toll which will be passed on to nation states. 
The European Central Bank has proved to be an institution that can easi-
ly adjust and cope with the necessities of each moment. Since its creation, the 
ECB has had three Presidents. Win Duisenberg was in charge for the first four 
years, but it was Jean Claude Trichet who has done the most to strengthen the 
institution by endowing the Bank with a more transparent communication policy 
and making sure it achieved an internal cohesion that has been helpful in the goal 
of speaking with one voice. His main task up until the break of the Greek sover-
eign crisis was to maintain inflation under control at an average of 2%. This has 
not been a big struggle. The “sacrifice ratio” was very high and it has always 
been debated if the ECB should have allowed for higher inflation in exchange for 
more growth and employment.  The mandate to maintain inflation under control 
forced Trichet to raise interest rates in 2008 and 2011, two actions that he has 
confessed regretting, particularly since it has been demonstrated that the need to 
control inflation did not prevent the creation of a real state bubble in countries 
such as Spain and Ireland while growth was stalled. In fact, the Taylor Rule has 
shown that the price of money was totally inappropriate between 2001 and 2007 
in the Eurozone: the periphery countries should have interests of around 5%, 
while hard core countries such as northern European countries should have the 
interest rate set between 2-4%.  
                                                 
5 European Central Bank Website at 
http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html (accessed February 2012)    
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However, the debt crisis made Trichet take steps that have divided the 
institution, and there have lately been dissidents within the ranks such as Axel 
Weber, President of the German Bundesbank, in January 2011 and Jurgen Stark, 
ECB Chief Economist in September 2011, for their disagreements with Trichet’s 
bond purchasing policy. In October 2011, Mario Dragui became the President of 
the European Central Bank. Dragui’s understanding of the economy and the mul-
tiple challenges that the Eurozone and the EU project is facing is leading him to 
change the course of action in the ECB. The EBC had been, up to Dragui’s arri-
val, extremely conservative, mainly because the economic situation up to the cur-
rent crisis did not require any bold monetary policy. Since mid-2011, the eco-
nomic situation has gotten more complicated and the new President had no other 
option but to press forward with more drastic measures. 
Since the last regular hearing in October with former President Trichet 
and now under Dragui, the ECB has taken a number of steps to ensure that it will 
continue to deliver price stability in the medium term in an environment that re-
mains very challenging. These steps relate both to changes in our interest rates 
and to non-standard measures. To begin with, the ECB has changed interest rates. 
The Governing Council decided in early December to lower the key ECB interest 
rates by 25 basis points, following an additional 25 basis points decrease which 
took place on November 3rd, 2011. These measures were taken despite the fact 
that inflation was 3.0% in November 2011 and it is expected to stay above 2% 
for several months to come. The second measure that has been taken was to 
change the non-standard monetary measures in order to attempt to prevent a cred-
it crunch and provide banks with access to funding markets. In order to attain 
these goals, the ECB has taken a number of measures. The most important of all 
has been the agreement on a three-year refinancing operation to support the sup-
ply of credit to the euro area economy. The purpose of this measure was to tackle 
the risk that financial markets tensions might affect the capacity of the euro area 
banks to obtain refinancing over longer horizons. That is, the ECB wants to en-
sure that banks continue to have access to stable funding, also at longer maturi-
ties, which gives them the ability to continue lending to firms and households. 
Another problem that the ECB has been trying to fix is the fact that some 
banks have difficulties accessing refinancing operations because they are lacking 
eligible collateral. In order to solve this situation, the ECB agreed not only on a 
temporary expansion of the list of collateral, but also intends to enhance the use 
of  bank  loans  as  collateral  in  Eurosystem  operations.  These  measures  should 
support bank lending by increasing the amount of assets on euro area banks’ bal-
ance sheets that can be used to obtain central bank refinancing. Finally, the Gov-
erning Council decided to temporarily reduce the reserve ration from 2% to 1%, a 
measure aimed at fostering money market activity. This was expected to increase 
the incentives for market participants to engage in money market transactions.   
As a consequence, on Wednesday December 21, 2011, the ECB loaned 
€489billion to 523 European banks for three years at an interest rate of 1%, 
which is an unprecedented measure for the amount and period. This measure is 
called a Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO). The ECB President, Mario  
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Draghi, had been pressing banks to take the money since announcing the plans 
earlier in December and on Monday, December 19, he warned of a chance of a 
credit crunch claiming that euro zone bond market pressure could rise to unprec-
edented levels early next year. French banks have almost quadrupled their intake 
of ECB money since June to 150 billion euros, while banks in Italy and Spain are 
each taking more than 100 billion euros. This move eased immediate fears of a 
credit crunch but left unresolved the question of how much will flow to needy 
euro zone economies as the funds should bolster banks' finances, ease the threat 
of a credit crunch and maybe tempt them to buy Italian and Spanish bonds easing 
the currency area's sovereign debt crisis. 
This move has been seen as the Eurozone’s version of quantitative easing 
as it allows European banks to borrow at low rates and in turn buy up sovereign 
debt. The idea is that European banks buy high yield sovereign debt from trou-
bled countries which banks can use as collateral in the LTRO to receive cheap 
cash they can use to buy still high yield sovereign debt and pocketing the differ-
ence in borrowing cost. This is what might explain the fact that in the last few 
months, auctions of peripheral European Sovereign debt have been very success-
ful. This is an alternative way of Quantitative Easing as the ECB is not allowed 
by Art. 123 to directly buy bonds from troubled countries. In fact, Article 123 
reads
6 
 
Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the 
European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member 
States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in fa-
vor of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central 
governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Mem-
ber  States  shall  be  prohibited,  as  shall  the  purchase  directly 
from them by the European Central Bank or national central 
banks of debt instruments. (101) 
 
Also, the ECB is pressing for countries to put their financing in order. This is 
also the reason why the ECB is not opening the flood gates to buy sovereign 
bonds in unlimited amounts. The ECB does not believe that the US response to 
the Federal Reserve’s expansionary monetary policy has been the adequate one. 
In fact, it has been declared that in the US “once the Federal Reserve made it 
known it would use quantitative easing to buy Treasury debt, the Congress aban-
doned any attempt to deal with U.S. deficit. The ECB has learned this lesson and 
                                                 
6 Official Journal of the European Union (2011).  Information and Notices. 51, 30 March 
at 
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:FULL:EN:PDF 
(accessed February 2012).  
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is not letting European governments slide back into their old habits. It wants 
some discipline."
7 
It is important to mention that Dragui has been actively pressing member 
states to implement what he calls the Fiscal Compact to put finances in order. He 
claims that this compact should be a three pillar structure. First, he has explained 
that governments should work at the national level by implementing national 
economic policies geared to obtain fiscal stability, improve economic and co m-
petitiveness growth, and create jobs. Second, Dragui has posited that these fiscal 
rules must be enshrined in primary legislation; hence, national legislation should 
contain limits to structural deficits and debt. Finally, he has advocated the need 
for a stabilization mechanism and defended the role of the temporary rescue fund 
(EFSF) and the permanent European Stabilization Mechanism (EMS). 
 
The Opportunity: New Rules to Reinforce the Fiscal and Monetary System 
 
The current economic crisis brings to mind the words of Albert Einstein who de-
clared  “Let's  not  pretend  that  things  will  change  if  we  keep  doing  the  same 
things. A crisis can be a real blessing to any person, to any nation. For all crises 
bring progress.”
8 As a consequence, the EU is working to improve the two most 
important pillars on which rest the stability of the project: the stability pact and 
the banking system. 
This crisis has shown that there are plenty of opportunities for the Euro-
zone to become the political and economic power that the founding fathers envi-
sioned if the fiscal pact is implemented and governments improve their finances. 
On December 9, 2011 European leaders proposed and agreed to work on a new 
fiscal pact tightening budget discipline, which will hopefully be signed on March 
1, 2012. The idea is to give to the Executive European Commission power to re-
ject national budgets plans that deviate from agreed EU targets. This project has 
been vetoed by Britain and criticized by some who believe that it will cause more 
harm than good, as it might send countries into a recession. 
As for the euro, the Eurozone member states will respond to downturns 
in economic activity due to a reduction in the demand of exports in the following 
way. To keep production and unemployment from falling, the national central 
banks would have lowered interest to boost national investment and consump-
tion. The increase in the unemployment rate would have decreased tax revenues 
and increased the need for government transfers—activating the automatic stabi-
lizers. To help the economy, the governments have the option to lower taxes in 
order to increase the disposable income at the same time that the government def-
                                                 
7 Cox, Jeff. 2011. “Europe Using US as a Model to Beat Debt Crisis: Bove. CNBC.com, 
December 13 at 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/45655607/Europe_Using_US_as_Model_to_Fix_Debt_Crisis_B
ove (accessed February 2012). 
8 http://blog.josepruano.com/2009/01/albert-einstein-on-crisis.html (accessed in February 
2012).  
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icit is increased. Finally, the value of the currency would have declined due to a 
lower demand for currency to buy exports.  
On December 9, it was agreed to control fiscal deficits. The idea of a 
well-managed budget deficit is that member states should not be allowed to run 
fiscal budget deficits in good times, but only in bad times. The problem with the 
Eurozone is that most members have been growing budget deficits in good times 
which, in times of economic difficulty, have become unsustainable. Thus, most 
Eurozone countries are suffering from structural and cyclical budget deficits. The 
new fiscal rules are designed to prevent countries from running structural budget 
deficits by seeking constitutional changes that require balanced budgets, although 
they are agreeing to cap structural deficits at 0.5% of GDP with penalties to those 
who surpass the 3% of GDP.  Those against this measure argue that the needs to 
maintain the fiscal deficit at 0.5% of GDP will force countries to cancel any au-
tomatic  fiscal  stabilizer,  thus  reducing  even  further  the  demand  and  sending 
countries into a depression. 
Furthermore, there is a need to make sure that the banking system in the 
EU is “healthy”; that is, it is necessary to measure the resistance of European 
banks during economic instability. The idea was to have a report on how solvent 
banks were to avoid a European version of the “US-banking-crisis” scenario par-
ticularly since the EU banking system is threaten by the difficult situation of 
Greece. This study, known as the Stress Test, would hopefully calm the markets 
and reassure investors that the European banking system is solid. There have 
been a number of stress tests. The first one took place in September 2009 when 
the Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CEBS)—the institution in charge 
of making this analysis—ran a very limited stress test on 22 banks that went al-
most unnoticed because the results were not made public. The second test took 
place in July 2010, pressured by the events that unfolded in Greece and the expo-
sure of European banks to a possible Greek default. The results showed that sev-
en out of the 91 banks tested failed.
9 The third time, 90 banks were tested. The 
results were presented on July 16, 2011. The stress test targeted approximately 
65% of the European banking sector and 50% of the banking sector in each coun-
try. According to the results, 8 out of the 90 banks tested have failed.
10 Finally, in 
early December the European Banking Authority published the results of a new 
round of European stress tests. This time, the results showed that European banks 
are missing 115bn euros in capital in order to be considered ready to face fina n-
cial instability.
11 
                                                 
9 BBC News Business. 2010. “Seven EU Banks fails stress test”. July, 23 at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-10732597 (accessed February 2012). 
10 Hooper, John, Giles Tremlett and Gil Treanor. 2011. “Europe’s banking regu-
lator reveals eight banks failed stress tests”. The Guardian, July 15 at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/jul/15/european-banks-stress-test (accessed 
February 2012).  
11 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8de33032-21b9-11e1-8b93-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1ky895a9o (accessed February 2012).   
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The stress test showed that banks need to work on their capital require-
ments to have the proper capital buffer in order to deal with a financial meltdown 
and avoid the US banking crisis. The Basel Accords are a number of agreements 
in charge of providing recommendations on banking regulations. The Basel Ac-
cord has been defined by the Bank of International Settlements as a comprehen-
sive set of reform and measures which have been developed by the Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and risk 
management of the banking sector. The aim of the Basel Accord is to improve 
the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from economic and financial 
stress, improve risk management and governance, and strengthen the transparen-
cy and disclosure of banks. There have been three Basel Agreements. The latest 
one—Basel III—has estimated that the European banking exposure to Greece 
reached €98.2bn ($138bn). Thus, to calm markets and investors’ fears, the EU 
has been the first area where these rules have become law obliging state to work 
towards  the  quick  implementation  of  the  so-called  Capital  Requirement  Di-
rective, which forces large banks to have bigger and better levels of capital ready 
to face a crisis. In an informative way, Basel III is asking banks to achieve some 
specific capital requirements. 
 
1.  The Common Equity Tier One (CET1) requires financial institutions 
to increase the percentage of risk-weighted assets from 2% to 4%, 
but the problem is that there are 14 strict criteria to determine what 
can be counted as CET1. 
 
2.  It requires financial institutions to implement a Capital Conservation 
Buffer, which should account for 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. 
 
This means that the total capital requirement is now 7%. This new reserve re-
quirement poses two intertwined threats to the system. First, banks have to put 
more money away to comply with this requirement which, in turn, will mean that 
there might be less money available for the banks to lend; this will reduce the 
liquidity available. Second, if the EU is the only area, or country, to implement 
these requirements, the EU would be at a disadvantage with less capital available.  
Basel III is aimed at imposing tougher capital requirements and liquidity 
standards. There are also plans to implement the liquidity standard. The new li-
quidity requirements are asking lenders to build up liquidity buffers by buying 
government  and  corporate  bonds.  However,  buying  these  in  times  of  distress 
such as the current times is expensive and could force lenders to slow down lend-
ing to the economy. The Liquidity Coverage ratio (LCR) aims at ensuring that 
banks in “in normal times have a sound funding structure and hold sufficient liq-
uid assets such that central banks are asked to perform only as lenders of last re- 
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sult and not as lenders of first resort.”
12  Most of the liquidity buffer has to be in 
the form of top-rated government bond with the remainder in highly rate corpo-
rate bonds. The idea was brought to the front line as some of the banks that run 
into problems – Northern Rock in Britain—had to be nationalized because of 
liquidity problems.  Implementing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio may represent a 
significant challenge for some banks but the benefit of implementing the LCR 
outweighs the cost of implementing it.   
 
The Threat: The Price of Oil 
 
An increase in the price of oil could negatively affect the economic recovery in 
Europe. The reason is that the barrel of oil is priced in US dollars, which means 
that Eurozone member states must sell euros and buy US dollars to pay for oil. 
Since the euro is losing ground against the American currency and the price of oil 
is increasing, Eurozone nation states are facing a difficult situation. As a conse-
quence, the price of oil is putting an extra burden on the feeble economy of the 
EU, particularly during the winter time when the demand for energy rises due to 
heating needs in most countries. By the same token, the Eurozone has enjoyed 
during the past years a preferred position as the value of the euro has been ex-
tremely high, which has helped pay the energy cost. 
Since February 2011, the world is watching a number of social revolts in 
the Middle East that are negatively affecting the price of oil to increase. Accord-
ing to the latest data, the cost of the EU annual need for oil surpasses $400bn. If 
BP previsions are right, this year will be the first with an average annual oil price 
above $100 a barrel.
13 
On January 4, 2012
14 European governments agreed, in principle, to ban 
imports of Iranian oil. This will be a heavy blow to Tehran just months before the 
Iranian election. EU diplomats have yet to set a date for the embargo which will 
force Tehran to find other buyers for oil. EU countries buy about 450,000 barrels 
per day (bpd) of Iran's 2.6 billion bpd in exports, making the bloc collectively the 
second largest market for Iranian crude after China. To add insult to injury, Ch i-
na has already cut its order of Iranian oil by more t han half in the past months. 
Still, Tehran has declared that this embargo will have no impact on the country as 
                                                 
12 Jones, Huw. 2012. “Global regulators signal leeway on new bank liquidity rules. Reu-
ters , January 8, at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/08/us-banks-regulation-
idUSTRE8070PD20120108   (accesses February 2012). 
13 BP Statistical Review at 
http://www.bp.com/sectionbodycopy.do?categoryId=7500&contentId=7068481. (Ac-
cessed February 2012). 
14 Reuters. 2012. “Europe Agrees to Ban Imports of Iran Oil; No Date Set”. 
CNBN.com, January 4 at http://www.cnbc.com/id/45871593  (accessed February 
2012).  
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"We  could  very  easily  replace  these  customers.”
15  However,  some  Eurozone 
member states are concerned about the economic impact of an embargo at a time 
when Europe is struggling with massive debt problems. Still, in retaliation Irani-
an Vice-President Mohamad Reza Rahimi warned that no oil would be allowed 
to pass through the Strait of Hormuz if the West applied sanctions on oil exports. 
Brent oil, a European crude company currently trading at $113 a barrel, could 
break $200 if Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz.
16 
 
Final Words  
 
The European Union and the Eurozone are at their finest hour. The possibility of 
a Greek default is now widely accepted and expected; further, the thought of a 
possible break up is no longer a taboo as Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands 
are openly expressing that they are now ready to face the ultimate case scenario 
as they have contingencies plans. Thus, the possibility of Eurozone disintegration 
should be considered unless member states agree on a true deeper integration at a 
monetary, economic, and political level and become the “United States of Eu-
rope.” Only this full integration will transform this bloc into a true common cur-
rency area which will guarantee its survival, since the Eurozone is lacking some 
of the most important ingredients: salary and price flexibility, economic homog-
enization, and the possibility of fiscal transfers.  
The Eurozone is suffering a current account crisis which is exacerbated 
by the fact that Spain and Italy are suffering from a liquidity problem, and Portu-
gal and Greece from an insolvency problem, which forced them to run govern-
ment deficit and grow their international debts. It is well know, that in order to 
reduce external debt, a country has only three options: reduce its debt, not pay its 
debt, or devalue. Since devaluation is not an option, and not paying back debt is 
economic and political suicide, the only option left is to reduce what it is owed. 
As a consequence, the only solution is for these countries to start a painful delev-
eraging process, implement public austerity, and a draconian internal devalua-
tion.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Irish Times. 2010. “EU Agrees in Iran oil imports ban”. January 5 at  
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0105/1224309832183.html (accessed 
February 2012). 
16 Forrest Jones. 2012. “Oil Could Soar 80 Percent of Iran Closed Hormuz, Analyst Says” 
Moneynews, January 10 http://www.moneynews.com/StreetTalk/Oil-Iran-Hormuz-
close/2012/01/10/id/423676 (accessed February 2012).  
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Abstract 
 
The Eurozone crisis is not just economic; it is also political.  The governance 
processes through which it has sought to resolve the economic crisis have raised 
a number of challenges for democracy in the EU and its member-states. These 
include its effects with regard to democratic legitimacy not just on ‘input’ politics 
and  ‘output’  policies  but also ‘throughput’  processes.    For  the  EU,  decision-
making  during  the  crisis  has  altered  the  ‘democratic’  institutional  balance 
through an increase in intergovernmental and non-majoritarian governance, while 
the recourse to technocratic processes raises questions about the legitimacy of 
this kind of ‘throughput,’ absent representative ‘input’ and effective ‘output’ if 
continued budgetary austerity produces recession.   For all member-state gov-
ernments—but  most  notably  for  the  unelected  technocratic  governments  of 
Greece and Italy—national democratic legitimacy through ‘input’ representation 
is also at issue. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Eurozone crisis is first and foremost an economic one, as the markets bet 
against the euro while pushing up the interest rates on the debt of the weaker pe-
ripheral countries to unsustainable levels —first Greece, then Ireland and Portu-
gal, now Spain and Italy.  The EU has responded late for the most part with a 
range of policies that have so far failed to calm the markets.  These have included 
loan bailouts to Greece (the second of which is currently under negotiation) and 
loan guarantee mechanisms for other countries at risk of contagion (the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the yet to be deployed European Stability 
Mechanism  (ESM)),  financed  in  conjunction  with  the  International  Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  Moreover, the EU member-states have all agreed to self-imposed 
across-the-board  austerity  policies  along  with  radical  deficit  reduction,  to  be 
monitored by the Commission, while those countries under the tutelage of the 
Troika (EU Commission, ECB, and IMF) have had to agree to even greater aus- 
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terity in exchange for debt relief (i.e., Greece, Ireland, and Portugal).  Concomi-
tantly, the European Central Bank (ECB) has been buying up government debt 
on the secondary markets and, most recently, provided three-year low cost loans 
to private banks also to buy government debt.  Only this last measure has seemed 
to ease market pressure.  But there has been no growth, with the EU predicted to 
slide into recession next year.  
EU policies, in short, have not solved the economic crisis.  And in the in-
terim, the governance processes through which the EU and its member-states 
have sought to solve the economic crisis risk engendering a political crisis as 
well.  Decision-making has become more and more remote from the citizens, as 
EU member-state leaders—dominated by France and Germany—have taken all 
the initiatives, along with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary  Fund  (IMF).    This  has  marginalized  not  just  the  EU  Commission, 
tasked with technocratic oversight using automatic rules, but also the European 
and national parliaments, excluded from debates or decision-making.  National 
citizens, moreover, are generally ignored, whether as voters with expressed pref-
erences, as members of interest groups or social movements, or as protesters in 
the streets.   
All of this represents a challenge to democracy at both the EU and na-
tional levels.  If we consider democratic legitimacy in the systems theory terms 
often applied to the EU, the problems involve not only the lack of effectiveness 
of the ‘output’ policy solutions to the crisis but also the minimal representative 
‘input’ into decision-making as well as the limited efficacy, accountability, and 
inclusiveness of the ‘throughput’ processes by which those decisions have been 
taken.   In what follows, we begin by defining these legitimacy terms, then turn 
to the challenges from Eurozone governance to EU democracy, and finally to the 
challenges to national democracy. 
 
Theorizing Democratic Legitimacy in the EU 
 
Democratic legitimacy in the EU is often theorized in terms of two legitimizing 
mechanisms derived from systems theory:  input, judged in terms of the EU’s 
responsiveness to citizen concerns as a result of participation ‘by the people,’ and 
output, judged in terms of the effectiveness of the EU’s policy outcomes ‘for the 
people’  (Scharpf 1970, 1999).  Input is concerned with citizen’s active participa-
tion and deliberation in EU political processes and the representativeness of EU 
institutions.  Output relates legitimacy primarily to policy outcomes, that is, to 
the effectiveness of EU solutions to problems.  Debates about EU legitimacy 
have tended to divide between those who argue that the EU can be legitimated on 
output alone, because the policies produced by independent regulators in multiple 
veto systems intrinsically serve the general interest (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 
2002; Caporaso and Tarrow 2008; Menon and Weatherill 2008), and those who 
insist that input politics are necessary and insufficient in the EU (e.g., Bellamy 
and Castiglione 2003; Mair 2006; Hix 2008).  
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What is generally missed in this dichotomous formulation of EU legiti-
macy is a third legitimizing mechanism, also derived from systems theory, that 
focuses on what goes on in the ‘black box’ of governance between input and out-
put, which I term ‘throughput’ (Schmidt 2012; see also Zürn 2000; Benz and Pa-
padopoulos 2006).  Throughput focuses on EU governance processes with the 
people,  analyzed  in  terms  of  the  efficacy  of  the  decision-making  processes 
(Scharpf  1988),  the  accountability  of  those  engaged  in  making  the  decisions 
(Harlow and Rawlins 2007), the transparency of the information (Héritier 2003), 
and the processes’ inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the interest 
groups  of  ‘civil  society’  (e.g.,  Coen  and  Richardson  2009;  Greenwood  2007; 
Smismans 2003).  The quality of the governance processes, then, and not just the 
effectiveness of the outcomes or the participation and representation of the citi-
zenry, is an important criterion for the evaluating EU legitimacy.  It has long 
been among the central ways in which EU institutional players have sought to 
counter claims about the poverty of the EU’s input legitimacy and to reinforce 
claims to its output legitimacy.   In so doing, they have operated under the as-
sumption that good throughput may serve as a kind of ‘cordon sanitaire’ for the 
EU, ensuring the trustworthiness of the processes and serving, thereby, as a kind 
of reinforcement or, better, reassurance, of the legitimacy of EU level govern-
ance. 
As for the interaction effects of the three, whereas input politics and out-
put policy can involve trade-offs, in which more of the one makes up for less of 
the other, throughput does not interact with output and input in the same way.  
Although throughput is also an important component of the EU’s democratic le-
gitimacy, better quality throughput does not offset bad policy output or minimal 
input participation. But bad throughput—consisting of oppressive, incompetent, 
corrupt, or biased governance practices—undermines public perceptions of the 
legitimacy of EU governance, and it can even throw input and output into ques-
tion by seeming to skew representative politics or taint policy solutions (Schmidt 
2012).   
The  multi-level  nature  of  the  EU  system  further  complicates  matters, 
since these legitimizing mechanisms are largely split between EU and national 
levels.  Because the EU lacks the input of a directly elected government, its dem-
ocratic legitimacy rests largely on the throughput processes and output policies of 
the EU level, whereas input representation remains situated largely at the national 
level.  This makes on the one hand for national ‘politics without policy,’ as more 
and more policy decisions have moved to the EU level while leaving the politics 
of the left and right to the national level; and on the other hand for EU  'policy 
without politics,' since in EU institutions the politics of the left and right is much 
less  present  than  the  politics  of  national  interests  in  the  Council,  the  super-
majoritarian politics of the public interest in the European Parliament, and the 
politics of organized interests in the EU Commission (Schmidt 2006, pp. 21-29).  
And yet, and here is the rub, the actual content of the policies can be very 
political.  The economic policies in response to the Eurozone crisis in particular 
are  highly  conservative,  following  neo-liberal and ordo-liberal (read  German)  
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ideas about the need for radical deficit reduction and harsh austerity policies to 
deal with high deficits and debts, even during times of economic recession.  But 
they are presented as technocratic solutions to which ‘there is no alternative’ 
(echoing Thatcher’s famous phrase).  As such, they are not subject to political 
debate or parliamentary deliberation.  The crisis has as a result only exacerbated 
the EU's 'policy without politics.'  This is because decisions on the rules to be 
applied to Eurozone countries have been made largely absent EU level input via 
parliamentary involvement while the rules themselves tend to make recourse to 
throughput processes via automatic rules and technocratic oversight in the im-
plementation of the output policies.  
 
The Challenges to European Democracy from Eurozone Governance 
 
Prior to the Eurozone crisis, the legitimacy of the euro was largely founded on its 
policy output.  This was generally seen as positive because the euro protected 
Eurozone countries from major currency fluctuations as it maintained credibility 
as an international currency.  The ECB, as a non-majoritarian institution with 
great independence from political authority, was given high points for the effica-
cy of its management of the currency, and thus also gained throughput legitima-
cy.  In this pre-crisis period, however, the ECB’s independence was occasionally 
challenged, in particular by French leaders, when its anti-inflation focus led to 
interest  rate  hikes  that  had  negative  effects  on  unemployment  and  growth.  
Moreover, when the Stability and Growth Pact was first defied by France and 
Germany in the early to mid-2000s, then altered to meet their concerns, questions 
were raised about the quality of the throughput governance of the Eurozone.  But 
leaving this aside, the lack of input politics was largely seen as legitimate up until 
the Eurozone crisis.   
Once the crisis hit, and in particular once some member-states had to go 
to the  IMF  and  the  EU for loan  guarantees  and  bailouts  while the  Eurozone 
member-states generally agreed to EU oversight of their budgets, the democratic 
legitimacy  of  technocracy—or  output  and  throughput  vs.  input—became  the 
main issue.   
With regard to the ECB, the main question has remained: How good is 
its output or efficacious its throughput, given its very narrow interpretation of its 
already narrow mandate?  The ECB has largely refused to do what other Central 
Banks do, which is save their currencies by acting as a lender of last resort or, 
more simply, by quantitative easing (printing money).  This is because its man-
date as established by the treaties does not allow it to buy government debt on the 
primary markets, and emphasizes maintaining price stability as its primary objec-
tive.  And yet, it did buy member-state debt on the secondary markets, beginning 
in May 2010, in order to help stop the contagion from the Greek crisis spreading 
to the other vulnerable countries.  Ensuring the stability of the monetary system 
is also part of its mandate.   
So has the ECB produced effective output and efficacious throughput?  
Some commentators question the effectiveness of the output, criticizing the re- 
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fusal of the ECB to hold on to member-state debt, which would have pushed 
down long-term interest rates.  Instead, they argue that the ECB has neutralized 
its bond purchases by reselling them to private banks.  As a result, instead of sta-
bilizing the financial markets, it has allowed the crisis to go on, and on (Guiggen 
2011).  That said, the ECB’s most recent move, of lending to the banks at a 1% 
rate of interest for a period of three years in view of their using that money to buy 
government debt—mainly in their own countries—has proven highly successful 
in easing market pressure, as a kind of backdoor quantitative easing.  So here, 
technocratic (throughput) governance may finally have produced effective (out-
put) policies. 
The EU policymaking process suffers from another set of problems, in-
volving  trade-offs  between  different  kinds  of  input  legitimacy  as  well  as 
throughput legitimacy.  By prioritizing decision-making through EU Summits, 
the European Council, and the Council of Ministers, EU member-state leaders 
have shifted the institutional balance increasingly toward the intergovernmen-
tal—acting as the indirect (input) representatives of their countries.  They have 
not done this well in terms of throughput efficacy, given the delays and hesitant 
solutions that repeatedly have failed to calm the markets.  The Council’s subop-
timal throughput, moreover, is accompanied by little input participation by the 
European Parliament, the only directly elected body in the EU, and less through-
put involvement by the EU Commission, now tasked with technocratic oversight 
of national budgets.    
The lack of involvement by the EP, first of all, raises further legitimacy 
questions, since EU-based democratic input derives not just from citizens’ indi-
rect representation through the Council—EU leaders’ justification for calling all 
the shots—but also from citizens’ direct representation in the European Parlia-
ment (EP).  The political leaders don’t acknowledge this, especially since they 
seem to have moved toward assuming that an intergovernmental Europe is the 
best way to govern.  Note Merkel’s statement in her speech at the College of Eu-
rope in Bruges (Nov. 2, 2010), in which she claims that with the new ‘Union 
Method:’ “a coordinated European position can be arrived at not just by applying 
the community method; sometimes a coordinated European position can be ar-
rived at by applying the intergovernmental method;” and Sarkozy’s statement in 
his Toulon speech on the Eurozone crisis (Dec. 1, 2011), in which he states that 
‘Europe needs more democracy’ and defines a more democratic Europe as ‘a Eu-
rope in which its political leaders decide.’  But even were intergovernmental 
governance to be perceived as sufficiently legitimizing as (indirect) input, prob-
lems stem from the fact that it is the Franco-German couple—or perhaps only 
Germany—in control. 
The EU Commission’s technocratic (throughput) function involving the 
vetting of national budgets, moreover, is also problematic with regard to the input 
legitimacy that the EP would normally provide.  The fact that the European Par-
liament has largely been sidelined in Eurozone decision-making means that it 
cannot deliberate or contest the decisions of Eurozone leaders with regard to the 
criteria for technocratic oversight, let alone revise the criteria—which are largely  
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those of the Stability and Growth Pact, reinforced in the ‘Six Pack’ voted in 
summer 2011, or the ‘fiscal compact’ under consideration today in the treaty of 
25 (following the UK veto in December 2011, with the addition of the Czech Re-
public’s opt-out). Even more importantly, the Commission’s power to vet nation-
al budgets before governments submit them to national parliaments undermines 
one of the main pillars of national parliaments’ representative power—control 
over national budgets.  The fact that the EU Commission’s mandate is not just to 
vet national budgets but to sanction governments that don’t mend their ways only 
adds insult to injury with regard to national parliaments’ input legitimacy. 
As for the input legitimation of technocratic governance itself, this be-
comes an issue once we recognize that most of it operates without much demo-
cratic input control.  It is not just that the EU Commission’s oversight role takes 
precedence over national parliaments and is outside the reach of the EP.  It is also 
that the ECB operates in its highly independent ‘non-majoritarian’ role without 
any government or parliamentary control, unlike its national level equivalents, 
that always operate in the shadow of national politics (Schmidt 2012).  And the 
IMF only increases the weight of the non-majoritarian, when it comes to the loan 
bailouts and loan guarantee mechanisms for EU member-states in need of rescue. 
Policy output is also in question. There has been little public debate over 
the recipe for economic reform—austerity for all, across the board—which has 
largely been imposed by Germany in exchange for agreeing to loan bailouts and 
guarantees.  But it has not been working, as seen from the deepening crises in 
Southern Europe and the slowdown in European economies generally, including 
Germany.  And the ‘fiscal compact’ agreed on Dec. 9, 2011, which intends to 
rigidify the criteria agreed but not enforced in the Stability and Growth Pact and 
set them in stone—meaning the Treaties—is likely only to make matters worse 
economically.  This is because even if the debt crisis is resolved, hiding behind it 
is a growth crisis for the member-states generally, and a competitiveness crisis 
for the Southern Europeans (Schmidt 2011b; see also 2010). 
The throughput processes pose yet another problem for democratic legit-
imacy.  The implementation of the austerity rules tends to be automatic, with 
technocratic oversight.  The assumption here is that good technocratic throughput 
by the Commission—as opposed to political input by the Council and EP—will 
serve as the ‘cordon sanitaire’ ensuring the trustworthiness of the processes and, 
thereby, their legitimacy.  But if the rules appear oppressive—as they are likely 
to very quickly for the Southern European countries—or biased, because they 
benefit  export-oriented  Northern  European  countries  with  corporatist  wage-
bargaining systems and penalize the South—then the legitimacy of both the input 
and the output will be questioned.   
 
The Technocratic Challenges to National Democratic Legitimacy  
 
Further  questions  related  to  democracy  versus  technocracy  must  be 
raised for the EU member-states.  These are highlighted in particular by the res-
ignations of Papandreou in Greece and Berlusconi in Italy and their replacement  
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by technocratic governments.  And issues related to technocracy only intensify 
when we add the EU Commission’s increasing powers of surveillance of member 
states’  national  budgets—crowned  by  the  ‘fiscal  compact’  agreed  on  Dec.  9, 
2010—not to mention the powers of the Troika (IMF, European Central Bank, 
and EU Commission) when it comes to Eurozone member states that have had 
recourse to loan bailouts (Greece) or to the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) (Ireland and Portugal).   
The  answers  to  the  questions  about  democracy  vs.  technocracy  are 
mixed.  Berlusconi's replacement with a technocratic government—precipitated 
primarily by global market pressures—may actually still be seen as democracy at 
work—with the EU to the rescue.  Papandreou's replacement—precipitated by 
the pressures of the Eurozone powers and Papandreou’s own ill-advised gamble 
on ‘direct democracy’—depends upon how things play themselves out.  
Berlusconi's demise has mostly to do with the power of the financial 
markets and how these have forced a response from a stalemated Italian political 
system—rife with patronage and clientelistic politics and led by a man who was 
spending his time attending to his own best interests rather than those of the 
country.  Berlusconi's last ditch effort to get the markets off his back, by offering 
to have the IMF vet Italy's reform efforts every three months, is testimony to this, 
as are earlier agreements to respond to EU Commission recommendations for 
budgetary cuts.  But even without those outside pressures, Italy has been having 
an internal crisis of national democracy for a while now.  The fall of Berlusconi 
may very well be a new chance to make democracy work—with the EU playing a 
positive role.  Italy has been 'rescued by Europe' in the past, in the mid-1990s 
when technical governments followed by the Center Left under Prodi performed 
the seemingly impossible, making a massive effort to put the country's accounts 
in order to join the Euro, as noted above. This could happen again, with ‘remain-
ing in the euro’ becoming the rallying cry of a technocratic government trying to 
make Italy competitive again, until new elections are held. But this will work 
only if the new Prime Minister Mario Monti manages to bring not just the politi-
cal parties but also the people along with him.  The early signs are good in this 
regard.  
In the case of Italy, then, democratic legitimacy could be said to be pre-
served if we think of what happens as a tradeoff:  the country briefly gives up 
participatory input, represented by the policies of an elected government, for po-
tentially good policy output provided by a technocratic government with effica-
cious throughput.  There is still a legitimacy problem, of course, because the 
government is not elected.  But this is attenuated by the fact that the Monti gov-
ernment is perceived as legitimate by the public.  This is largely because it is 
democratically anointed and supported by input politics, given that it was ap-
pointed by the elected President and governs through a massive Parliamentary 
majority that includes the major parties.    
Papandreou's resignation, by contrast, is more problematic with regard to 
the democracy/ technocracy tradeoff.  In order to avoid default, Papandreou had 
to make a 'pact with the devil' that all countries in danger of default do:  give up  
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control over national policy in exchange for a supranational bailout.  Even this 
can be considered democratically legitimate to the extent that a country for a 
short time gives up participatory input in exchange for good policy output.  The 
difference is that when non-Eurozone countries go to the IMF, they give up con-
trol of their economic policy in exchange for a negotiated reduction in debt and a 
short, sharp period of austerity plus a devaluation of their currency.   Greece, as a 
member of the Eurozone, could not devalue its currency, and in the first bailout it 
did not even get a renegotiation of its debt, promised only in the second bailout 
package.  In exchange for  following the policies dictated by the Troika (IMF, 
ECB, and EU Commission), the bailout, including the second tranche, was ac-
cording to projections only going to bring its debt back to its old level of 120 % 
of GDP in ten years, accompanied by a an equally long sharp period of austerity 
that would produce devaluation not of the currency but of salaries along with a 
massive reduction in welfare state entitlements and services.   
So what Greece got is no participatory input and bad policy output dic-
tated via the (not so efficacious) throughput processes of the Troika.  While Pa-
pandreou ignored the increasingly vociferous protests of the Greek public over 
the past two years, thereby denying the protesters any participatory input, the 
policies themselves produced no growth while imposing increasing pain on a dis-
enfranchised public.  This is a recipe for disaster.  In this light, Papandreou's call 
for a referendum could be seen as a genuine desire to bring participatory democ-
racy  and  political  citizenship  back  in,  by  allowing  the  electorate  to  vote  on 
whether to accept the bailout package and, by extension, to stay in or to leave the 
Eurozone.  The catch here, however, is that in re-enfranchising the Greek public 
he was single-handedly dis-enfranchising the greater public of Eurozone coun-
tries, for whom the fate of the euro itself was likely to depend on the outcome of 
the Greek referendum (Dehousse 2011).  Any ‘no’ vote would have been an eco-
nomic disaster for Europe, by endangering the survival of the euro.  Moreover, 
the run up to the referendum would have spelled economic disaster in Greece, 
with a run on the Greek banks as people in Greece worried about the uncertain-
ties of the outcome.  Various scenarios discussed in the press had Greece out of 
the euro, followed by Italy, then Spain, with France under severe pressure due to 
the exposure of its banks and possibly out while Germany would constitute a 
northern euro zone. 
The democratic legitimacy of the new technocratic government under 
Prime Minister Lucas Papademos will depend largely on the extent to which it 
can produce good policy output, with policies that work—by not just inflicting 
pain but also generating growth.  The only way to do this would be to gain the 
public’s trust—lost to the previous government—by truly representing the Greek 
public’s interests.  This would entail quietly working out compromises with the 
Troika that exchange structural reforms for growth strategies focused on job and 
business creation and necessarily a slower reduction in deficits. 
Greece is not the only country to potentially undermine EU ‘democracy’ 
by imposing its own decisions on Europeans as a whole.  Germany’s constant 
evocation of its Constitutional Court to delay decisions or to push for Treaty  
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change has been another way one country can hold the entire EU hostage.  Chan-
cellor Merkel used the Constitutional Court first as an excuse to stall on bailing 
out Greece in spring 2010, leading to a worsening of the crisis and the need to 
create the EFSF against further contagion.  She used it also to insist on creating 
an ESM within the Treaties in fall 2010, which led to a steep increase in interest 
rates on Irish debt, forcing Ireland to find shelter with the EFSF.  The Constitu-
tional Court ruling on democratic oversight of decisions has additionally meant 
that the Chancellor has to consult the Bundestag (the German upper house of Par-
liament) on any major decisions.  This has entailed repeated breaking up of Eu-
ropean Council meetings to consult the Bundestag in order to satisfy the rules 
imposed by the Constitutional Court.   The point here is not that member states 
should do away with national democratic processes they consider necessary to 
maintain legitimacy but that this can cause problems for European democracy if 
these kinds of national democratic exigencies are multiplied across EU member 
states (Dehousse 2011). The irony here is that Germany has insisted on ensuring 
the full reign of its own parliamentary democracy while denying this to the EU 
level, where it pushes instead for automatic rules and technocratic oversight that 
deny the possibility of parliamentary deliberation at the EU level. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the final analysis, the biggest problem posed by the Eurozone crisis for demo-
cratic legitimacy is at the national level, with regard to input politics.  Only the 
biggest countries can throw their weight around like Germany, and demand that 
their own constitutional considerations take precedence over those of the EU as a 
whole. For most member-states, and in particular for those caught by the Euro-
zone crisis, their elected governments don’t have a choice, which also means that 
the people’s choice doesn’t matter.  This has engendered a massive loss of trust 
in national governments.  The Eurobarometer polls show that trust in government 
was down to 10% in 2010 in Ireland from 41% in 2007, down to 19% from 46% 
in Portugal, from 41% to 22% in Greece, and 52% to 21% in Spain.  And it is 
even worse in terms of political parties, with Greece at only 5% and Ireland at 
9%; and it is not much better in Spain (11%) and Portugal (14%).  Moreover, 
while all unions can do is agree to concessions while gaining nothing in return, as 
in the Spanish pension agreement and the Irish Croke Park deal, all social move-
ments like the Spanish indignados manage is to mobilize members for protests 
and demonstrations that get them nothing other than, sometimes, news coverage 
(Armingeon and Baccaro 2011). 
If  the  Eurozone  crisis  resolves  itself  very  soon,  and  the  austerity 
measures actually work, then we might be able to argue that the tradeoff between 
reducing input politics in favor of output policy solutions, governed by through-
put technocracy, was worth it.  But the likelihood that the debt crisis will be re-
solved soon is low, given that the ECB has not as yet deployed its ‘big bazooka’ 
as lender of last resort, the EFSF and ESM have not been increased to bazooka 
size, and Eurobonds remain off the table.  In the interim, with all member-states  
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except the UK and the Czech Republic signed up to the austerity of the fiscal 
compact, and the UK outside but imposing its own equally austere economic pol-
icies,  the  growth  crisis  is  looming,  along  with  the  competitiveness  crisis  for 
Southern Europe.  In this context, EU and national government legitimacy is cer-
tain to be questioned, putting strains on political citizenship, and leaving an open 
playing field to the Eurosceptic extremes on the right and the left. 
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Abstract 
 
With the publication of the European Security Strategy in 2003, the European 
Union has placed particular significance on enhancing its relations with major 
international  organizations  across  a  variety  of  policy-fields.  Accordingly,  the 
EU’s  overarching  ‘foreign  policy  philosophy  of  Effective  Multilateralism’ 
(Barroso 2004) calls for the EU to reinforce global governance schemes with a 
strengthened United Nations at its core and strong transatlantic relations, embod-
ied through a comprehensive EU-NATO ‘strategic partnership’. This paper takes 
stock of the achievements, impact and limitations of the ‘European Union as an 
Inter-organizational Actor’ during the last decade. It will be argued that despite 
intensified relations and institutionalized collaboration, the European Union has 
nevertheless pursued a strategy of inter-organizational cooperation that seems to 
have been more beneficial for the internal build-up of its own Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) and external visibility and less aimed at reinforcing 
the partner organizations. The paper will argue for a more ‘genuine’ implementa-
tion of effective multilateralism, which would benefit both the impact and reputa-
tion of the EU as an international actor as well as the development of more co-
herent and effective forms of global governance.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“To meet today’s global security threats, the European Security Strategy calls for 
a more effective multilateralism as the only way forward. Close co-operation 
with the UN and NATO are [sic] essential for a more effective multilateralism.” 
(José M. Barroso 2009) 
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In June 2003, against the dislocating back-drop of the Iraq War that rather forci-
bly exposed the European Union’s (EU) external ineffectiveness as well as its 
internal disarray, the EU’s former High Representative for the Common Foreign 
Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana presented his first draft of an EU document 
that was intended to reassert the EU as a capable and coherent international actor. 
In his ‘European Security Strategy (ESS) – A Secure Europe in a Better World’ 
Solana introduced a key term to the EU’s official foreign policy discourse that 
was to become synonymous with the ESS as a whole: effective multilateralism 
(Council, 2003, 9). This overarching EU foreign policy guiding principle includ-
ed the EU’s declared goal of strengthening – and closely cooperating with – the 
United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), par-
ticularly in the realm of peacekeeping and military crisis management (ibid, 9-
10). Barely a year after the final draft of the ESS had been adopted by the EU, 
the then newly elected EU Commission president, José Manuel Barroso picked 
up on this term and declared “the European Union pursues a specific foreign pol-
icy philosophy which I would term ‘effective multilateralism’” (Barroso 2004: 
3). So doing, the Commission elevated the new concept to a cornerstone of an 
emerging EU ‘Foreign Policy of Effective Multilateralism’. Arguably, for the 
first time in the EU’s history, the organization had given itself a clearly identifia-
ble and distinct foreign policy objective; and one that has been firmly rooted in a 
discourse of strengthening global governance through inter-organizational col-
laboration. 
   Indeed, during the nine years since the ESS was first adopted, there has 
already been a remarkable range of far-reaching developments and advances as a 
result of the EU’s active promotion of effective multilateralism on the ground. 
Particularly in the context of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP)
1, EU-NATO and EU-UN cooperation schemes were vital in enabling the 
EU to launch its first six military missions in the Western Ba lkans and on the 
African Continent (Grevi et al. 2009; Koops 2011). Furthermore, more instit u-
tionalized and more permanent cooperation mechanisms have been established, 
such as the NATO-EU Capability Group or the UN-EU Steering Committee. Be-
yond the CSDP, the European Commission and the European Council have dur-
ing the last decade also expanded their ‘strategic partnerships’ with more than 30 
major international organizations and UN Agencies (Emerson et al. 2011). Thus, 
the emergence and the EU’s actual promotion and implementation of ‘effective 
multilateralism’ were welcomed by policy-makers and commentators alike and 
viewed as having potentially significant implications – not only for the EU’s own 
evolution as an international security actor, but also for more comprehensive and 
coherent schemes of global (security) governance. 
  Yet, recent developments inside and outside the EU have put some fun-
                                                 
1 In this chapter, I will use the new post-Lisbon Treaty acronym Common Security and 
Defense Policy (CSDP). In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted, however, that 
prior to the Lisbon Treaty from 1999 to 2009 CSDP was referred to as European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP).   
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damental question marks behind the impact of ‘effective multilateralism’ as well 
as behind the motivations, capacities and performance of the European Union as 
an  ‘Inter-organizational  Actor’  (Jørgensen  2009; Kissack  2010; Koops  2011). 
From NATO’s perspective, the lack of ‘reciprocity’ in EU-NATO relations and 
the tendency of some member-states to systematically block more meaningful 
cooperation between both organizations has led to widely shared frustrations (De 
Hoop Scheffer 2007). United Nations officials, on the other hand, increasingly 
voice their disappointment over the EU’s alleged inward-looking approach to 
international  security  governance  and  its  general  inability  to  provide  much-
needed peacekeeping support and critical resources (Gowan 2009). The rather 
sobering  saga  of  the  EU  Battle  groups, first  greeted  with  high  hopes  by  EU 
member states and the wider peacekeeping community, then widely ridiculed as a 
‘paper tiger’ due to not having been deployed even once so far, serves as a case 
in point (ibid).  
      Assessing the first decade of the EU’s pursuit of Effective Multilateralism, 
this chapter seeks to provide a critical appraisal of the EU’s track record in en-
gaging in cooperation with key international organizations so far. Whilst EU-
NATO and EU-UN relations in the field of peace and security serve as the main 
case studies of this chapter, the discussion will also generate more generalizable 
observations and conclusions about the impact and performance of the European 
Union as an Inter-organizational Actor.  
  The structure of the chapter will be as follows: the next section will offer 
a brief overview of the history of, and evolving scholarship on the EU’s inter-
organizational relations with both NATO and the United Nations. Thereafter, the 
chapter will take a closer look at the EU’s implementation of EU-UN and EU-
NATO  ‘effective  multilateralism’  on  the  ground.  Here  the  main  inter-
organizational effects and dynamics the EU’s six military operations carried out 
so far will be examined. Finally, the concluding section will provide some gen-
eral remarks about the dangers of a too inward-looking and self-promoting EU 
approach to inter-organizational global security governance.  
 
 
A Brief History of the EU’s Inter-organizational Relations 
  
Research on the European Union’s relations with other international organiza-
tions has burgeoned during the last decade (for the most comprehensive works, 
see  Laatikainen  and  Smith  2006;  Wouters  et  al.    2006;  Jørgensen  2009; 
Blavoukos  and  Bourantonis  2011;  Koops  2009,  2011;  Costa  and  Jørgensen 
2012). Of course, problems related to inter-organizational relations are not a new 
phenomenon. In the mid-1960s, the proliferation of international organizations 
with overlapping memberships in Europe prompted the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe at the time to warn member states in a confidential communi-
qué (entitled Duplication and Co-operation Between Organizations) about “the 
imperious necessity to make some progress in the long and arduous task of giv- 
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ing a more coherent structure to the growth and development of international or-
ganizations” (Council of Europe 1966, cited in Smithers 1979: 30).  
  From  an  EU  perspective,  the  peculiarity  of  Cold  War  dynamics  also 
structured and limited to a large degree the relations (or lack thereof) between the 
European Community  (EC) and other organizations, especially in the ‘ high poli-
tics’ field of peace and security. Contacts between officials from the EC and the 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organization  were  explicitly  prohibited  until  the  early 
1990s (Ojanen 2004: 12). Yet, in other ‘low politics’ fields the EC and its institu-
tional predecessors did establish closer links with other organizations (particular-
ly Agencies and Programmes of the UN system) from the early 1950s onwards.
2 
During the 1970s, with the onset of the European Political Cooperati on (EPC) 
mechanisms, the EC also gained an elevated position in international politics 
through its observer status in the UN General Assembly since 1974 and its role as 
a player in its own right in the negotiations of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between and 1973 and 1975 (Möckli 2007).  It 
was not, however, until the end of the bipolar global order and the outbreak of 
the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) that the opportunities and imperatives for closer 
inter-organizational cooperation intensified (Biermann, 2008: 154). Indeed, in its 
new post-Cold War Rome Declaration and its Strategic Concept of 1991, NATO 
already called for a ‘new security architecture’ based on a “framework of inter-
locking institutions” between, inter alia, NATO, the EU, the CSCE and the Unit-
ed Nations. (NATO 1991a: para 3, see also NATO 1991b: para 33). Yet, the 
cumbersome NATO-UN ‘Dual Key’ Arrangements as well as the general failure 
of the EU, CSCE and UN to exert meaningful influence during the Balkan wars 
highlighted not only the weakness of the post-Cold War security architecture in 
Europe, but also underscored the limits of effective inter-organizational coopera-
tion.  As  a  result,  the  Organization  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(OSCE)
3 reiterated in its inaugural Lisbon Report of 1996 the need for a “mutual-
ly beneficial and mutually reinforcing security network” between core interna-
tional organizations, whilst the United Nations repeatedly pleaded for closer rela-
tions  with  regional  organizations  (Boutros-Ghali  1992,  1995;  United  Nations 
2000) that should ideally transform into a ‘system of interlocking peacekeeping 
capacities’ (Annan 2005). Against this backdrop, the far-reaching decisions taken 
by European leaders and EU policy-makers on the Common Security and For-
eign Policy (CFSP) in 1991 and on the Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP) in 1998 and 1999 created both fundamental risks and unprecedented op-
portunities in the field of inter-organizational relations.  
                                                 
2 One of the earliest formal cooperation agreements dates back to the European Coal and 
Steel Community’s Cooperation Agreement with the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) in 1953. Further agreements were signed by the EC with, inter alia, the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (1962), UNESCO (1964) and the World Health Organization 
(1982).  
3 In 1995, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was transformed into a 
permanent organization and renamed as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE).   
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First of all, the decision to build up an autonomous military security di-
mension within the European Union inevitably posed questions about the role of 
NATO and US in the new European security framework. Whilst the Clinton ad-
ministration welcomed European efforts to strengthen their military capacities, 
concerns about European ‘autonomy’ and direct challenges to NATO led to the 
formulation of some strict ‘red lines’, summed up infamously by Madeline Al-
bright’s ‘Three Ds’. Accordingly, the development of CSDP should neither lead 
to the decoupling of North American and European security, nor to the duplica-
tion of NATO assets, nor to the discrimination against non-EU NATO members 
(Albright 1998). Arguably, as will be discussed in more detail below, 14 years on 
it seems as if all three fears have become an uncomfortable transatlantic reality: 
during  the  last  decade  the  EU  increasingly  autonomized  and  decoupled  from 
NATO (albeit not entirely from the US), duplicated several institutions (such as 
the ESDP military institutions and the EU Battle groups) and inevitably discrimi-
nated against NATO members that are not part of the EU, most notably by ex-
cluding Turkey and the US from core decision-making procedures and CSDP 
institutions, such as the European Defense Agency (EDA). Nevertheless, during 
the first five years of CSDP between 1999 and 2004, NATO and the European 
Union forged one of the most densely institutionalized relations between two 
separate organizations with a wide range of positive results and significant  –
albeit hitherto untapped- potentials. 
In parallel, the EU’s relations with the United Nations in the field of 
peace and security also grew into more formalized arrangements with the onset 
of CSDP in 1999. After informal staff-to-staff contacts, the EU Council Presi-
dency report of June 2000 boldly declared that CSDP “will enable Europeans to 
respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organiza-
tions such as the UN” (Council 2000). With the build-up of CSDP and its opera-
tionalization in 2003, particularly in the context of the EU’s Military mission Ar-
temis – launched in June 2003 in support of the UN Peacekeeping mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo – hopes were raised that the EU’s policy of ‘ef-
fective multilateralism’ could indeed lead to a strengthened UN security govern-
ance system and a strategic EU-NATO partnership at the core of reinvigorated 
transatlantic security relations.  Yet, a closer examination of the EU’s military 
CSDP missions and its inter-organizational relations with NATO and the UN 
from 2003 to the present reveal a less optimistic picture.  
 
The European Union’s Relations with NATO and the UN in the Field: ‘Ef-
fective Multilateralism’ or ‘Instrumentalist Inter-organizationalism’? 
 
As highlighted by the table below, all of the EU’s six military missions so far 
have been carried out in some form in cooperation with either NATO or the 
United Nations. Indeed, it could be argued that close cooperation with both or-
ganizations was essential for breaking the taboo of the EU becoming a Military 
Actor and for kick-starting the military missions of CSDP in the first place. Ever 
since the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, the EU  
 
 
122    Koops 
 
had restricted itself to ‘civilian’ and ‘soft power’ approaches to international se-
curity, leaving the military, hard end of security cooperation to NATO. Particu-
larly for British governments, the veto on developing any European security ar-
rangement outside NATO was non-negotiable. Even Tony Blair’s reversal of this 
position at St Malo in 1998, which laid the political foundations for CSDP at the 
bilateral  Franco-British  level,  was  advanced  under  the  firm  assumption  that 
CSDP would strengthen NATO and would reassure the Americans that the Euro-
peans could close the gap of their capability short-falls. It was thus also a British 
General – Graham Messervy-Whiting – who was tasked by the EU to set up the 
new CSDP procedures and institutions (EU Military Staff, Military Committee 
and Political and Security Committee) between 1999 and 2001, borrowing heavi-
ly from NATO (and the Western European Union) as a model (Koops 2012). 
Furthermore,  the  heavily  negotiated  and  highly  technical  ‘Berlin  Plus  Agree-
ments’ that were concluded just in time for the EU’s first ever military operation 
– Operation Concordia in Macedonia, launched in March 2003 – ensured on the 
one hand EU access to NATO and US military assets (including Operational 
Headquarters and NATO’s D-SACEUR double-hatted as EU Operational Com-
mander), but on the other also allowed for some degree of continued US influ-
ence and control over CSDP. As long as EU Military Missions were conducted in 
close cooperation with NATO, Britain and other trans-atlantically minded EU 
member-states had little objections. NATO provided not only internal and trans-
atlantic legitimacy for launching the EU’s first military mission, but it also pro-
vided the EU with external credibility towards a skeptical public in both Mace-
donia and in the context of the EU’s 2004 Althea Mission in Bosnia, where nega-
tive  memories  of  the  EU’s  failure  to  act  decisively  during  the  Bosnian  War 
(1992-1995) were still wide-spread. Thus, during the first four years of CSDP, 
NATO not only served as an institutional model, but also as a critical enabler and 
provider of internal legitimacy and external credibility for the EU’s missions in 
the Western Balkans. 
  However, with growing experience in the field of hard security (Concor-
dia served as an excellent test run of Berlin Plus mechanisms and the EU as a 
Military Actor) clear ambitions emerged both at the member-state level and EU-
institutional level to differentiate itself from NATO. Even though EUFOR Althea 
in Bosnia was launched in 2004 again in close cooperation with NATO under the 
Berlin Plus Agreement, Solana explicitly briefed the new EU Force Commander 
to ensure that the EU mission would be clearly ‘new and distinct’ from NATO’s 
preceding SFOR operation (Leakey 2006: 59), thereby heightening the potential 
for image and identity rivalries. Indeed, in this context the role of Javier Solana 
was crucial. Whilst having been a key driving force for the establishment of for-
mal EU–NATO relations from 1999 to 2003, since the inception of Concordia, 
CFSP’s High Representative was now increasingly pushing for the Europeaniza-
tion of military activities and a more visible EU role (Barros-Garcia 2007). Here, 
closer cooperation with the United Nations also offered scope for demonstrating 
the autonomy and independence of the EU in hard security affairs. Indeed, barely 
three months after the launch of Concordia, France pushed for an autonomous  
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EU military mission (Artemis) in support of UN’s MONUC mission in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo. Whilst the rather robust mission was celebrated as an 
EU military success and laudable effort ‘EU-UN Effective Multilateralism’, the 
bypassing of NATO, the US and ‘Berlin Plus’ structures raised not only eye-
brows and temperatures in Washington. Similarly, the second EU-UN mission, 
EUFOR RD Congo launched in 2006, provides another illuminating case. Whilst 
an initially reluctant Germany was persuaded both by French policy-makers, and 
in particular by the EU High Representative Solana, to take on the overall com-
mand of the mission (Interview with German  
 
 
Inter-organizational Dimensions of the EU’s Military Missions (2003 – 2012)           
 
  EU-UN  EU-NATO  Implications for EU 
Actors 
Concordia 
(2003) 
 
- 
NATO  as  kick-starter, 
credibility-provider  ‘re-
assurer’  and  taboo-
breaker 
First  ever  EU  Mili-
tary Operation 
Artemis 
(2003) 
UN  as  legitimacy-
provider  and  focus-
point  for  EU 
autonomization.  Lim-
ited Intervention 
Lack of EU-NATO Con-
sultations.  By-passing 
Berlin+  and  breeding 
mistrust 
Demonstrating 
Actorness  and  Au-
tonomy;  Supporting 
UN, but on strict EU 
terms 
Althea  
(2004 - present) 
 
 
- 
Second  &  last  applica-
tion  of  Berlin  Plus 
(cumbersome).  NATO 
provides  credibility  & 
legitimacy, control  
Largest  and  most 
‘comprehensive’ 
military  mission  to 
date;  Recovering 
image in Balkans 
EUFOR  
RD Congo 
(2006) 
Supporting  UN,  but 
difficulties  in  coordi-
nation. No ‘rehatting’ 
Demonstrating  EU  au-
tonomy from NATO  
‘Normalizing  Ger-
many’?  Actorness 
Growth 
EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA 
(2008 – 2009) 
Difficult  coordination, 
but first instance of re-
hatting 
Further  distances  be-
tween EU and NATO 
Ability  to  conduct 
complex  mission. 
Inability  to  generate 
forces 
NAVFOR  Atlan-
ta 
(2008 - present) 
In  support  of  World 
Food Programmed 
Rivalry over Missions – 
Two parallel operations 
First ever naval oper-
ation – led by British 
OC; Motives? 
 
EU Battle groups  
In support of UN? 
Undermining 
SHIRBRIG? 
Disillusionment 
Rivalry with NATO 
Response Force 
Catalyst  for  Internal 
Integration; 
Loss of Credibility 
Support  to  AU 
AMIS 
(2005) 
 
- 
Outright  competition 
with  NATO  over  AU 
Support 
Strengthening  EU-
AU  Relations  on 
expense  of  EU-
NATO ones 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Koops 2011.  
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EU Council Secretariat Official, Brussels, 6 July 2007), Germany at first sug-
gested a mission under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangement in cooperation with NATO. 
In the end, the French insistence on an independent EU mission run from the 
German Operation Headquarters prevailed. Hence, Althea remains only the se-
cond and so far last instance of formal NATO-EU cooperation in the field. Par-
ticularly the running of two separate anti-piracy missions by both NATO and the 
EU off the coast of Somalia since 2008 screamed out for more formalized coop-
eration – yet less cooperation, not more seems to be the more common norm in 
EU-NATO  relations  during  the  last five  years. The  public  spat in  2005  over 
which organization should support the African Union’s mission in Sudan luckily 
remains so far the absolute low-point. Whilst the United Kingdom, Italy and The 
Netherlands preferred a NATO mission, France, Germany and Greece supported 
the idea of an EU mission. In the end, after severe inter-organizational procrasti-
nation that did as much damage to the credibility of each organization’s rapid 
reaction mechanism as to the relevance of Berlin Plus itself, both organizations 
launched separate missions (Varwick and Koops 2009: 107). 
  However, whilst the EU shifted its focus from NATO to the UN for con-
ducting military operations, this does not mean that EU-UN relations have been 
problem-free. The insistence of the EU on very short time-frames (Artemis only 
lasted  for  a  mere  3  months,  EUFOR  RD  Congo  6  months  and,  EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA for 12 months), strict end dates (instead of end states) and a general 
reluctance to leave equipment or soldiers behind (who could ‘re-hat’ with blue 
helmets as part of the ongoing UN missions), have caused substantial frictions 
between both organizations. Despite deeply institutionalized inter-organizational 
relations (in the form of two joint declarations on cooperation and the formalized 
exchange mechanisms of the UN-EU Steering Committee) differences in organi-
zational culture, interests and approaches persist. The hope that the EU could 
provide much needed capacities and support for the UN (above all, rapid reaction 
capabilities in the form of the EU Battle groups) has so far not turned into reality 
on the ground. Particularly the indecisiveness and incapacity of the European 
Union to play a meaningful role in Libya this year has fuelled suspicions that 
CSDP  is  a  victim  of  internal  disagreements  between  the  EU’s  Big  Three  – 
France, Germany and the UK - and of a general ‘mission fatigue’, aggravated by 
the departure of Solana as a key driving force for EU CSDP operations.  
 
 
The European Union as an Inter-Organizational Actor:  
Doing More Harm than Good? 
 
The most fundamental critique one can make about the EU’s approach to ‘effec-
tive  multilateralism’  is  that  it  has  not  really  lived  up  to  its  own  inter-
organizational  aims  outlined  in  the  European  Security  Strategy.  Instead  of 
strengthening and reinforcing its partner organizations, such as NATO and the 
UN,  it  has  so  far  rather  instrumentalized  them  in  order  to  advance  its  own 
actorness growth, visibility and image as an international security actor. Further- 
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more, cooperation with NATO and the UN has had fundamental ‘spill over’ ef-
fects that advanced (tenuous) EU-internal integration and Europeanization effects 
instead of effective inter-organizational ‘global governance’ outcomes that could 
both strengthen the partner organization and responses to pressing policy issues. 
For instance, operation Artemis gave birth to the EU Battle group concept that 
sparked substantial internal EU coordination and cooperation, joint training and 
standard convergence among EU member-states without having been put to use 
for UN-support mission – or indeed, any missions for that matter. The inward-
looking promotion of the Battle groups also has had detrimental effects on its 
partner organizations. In a time of scarce resources, member states that were both 
members of NATO, the EU and UN rapid reaction mechanisms had to make stra-
tegic decisions whether they wanted to put their time and money into the NATO 
Response Force, the Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Opera-
tions (SHIRBRIG) or the EU Battle groups. For many countries, the EU option 
seemed the most attractive. This led not only to shortfalls for the NATO Re-
sponse  Force,  but  more  detrimentally,  also  contributed  to  the  demise  of 
SHIRBRIG (see Koops 2011, 393 – 424). Founded in the aftermath of the Peace-
keeping failures in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica by Denmark, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Poland and Italy, SHIRBRIG was supposed to 
provide the UN system with a readily deployable peacekeeping tool. Between 
2000 and 2009 its members and observers grew to 23 states and it contributed to 
five missions on the African continent. Furthermore, since 2004 it served as a 
model and mentor for the African Union’s African Standby Forces (ASF). The 
EU stressed in various EU-UN documents and implementation plans the rein-
forcement of SHIRBRIG (Council 2004). Indeed, the EU would have been well 
placed for advancing an effective UN-EU-African Union scheme of ‘interlocking 
peacekeeping capacities’ that Kofi Annan envisaged in 2005.  Unfortunately, the 
EU not only failed to capitalize on these opportunities, but also inadvertently 
contributed to SHIRBRIG’s demise as core member-nations (especially the Nor-
dic countries) chose to switch their preferences to CSDP and the EU’s Battle 
group scheme.  
  More research is needed in order to understand the actual effects and 
overall impact of the EU’s approach to inter-organizational partnerships. Do they 
mostly advance its own actorness growth or do they also strengthen the partner 
organizations and their overall effectiveness for solving major issues in interna-
tional affairs? Emerging research on other EU-IO partnerships, such as with the 
Council of Europe (Kolb 2012), OSCE (van Ham 2009) the UN Human Rights 
Council (Macaj 2012) warns about similar dangers where uncoordinated and in-
ward-looking EU activism and actorness promotion comes at the price of weak-
ening other organizations and global governance approaches overall.  
The European Union has set itself the ambitious goal of advancing for-
ward-looking implementations of ‘effective multilateralism’ in close partnership 
with other core international organizations. Even though considerable achieve-
ments have been advanced, serious challenges remain. For the sake of global 
governance and the EU’s own credibility as a meaningful international actor, it  
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should focus its energies less on self-promotion, ‘quick impact’ and visibility, but 
rather invest more thought, skills and resources in mutually reinforcing and mu-
tually empowering EU-IO partnerships. Otherwise, despite significant advances, 
the EU’s inter-organizational activities and approaches risk to do more harm than 
good.  In this light, more emphasis on gathering, identifying and actually imple-
menting lessons learned from cooperation schemes, but also from the experiences 
of other international organizations are all vital ingredients for a more systematic 
approach to effective multilateralism. This also means, at times, to strengthen the 
institutions and mechanisms of other organizations rather than devising new EU-
internal institutions if there is no comparative advantage to be gained. Effective 
Multilateralism properly implemented requires thus in the majority of cases quiet 
leadership behind the scenes with a view to supporting and empowering other 
actors through resources, coordination and long-term cooperation.     
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Abstract 
The European Union’s (EU) foreign policy towards its southern neighbors is cur-
rently anchored i.a. in the Union for the Mediterranean (as an upgrade of the 
EuroMed Partnership (EMP), which represented the southern dimension of the 
EU’s  European  Neighborhood  Program  (ENP)). The  proposed paper  seeks  to 
address how effectively the EU will be able to “manage” its southern neighbor-
hood with soft power alone in the evolving de-stabilizations in North Africa and 
the Middle East, when security financing will likely be compromised in the fu-
ture, both EU-wide as well as national budgets, as emerging actors will seek to 
absorb  assets  in  the  greater  Euro-Mediterranean  region.  Adding  to  this 
problematique is the trans-Atlantic link towards the security constellation of the 
Euro-Mediterranean, in light of the EU’s evolving financial crisis (and the finan-
cial implications this likely will have on any “consolidation” of EU hard power, 
specifically the security of the EU’s southern border) vis-à-vis the U.S. stated 
interest by President Obama that U.S. hard power will shift away from Europe 
(and its role in NATO there for European security) towards the Pacific in the 
foreseeable future.   
 
Introduction 
 
This paper aims to trace some of the macro strategic currents affecting power 
shifts in the Euro-Mediterranean region.  It incorporates previous research (e.g. 
Boening,  2008a,  Boening  2008b,,  Boening,  2009
1), which assessed the Euro -
                                                 
1 This was later independently recognized on a more general trans-Atlantic level by the 
“Euro-Atlantic Security Community”, a unique process created in 2009 called the Euro-
Atlantic Security Initiative (EASI) by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,  
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Mediterranean  region  as  a  Regional  Security  Super  Complex  (representing  a 
modification of work by Buzan and Waever (2003) pertaining to a Middle East-
ern Regional Security Complex). The notable actors of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Regional Security Super Complex would be to the north especially the EU, rep-
resented post-Lisbon formally via the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
as well as European Commission programs (specifically those geared to relations 
with the southern neighborhood, such as the European Neighborhood’s EuroMed 
Partnership(EMP)/Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)) as a soft power projec-
tion in this region, and NATO as the transatlantic link of a Euro-Mediterranean 
Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC), representing a soft
2 as well as a 
hard power aspect. Additional “actors” of an EMRSSC are i.a. the national poli-
cies of the UfM member states (MSs), These are outlined in this paper amidst the 
radically  changing  regional  and  inter-regional  dynamics  asserting  themselves 
following the Arab Spring, starting in the winter of 2010/11, as well as the possi-
ble consequences of likely changed foreign and military capabilities of the EU 
following the reverberations of the Euro crisis, starting in 2011. 
 
The EU’s Political and Economic Projection South within the Union for the 
Mediterranean 
 
The initiatives of the EMP and UfM are intended to extend the European area of 
stability south, and to create a pluralistic security community whose practices are 
synonymous with peace and stability (Adler and Crawford 2004). The UfM was 
also “designed as the EU’s preferred tool for engaging Islam in a ‘dialogue of 
civilizations’, and is central to foreign economic policy in the region as a whole” 
(Crawford 2005, 1).  
           This is significant in the wider globalization setting, such as an analysis of 
the dynamics within the UfM, as well as to capture not simply power gains and 
expansion spheres of political interest considerations, but to address the socio-
cultural aspects of economic integration, and to eliminate dependencies in terms 
of the English School writers, such as Hedley Bull might, and hereby achieve, 
ideally, political harmonization within the area of the UfM (perhaps comparable 
to what the European Coal and Steel Community achieved after World War II 
between France and Germany).  
           In the absence of another alternative for peaceful coexistence, we observe 
how the agreements and programs
3 between UfM MSs have started to contribut-
                                                                                                                         
and reaffirmed on Feb. 3, 2012 at the Munich Security. Conference by twenty-six former 
generals, senior policymakers, and businesspeople from Russia, North America, and Eu-
rope, who warned that the security situation in the Euro-Atlantic region is sliding back-
wards, and called for the creation of a new, more ambitious security dialogue in the re-
gion. 
2 In terms of non-Article 5 missions, such as the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative and the 
Mediterranean Dialogue 
3 Ranging i.a. from the establishment of solar grids in the Maghreb, to common heritage 
preservation projects, Mediterranean Sea de-pollution and fish re-stocking.  
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ed  to  interdependence  between  them,  enhancing  the  zone  of  increased  trust 
(through predictable and stable institutions), as well as peace and prosperity due 
to improving the functioning of market economies, accountability and transpar-
ency. The UfM also started to contribute to a reduction of economic boundaries 
and cultural prejudices
4 to counteract the marginalization of the Middle East and 
North African regions (MENA) in globalization processes and to contribute to 
the stabilization of this region politically through economic integration with its 
neighbors across the Magreb and Mashreq, as well as with the EU. Perhaps Rob-
ert Putnam’s proposal (in Lloyd, 2006) can be applied to the members of the 
UFM: “What we shouldn’t do is to say that they should be more like us: We 
should construct a new ‘us’,”such as a regional Euro-Mediterranean ‘us’.” 
       Soft power has significant security implications, the optimal mix between the 
two constantly being adjusted (Heisbourg 2001, 6/7), based on the political reali-
ties of the day as well as progress in the process of harmonization among UfM 
members. Heisbourg (2001, 7) points out that capability is not merely a function 
of military hardware, but equally a “function of strategic vision” (Ibid.). The 
UfM was founded to represent the soft power security-political interface among 
countries bordering the Mediterranean on the North and South via a vision of 
cooperative security. This contrasts with the past “vertical” North-South confron-
tations such as the Reconquista and the Crusades, or the South-North conflicts, 
such as the Battle of Potiers in the 8
th century and the sieges of Vienna by the 
Ottomans (Heisbourg 2001, 7), or the perpetual South-South disagreements in 
this region.  
         However, aid and debt relief have not pivotally improved political stability 
or economic wellbeing in MENA adequately pre-Arab Spring. Instead the EU 
prefers to support developing countries to commit themselves to good policies 
(Williamson and Beattie 2006) through the promotion of trade coupled with aid. 
While from the Southern perspective, partnership entails the process of political 
cooperation in which a number of soft-security issues (such as terrorism and mi-
gration) are dealt with on a case-by-case basis to avoid the “Second Image Re-
versed,” i.e. reciprocal domestic-international factor dynamics to affect MENA’s 
foreign policies (such as any threat to MENA’s concepts of national sovereignty), 
according to Chourou (2001, 62, quoting Aliboni 2000), this contrasts with 
       (t)he EU perspective [which] seems more complex and far-
reaching. Partnership-building means that political co-operation has 
to be upgraded with a view to strengthening the broad and long-term 
foundations  of  security…  by  achieving  sustainable  development, 
political democracy and good governance … This entails a much 
closer interplay between inter-state and intra-state frameworks, for 
                                                 
 
4 Compare the FTA being signed between the EU and Morocco in early 2012, and the 
European Parliament’s vote in favour of a Protocol, which provides a legal basis for Mo-
rocco’s participation in EU programmes (ENPI Feb 14, 2012. http://www.enpi-
info.eu/mainmed.php?id_type=1&id=27964&lang_id=450.  
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regional security is dependent on a set of domestic processes of de-
mocratization. 
 
Threats to the EU’s “Management” of its Southern Neighborhood 
 
Escribano  (2005)  points  out  that  the  ENP’s  (in  contrast  to  the  UfM’s 
regionspecific) economic prescriptions had been perceived as merely cosmetic in 
the past. However, security perceptions in particular 
  are a decisive component of Mediterranean security in North-South 
and South-North relations alike. In the minds of a number of European 
publics, political Islamism  – identified with terrorism and, at its worst, 
confusingly identified with Islam itself – tends to replace the defunct Sovi-
et threat as the number one enemy, potentially at its best (Vasconcelos 
1999, 31). 
 
Hence, security in MENA is based partially socio-economically, and partially 
politically (e.g. through the radicalization of Islam), while the United States, es-
pecially through NATO, contributes substantially to the security perception in the 
Mediterranean.  The  UfM’s  role  in  Mediterranean  security  had  been  through 
deepening institutionalization (with correspondingly increasing trust among its 
partners through iteration and predictability) as the potential political spill-over in 
terms of Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalist theory, and social-cultural rapprochement, 
often through the efforts of NGOs. 
          Just this promotion of diversity can become the Achilles heel when it pro-
motes resistance, exemplified in the current struggle among EU MSs in agreeing 
to solutions to the Euro crisis. Until the financial and economic crisis in Greece 
showed that the EU’s control over its MSs’ fiscal discipline was inadequate, few 
doubted the EU’s power rivalry with major powers, at least economically. How-
ever, since 2011, the catastrophic consequences of the EU to e.g. enforce mone-
tary stability requirements of its acquis on MSs have not only called into ques-
tion the EU’s ability to assert internal legal compliance, much less its “soft pow-
er” in asserting its influence on other states to follow the rule of law. As econom-
ic power translates into not only political soft, but also hard power (e.g. a consid-
erable threat to EU interregional security), this paper will briefly highlight some 
of the threats to security the EU faces to its (greater) “South”. 
         The founding of the UfM as a “re-invigorated” EMP represents an incom-
plete “project,” to a large extent due to progress in this area being dependent on 
the resolution of issues being worked out elsewhere, and the results of which on-
ly gradually feed into the security processes devised for the Mediterranean itself 
(Spencer 2001, 29).  This includes the considerable number of issues which are 
(still) being dealt with on a bilateral basis, not an EU-MENA basis.           
         Has the EU now become not a pro-active, but a reactive actor – not a trend-
setter, but “maintaining” at best, fearing for “losing the peace” (e.g. Libya as a 
case study) in terms of its interests in the southern Mediterranean (i.e. control 
illegal immigration (coupled with ensuring the human security associated with   
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it),  especially  if  the  socio-economic  and  political  pressures  there  continue  to 
build up pressures on some populations groups, such as the young and unem-
ployed, to emigrate from the south to the north; or ensuring energy security di-
rectly (e.g. ensuring the development of the solar grid) and indirectly (e.g. oil 
shipments  from  the  Gulf  and  Libya)  as  another  specific  example,  which  are 
threatened by the compromised EU soft and hard power, leading to the current 
shift in the EMRSSC.  
 
The “Current Transformation” of the Euro-Mediterranean: A Joint Space 
of Inter-Dependence or a Radical Shift in Power Equilibrium between North 
and South, Partially due to Inter-Regional  Intervening Variables? 
 
Arab Spring and Greater Inter-Regional Sectarian Instability: The Ideological 
and the Political  
 
While many factors underlying Arab uprisings since late 2010 were against au-
thoritarian  regimes  and/or  rules,  they  came  to  a  boil  often  because  of  socio-
economic pressures. However, they were also re-assertions of popular values, 
such as the desire to have religious values asserted in everyday life. This is not 
only apparent in the recent election results in Egypt, but is also (inter-regionally) 
evident in the Shia uprisings in Bahrain, and the Saudi kingdom’s efforts to quell 
theirs through sharply increased social spending, and most recently the Sunni 
opposition
5 to the violent (Shia) Alawite rule of the al Assad regime in Syria. 
While these internal ideological decisions may be national issues for the cou n-
tries involved, the EU may not want to forget that some of its own dominant ide-
ologies are being violated in MENA on  numerous occasions during these pro-
cesses: the burning of Christian symbols, such as Coptic churches in Egypt, being 
a bitter indication of this. Additionally, let us not forget the terrorist groups, such 
as Hamas, which are Shia–backed and strengthening. Perhaps genuinely engag-
ing the populations on the southern Mediterranean economically, politically and 
socially (the “3-basket structure” of the EMP originally, and largely maintained, 
at least in theory (compare the Marseille Declaration of November 2008), by the 
UfM), rather than shunning them as “third world masses” would have laid a bet-
ter basis for communication  and trust, rather than creating a backlash of popular 
anger in MENA now. While the EU’s sanctions in tandem with Arab League 
sanctions against the al Assad regime as of early February 2012 are an example 
of political policy coordination between the northern and southern Mediterrane-
an, the results as of the time of writing have not been decisive. 
          Tragically, with the EU facing a severe financial and economic crisis, the 
political will and material means (despite verbal assurances to the contrary) at the 
EU’s disposal may not move the UfM’s progress further along – at a time when 
the drastic socio-political “re-structuring” in its southern neighborhood would 
indicate an enhanced need for this support there. Ironically, the trigger to the Eu-
                                                 
5 Al Qaeda being one of their sections, nevertheless  
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ro crisis was the financial meltdown of a small (Mediterranean) country, Greece, 
which some authors interpreted as having reciprocally “unleashed  a wider eco-
nomic  conflict  between  the  largely  Protestant  north  and  a  Catholic/Orthodox 
south” (Muenchau 2011) in the EU internally.  
        
Lack of EU Military Hardware and Logistical Capability/Coordination 
 
Operation Desert Dawn in the spring of 2011 demonstrated clearly that “Europe-
an NATO” (i.e. specifically England and France) were not able to conduct even a 
simple operation such as this autonomously: basic coordination between those 
two countries was a failure, leading President Obama to request the Canadians to 
take its lead to avoid the U.S. being involved a third time within a decade in an 
“Arabic” military exercise (although the U.S. nevertheless supplied nearly 90% 
of the missiles launched again Gadaffi’s installations – either because the Euro-
pean  NATO  partners  were  unwilling  to  contribute  their  part,  preferring  lip-
service against Gadaffi’s atrocities to putting their money where their words are, 
or they were simply unable to materially supply them). This lack of hard power 
“consolidation” in the EU is reflected in the PESCO/French-British military co-
operation agreement – more “parallell to” than “within” the EU
6. Either way, talk 
is cheap – and quite visible to everyone evaluating them for their purposes, even 
if the EU perhaps finds this strategy economically and politically clever. 
 
US Pivot in NATO Towards the Pacific 
 
In light of the preceding, the EU should take particular note of the U.S’ formal 
strategic security shift in late 2011/early 2012 from an Atlantic (including Medi-
terranean) to a Pacific orientation, emphasizing that U.S., not European, security 
priorities will prevail in current U.S.budget and strategic considerations. In light 
of the preceding, the EU should be very concerned about its hard power capabili-
ties, which were previously to a large part anchored in the U.S.’ NATO presence 
on continental Europe, including the Mediterranean, especially Morocco, Turkey, 
and, inter-regionally in parts of the Middle East. While the U.S.’ 2012 Defense 
Strategy Review of course highlights that the transatlantic relationship remains 
significant in promoting global and economic security (compare footnote #1), 
and reaffirms U.S. Article 5 commitments, the EU depends on petroleum ship-
ments from the south-eastern greater Mediterranean (as Russian supplies cannot 
be considered reliable) (compare e.g. EUobserver Feb. 3, 2012)
7, never mind 
                                                 
6 Compare Military Permanent Structured Co-operation under the aegis European Union 
which has stalled. Instead, a “two-speed Europe is going to be institutionalized on the 
field of military affairs, where the British-French ‘Euro-core’ will take the lead, and oth-
ers will join only if London and Paris want it”. (Nemeth 2012, 1). 
7 In light of the planned expansion of the western embargos towards Iran in early 2012, 
and Iran’s planned reduction of petroleum exports in February 2012 in response to this, 
Russian “unreliable oil deliveries” gain strategic traction in terms of an Syrian-Iranian- 
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other threats originating from its southern border, such as all types of illegal traf-
ficking. This requires the EU not to deny its military vulnerability in this region 
as a result of mismanaging the opportunities the U.S. offered in the past within 
NATO in Europe - as well as those the UfM could have achieved in the area of 
soft power, had they been taken more seriously by those able to maximize them.  
         In this dilemma enters the laudable, if questionable (too little too late?) de-
clared intent of the Arab League and the UfM to strengthen regional cooperation 
to address the threats to the stability necessary for smooth economic transactions 
in MENA following the Arab Spring – and the effect this has on stabilizing popu-
lations following the political and military destabilizations. And, yet, the with-
drawal in January 2012 of the Arab Union’s monitoring mission of human rights 
abuses during the preceding months (if not years) by the Syrian Assad regime 
may just be a further indication that the southern Mediterranean region is reliant 
on external assistance to not only deconstruct those aspects of the political past 
which are not longer tolerated by their demos, but that external assistance will be 
necessary again to accomplish this – whether with the EU, the U.S. or a combina-
tion through UN/NATO R2P-assistance in this specific case. In this sense, and 
others, the U.S. can be expected to engage in MENA – even if its security com-
mitments to Europe per se will be drawn down to the bare minimum. 
 
Inter-Regional Intervening Variables (Threats) to EU Security and Stability, 
Ultimately by and to its Southern Neighborhood 
 
China (and Others’) Asset Grab 
 
The shift of power perceptible in the Euro-Mediterranean region due to the sig-
nificant economic shifts having started in the northern Mediterranean (i.e. the 
EU) and the political shifts in the southern Mediterranean, cannot yet be estimat-
ed in their broader dimensions. In the absence of the IMF’s ability to raise mon-
ies from the U.S. or even from emerging countries, such as in Brazil and Turkey, 
for a Euro bail-out, the EU is turning towards China for especially large, and 
growing (Hook and Sakoui 2012) FDIs in its infrastructure. In the global free 
market place, this appears as a logical and win-win solution to the EU’s financial 
and economic troubles. Yet, the speed with which China seeks to take over stra-
tegically significant infrastructure projects in Europe might at some point give 
geo-political strategists pause to think: not only is the quality of Chinese work-
manship often questionable, but their reputation as “tenants” and as “landlords” 
in similar projects in Africa and Latin America is rarely laudable. More signifi-
cantly, in this context their military assertiveness, despite official declarations to 
the contrary, cannot be assumed to peaceful.  Hence, once Chinese control of 
European infrastructure gains strategic momentum, Europe may find itself less 
able to physically govern itself internally or at least resist Chinese demands con-
                                                                                                                         
Russian axis, demonstrated during Russia’s veto on February 3, 2012 at the UN Security 
Council regarding Bashar al-Assad’s resignation.  
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cerning internal – and global - economic and physical management
8. Examples 
are China’s potential purchase of Euro bonds, conditional on EU acquiescence to 
grave Chinese political and economic demands
9, such as its refusal to pay the air 
carbon tax (starting in February 2012) as well as its veto on February 3, 2012 at 
the UN Security Council regarding Bashar al-Assad’s resignation. 
     Of course, the political balancing event might “simply” be an EU recession, 
which would in turn depress Chinese exports to the EU, further weakening the 
Chinese economy – and its political and hard power. 
        
Conclusions: The Cost of Omissions – When the Cost of Not Saying “No” is 
Higher than the Cost of Losing a Popularity Contest  
 
In conclusion, the Euro-Med region continues evermore as a regional security 
complex based on the following facts, with the UfM as a promising option never-
theless: In addition to the historical political, economic, social ties, as of 2007, 
the EU has already formally recognized its relationship with the (southern) Medi-
terranean and the Middle East as strategic (Council of the European Union report 
16572/06) in all its implications: energy (e.g. EU-Africa-Middle East Energy
10 
Conference in Sharm El Sheikh November 2007), the humanitarian impact of 
environmental degradation, including controlled migration of especially North 
African populations who have historically a strong presence there, especially in 
those EU MSs bordering the Mediterranean, as well as youth exchanges (esp e-
cially to contrast the active student recruitment by Chinese universities in Afr i-
ca). Additionally, the establishment of an UfM free trade area in the next few 
years with, ultimately of a pan -African-European free  trade area and the a c-
ceptance of UfM-membership application by Iraq once they fulfill the EuroMed’s 
acquis (Beatty 2007)
11  underscore a Euro-Med regional security complex. 
         By avoiding and/or misunderstanding the significance of the Eastern Medi-
terranean for its economic and political future, the EU gambled it away. The ina-
bility of the EU to play a significant role in its southern neighborhood either d i-
rectly  (e.g.  mismanaging  Turkey’s  EU  candidacy),  or  indirectly  (e.g.  through 
lack of control of the EU’s economic means (i.e. the Euro-zone) to control its 
                                                 
8 Compare China’s calls on Germany to save the Euro (Dey, 2012). 
9 Compare Angela Merkel’s visit to China, seeking accelerated Chinese FDIs and Euro 
bond purchases in February 2012 – and being partially rebuffed (China becoming “con-
cessionary” upon R. Zoellig’s resignation from the World Bank and its desire to be per-
mitted to play a significant role in naming a replacement). 
10 Energy in MENA does not refer to petroleum resources alone, but also solar energy 
(McKie 2007) 
11 Recognizing that some authors have sounded very pessimistic alarm bells in the past, 
e.g. Everts (2004, 155), who wrote that “The manner in which European leaders have 
chosen to handle, or rather mishandle, the Iraq crisis has inflicted serious and possibly 
lasting damage to the EU’s ability to frame and implement a credible set of policies to-
wards the greater Middle East… Thus the prospects for a meaningful EU role, as opposed 
to national ones, are exceptionally poor.”  
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politics (e.g. to the south) paints a pessimistic perspective of the EMRSSC’s eco-
nomic and socio-political future, now that the northern and southern Mediterra-
nean need each other more than ever.  The EU-Turkey relationship e.g. could 
have been managed  more effectively for the benefit of controlling  Iran (as a 
poignant example how the Euro-Mediterranean has considerable inter-regional 
significance for the EU). By sidelining Turkey’s EU-candidacy, the EU ironically 
delegated the power to influence the south-eastern Mediterranean and the regions 
beyond it
12. On the other hand, the U.S.’ relationship with Turkey
13 remains stra-
tegically significant – and the former’s influence in the region likely as well. 
           In this light, the UfM could be interpreted as a liberal material as well as a 
Weberian value society, potentially contributing to overcoming not only ancient 
tribalism, as the EU has overcome ancient internal civilizational confrontations, 
but in the paradigm of the UfM parameters per se: while church and state are as-
pired to be separate, pure economic liberalism without values is not acceptable to 
many peoples in the UfM, but can be – and are - combined. Reminding ourselves 
that one of the goals of the ENP is “to share everything but institutions” (between 
the EU and its neighbors), it is perhaps not overly optimistic that the UfM is not 
simply an area of shared security, but also a sui generis of international society 
for the neighbors to maximize on the benefits of globalization, and buffer its neg-
ative consequences in their countries and across the region. Martin (2007) makes 
this point when he suggests instead of “either/or- thinking” to adopt instead “in-
tegrative thinking,” which embraces contradictions to lead to more nuanced deci-
sions and strategies. 
        While we strive for a positive-sum world (Wolf 2007), some relationships 
are more privileged than others. The UfM certainly could have this potential in 
delineating  an  EU  security  paradigm  for  its  (greater  inter-)  regional  southern 
neighborhood:, while recognizing that it is a continuous process: there is not one 
road to modernity (Hoffmann 1966; Talor 1983), nor one recipe for regional in-
tegration,  but  peace  as  a  step-by-step  process  through  regional  integration.
14 
Amidst the truly grave socio-political and economic conditions facing the north-
ern
15 as well as the southern Mediterranean currently, and with little help to be 
expected from outsiders any longer, the greater Euro-Mediterranean region is left 
to dancing with itself  – with the vultures circling the sky
16. When the Euro -
                                                 
12 Note Turkey’s very pronounced stance (i.a.)  against the Russian and Chinese UNSC 
vote on February 4, 2012 again al-Assad (and in fact, its strategic support of this regime’s 
opposition in the preceding months, and continuing to date) 
13 Despite the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran, Ankara is not likely to develop its own 
nuclear weapons, unless there were a breakdown in Turkey’s security relationship with 
the United States (Uelgen 2012). 
14 Which was after all started already some 3,000 years ago by the Phoenicians, with a 
divine nod according to  mythology when the Greek Zeus sought his bride among them. 
15 Note the latest Moody’s downgrades in February 2012 not only of southern EU MSs, 
but also the “watch-“ status of some core EU MSs  
16 “China’s defence budget is expected to almost double by 2015 as Beijing accelerates 
its spending on fighter jets and other military equipment, according to defence forecasts,  
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Mediterranean region could have become the socio-political and economic en-
gine for both shores of the Mediterranean… 
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Abstract 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen the emergence of new regional re-
gimes of an increasingly political type. There are approximately fifty such organ-
izations in existence today. These blocs have generated a virtual explosion of 
academic analysis. The sub-field of ‘comparative regionalism’ has recently come 
into its own. One of the key debates is the extent to which the European Union is 
perceived around the world as a model to be emulated. The EU is the most elabo-
rate and highly developed of the existing blocs, but it has developed in response 
to *European* issues, challenges and conditions. Some of the processes it has 
generated may be replicable in other parts of the world. A theory of diffusion 
might argue that emulation has taken place. However, when one examines pre-
cisely how the respective institutions actually function and what they represent 
within the entire system, the less possible it becomes to claim meaningful compa-
rability. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed an apparent mushrooming of 
regional (largely trade-based) regimes.  Whereas there were only some 50 of the-
se in 1990, there are 313 of them in 2011
1.  Approximately 50% of these are bi-
lateral agreements between just two sovereign states.  However, beyond that type 
of limited agreement, we have also seen the emergence of new regional regimes 
of a more political type, some of which are re-incarnations of pre-existing bodies, 
and some of which are brand new.  There are approximately fifty such organiza-
tions in existence today.  Some, mainly the preferential trade agreements (PTAs) 
                                                 
1 See WTO figures at: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/publicsummarytable.aspx   In fact, as many 
as 490 regional agreements have been registered with the WTO, but about one fifth of 
them have failed.  
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or  free  trade  areas  (FTAs),  have  gone  little  beyond  commercial  cooperation. 
However, others have involved various degrees and levels of structural integra-
tion.  Such regional regimes range from the Arab League, chronologically the 
first of all such bodies, founded in 1945, a decade before the EU, via the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN - 1967), South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC - 1985), Mercosur (1991), South African Devel-
opment Community (SADC  - 1992), North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA – 1994), Pacific Islands Forum  (PIF – 1999), Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO – 2001) and the African Union (AU – 2002), to the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR), the last of the crop, founded in 2008.  The-
se bodies have progressively taken on the scale and dimensions of continental-
size blocs.  What is the significance of this development?  How central is the EU 
experience to this phenomenon? 
With the advent of these blocs has come a virtual explosion of academic 
analysis of their significance
2.  The sub-field of “comparative regionalism” has 
recently come into its own (Sbragia 2008).  It has a dotted past. In the 1960s, 
several scholars attempted to launch such a sub-field by comparing embryonic 
regional regimes, mainly in Africa, with the EU as it existed at that point (Haas 
1961; Nye 1968).   Thereafter, as the EU went through the doldrums of the 
1970s, comparative regionalism tended to wither on the vine.  It was only after 
the Cold War, as the new regional regimes began to mushroom on every conti-
nent,  that  the  literature  on  comparative  regionalism  underwent  a  renaissance. 
Many of the early studies of the phenomenon tended to interpret it as structurally 
linked to globalization or to the hegemonic role of the US as the sole superpower 
(Mansfield 1998; Baldwin 1993; Mansfield & Milner 1997; Katzenstein 2005).  
There was no suggestion that these new regional entities were following any spe-
cific model, and certainly not any European model. Indeed, the general assump-
tion was that they were coming into existence primarily for endogenous, local 
reasons, usually connected with the aim of optimizing trade. 
  More recently, a new body of literature has begun to argue that these re-
gional regimes are, in many cases, explicitly modeled on the European Union.  In 
the case of ASEAN, one German scholar, Anja Jetschke, goes so far as to argue 
that “there is convincing evidence that Southeast Asian states have downloaded 
European institutions and policy programs since the very establishment of the 
EEC in 1957” (Jetschke 2011).  Other scholars have noted, for example, that ep-
istemic communities composed of European lawyers (specifically those involved 
in the Jean Monnet network), working closely with South American lawyers, es-
tablished the Andean Court of Justice (ACJ – the third most active international 
court  in the  world)  precisely  on  the  model  of  the European  Court  of Justice 
(Saldias 2010); or that the “expansionist law-making” of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) has been copied wholesale by the ACJ “in ways that constrain na-
tional sovereignty beyond what states had intended” (Alter 2010: 563).  Tobias 
                                                 
2 The Bibliography to one recent overview (Börzel 2011) listed around 250 academic 
papers on the subject.   
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Lenz has posited what he calls “a model of EU influence” based on four causal 
mechanisms: learning, rewards, emulation and socialization (Lenz 2010: 17-29). 
His argument is that there is a very clear and repeated pattern of EU “steering” 
with regard to the world’s regional regimes which results in a significant influ-
ence being enjoyed by the Union, both with respect to the recipient entity’s insti-
tutional design and with respect to policy outcomes.  Lenz has recently consoli-
dated this analysis in a new study which analyzes the EU’s influence on regional 
institutional change in Mercosur and the Southern African Development Commu-
nity by arguing a process of diffusion.  By focusing on market-building objec-
tives and dispute settlement mechanisms, his study concludes that both of these 
major regional regimes have tended to adopt EU-influenced institutions despite 
the fact that more appropriate models based on closer to home, pragmatic, sover-
eignty-respecting preferences have been available. Lenz's analysis suggests that 
the EU has indeed "affected outcomes in several specific ways that are irreduci-
ble to, and quite different from, mainstream functional accounts of economic re-
gionalism". He concludes that, despite clear awareness in South America and 
South Africa that the EU does not necessarily have the solution to local prob-
lems, these embryonic regional regimes embrace EU practice "under conditions 
of uncertainty and promoted by EU-oriented domestic actors as well as the EU’s 
direct involvement in the process" (Lenz 2012). 
  Tanja Börzel, from the Freie Universität Berlin has recently emerged as 
the most energetic academic scholar seeking both to pin down the taxonomies of 
regional regimes of integration and to assess their comparability with the Euro-
pean Union as a model (Börzel 2011; Börzel 2012).  She focuses on the several 
dozen cases where genuine integration has taken or is taking place. She argues 
that bodies such as ASEAN, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), the Arab League and Mercosur are all deepening their integration, 
introducing institutional changes which follow the EU’s lead, consolidating their 
trade arrangements around a customs union and flirting with ideas of monetary 
union. They are also setting up dispute-settlement procedures and delegating sig-
nificant aspects of political authority.  More significantly, perhaps, they are be-
ginning to tackle “issues connected with security such as non-proliferation, dis-
armament,  territorial  disputes,  migration,  terrorism  and  human  trafficking” 
(Börzel 2011: 12). The African Union, indeed, has gone even further than the EU 
in  organizing  a  common  security  and  defense  policy  intended  to  foster  and 
strengthen democracy (Streibinger 2012).  Börzel sets out what she calls a new 
research agenda in comparative regionalism which she believes will help to clari-
fy the differences between the different drivers (economics, power and norms) of 
the different regional regimes around the world, and the ways in which rational-
ists, institutionalists and constructivists would approach such issues.  She con-
cludes that a key feature of regionalism in the 21
st century “is the extent to which 
it draws on existing forms” and she argues that “due to its lasting success, the EU 
has become an important reference point in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as a 
model to emulate or to resist”. As examples she cites Tel￲ 2001; Farrell 2007; 
Henry 2007, Katsumata 2009 and Jetschke 2010.     
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  In  addition  to  this  academic  literature,  there  are  many  instances  of 
statesmen and leaders explicitly insisting that the EU is and can be a model. As 
Lenz noted, the former foreign minister of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, stated in 
1992 that “for many of us and for me in particular, our model has been and still is 
the European Community, not because I was trained there but because it is the 
most suitable form for us living in this part of the world” (Khoman 1992). The 
former President of the European Commission and former Italian prime-minister 
Romano Prodi believes that “our European model of integration is the most de-
veloped in the world. Imperfect though it still is, it nevertheless works on a con-
tinental scale […] and I believe we can make a convincing case that it would also 
work globally” (Prodi 2000). Robert Cooper has theorized “the breaking of na-
tions” as the cardinal feature of the European Union – a model which goes be-
yond Westphalia and creates a “post-modern” community which is waiting to be 
joined by others, among which he cites ASEAN, NAFTA, Mercosur and the AU 
(Cooper 2005: 42).  To what extent is it true that the European Union can be con-
sidered an appropriate and/or fitting model for regional regimes throughout the 
world?  In order to begin to answer this question, we need first to be clear about 
what the EU is.  This paper is predicated on the belief that each of these regional 
regimes has come into existence primarily, if not overwhelmingly, for reasons 
peculiar to the geographic region they embrace and to the specific histories from 
which they emerge. In this sense, they are all different from each other in their 
underlying raison d’être and ambitions. 
  This may not be the most appropriate moment to be laying down defini-
tive prescriptions about the EU’s essence.  The visionary dimension of the Union 
currently seems to be under some threat. In the two – or even three – most sensi-
tive areas of policy, those that go to the very heart of sovereignty (monetary poli-
cy, security & defense policy and, arguably, external borders), there are today 
questions over the EU’s ability to square the circle between the interests of the 
individual member states and the interests of the whole.  Economic and monetary 
union and the single currency were launched at least as much as political – iden-
tity-building – projects as they were for strictly economic or financial reasons.  
Many people knew (and said) at the time of the launch that a monetary union 
with no common fiscal or redistributive policies was a huge gamble. But these 
same people assumed that, when push came to shove in this area, further integra-
tion would be virtually inevitable – because the only alternative would be the 
unraveling  of  the  complex  structures  that  had  been  so  painstakingly  erected 
(Feldstein 1997).  The “common” security and defense policy was launched for 
powerful reasons arising out of the movement of history’s tectonic plates after 
the end of the Cold War.  The fall of the Berlin Wall spelled the inevitability, 
sooner or later, of American disengagement from Europe. Europeans had little 
choice but to face up to the responsibility of organizing their own security and, if 
necessary, their own defense (Howorth 2007 & 2012).  They spent twenty years 
from the outbreak of the Wars of Yugoslav Succession in 1991 trying to fill the 
gaps in their own military capacity and organizational and decision-making pro-
cesses.  The crisis in Libya was precisely the type of regional crisis which CSDP  
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had been established to manage. And yet when the moment came in spring 2011, 
the EU per se was nowhere to be seen. A majority of its member states saw no 
national interest whatsoever in protecting the citizens of Benghazi and watched 
from the sidelines while a small number of member states, led by the UK and 
France and assisted by six others, used NATO as a framework/platform within 
which/from which to carry out the mission (Howorth 2012).  The implications of 
this for the future of CSDP are far from clear (Valasek 2012).   
But for the purposes of this paper, we need to engage with the literature 
that tells us what sort of animal the EU seems to be.  Only then can we really test 
the comparability of the other regional regimes.  The core issue here is precisely 
the tension between the parts and the whole and what that says about identity. If 
the vast majority of the citizens of the EU still identify first and foremost with 
their nation-state rather than with the Union itself (which is the case), then the 
project itself might be deemed to remain in an experimental phase. 
  Throughout recorded history, groups of human beings have come togeth-
er for two main purposes: being together and doing together.  Being involves 
identity, doing does not – or at any rate not necessarily. An association or a 
committee is for doing (something) together. Society is for being together.  Being 
has to do with the deepest communicative dimensions of a collectivity: language, 
psychology, empathy, values, memory. It speaks to a sense of continuity and col-
lective destiny. Doing involves the more organizational dimensions of collective 
action: institutions, hierarchies, structures. It has no necessary association with 
the past but looks resolutely to the future. The rule of being is consensus; that of 
doing is the majority. In short, being is essentially about what we call culture, 
while doing is about what we call politics.  When the two are in harmony that is 
what we call political culture (See Figure 1).  The most effective groupings of 
human beings have been those imbued with a deep and meaningful political cul-
ture – the harmonization of being and doing.  The tendency throughout history 
has been for these groups to grow  continuously larger – families, tribes, city 
states, provinces, regions, etc. – and occasionally they have grown too big. 
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Figure 1. Being and Doing 
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Empires attempted to gobble up entire functional political cultures and subsume 
them into a massive entity. But it never worked, and eventually Empires col-
lapsed because they did not succeed in combining being and doing in a meaning-
ful political culture.  
For the past two centuries (but only for the past two centuries), the opti-
mal form of the combination of being and doing in a deep political culture has 
been the nation-state (Howorth 2000).  The huge challenge facing the new re-
gional regimes is that of transcending the nation-state by creating a new political 
entity which will not share the fate of Empires, but will gradually generate a new 
and higher level of that crucial combination of being and doing which will even-
tually amount to a higher form of political culture. The key question: is the Euro-
pean Union on track towards (or even approaching) that point?   
Many actors and authors have grappled with this problem of attempting 
to state precisely what sort of beast the EU is.  The former German foreign minis-
ter Joschka Fischer called, in a 2000 speech, for the EU to turn itself explicitly 
into a federal state (Fischer 2000).  The former European Commission President 
Jacques Delors called the EU an “unidentified political object”.  LSE Professor 
William Wallace saw it as “less than a federation; more than a regime” (Wallace 
1983).  Oxford University’s Jan Zielonka sees it as a future “neo-medieval Em-
pire” (Zielonka 2007), while Gary Marks sees it as a new form of previous Euro-
pean  Empires  (Marks  2012).  The  EUI’s  Philippe  Schmitter  called  it  a  
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“condominio” or a “new post-Hobbesian order” (Schmitter 2000).  Harvard’s 
John Ruggie, anticipating Cooper, saw it as “the first truly post-modern political 
form” (Ruggie 1993).  Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann saw it primarily as 
a “network of pooling and sharing sovereignty” (Keohane & Hoffmann 1991) 
while Liesbeth Hooge & Gary Marks have operationalized the notion of a “sys-
tem of multi-level governance” (Hooge & Marks 2001).  Rainer Eising and Beate 
Kohler-Koch  present  the  EU  as  a  form  of  “network  governance”  (Eising  & 
Kohler-Koch 1999).  Thomas Risse has recently published the most comprehen-
sive inquiry into whether or not we are seeing the emergence of a “community of 
Europeans” through an investigation of transnational identities and the appear-
ance of a public sphere (Risse 2010). He argues that, through the repeated tran-
scendence of crises and through a growing public discourse which expresses it-
self in an increasingly politicized way, the EU is progressively moving towards 
the constitution of that “community” which would amount to a new political cul-
ture.  Finally, in recent years, there has been a veritable profusion of academic 
writing converging around the notion that the EU is essentially a “normative 
power” (Whitman 2011). All of these approaches have inherent value, but the 
coexistence of so many different interpretations of what the EU is makes it al-
most impossible to put the EU in a glass case with a pink ribbon and a clear label 
which would allow us to compare it with similar regional regimes in other parts 
of the world, all of which remain under-analyzed and under-theorized, particular-
ly in comparison with Europe.  Furthermore, none of these approaches proves 
terribly helpful in answering the question about the combination of being and 
doing, about the potential for a new form of political culture because they all 
eventually come to the same circular conclusion: that because the EU is not a 
state it cannot therefore be expected to function optimally in those key areas of 
policy such as monetary and financial or security and defense with which I start-
ed this discussion.  
The  best  theoretical  approach  is  that  of  Boston  University’s  Vivien 
Schmidt, who has pondered deeply the issue of the “state-like” qualities of the 
EU and has suggested that it is, in fact, a “region-state in the making”, by which 
she means “a regional union of nation-states in which the creative tension be-
tween the Union and its member states ensures both ever increasing regional in-
tegration and ever continuing national differentiation” (Schmidt 2006: 9).   She 
believes that this will take the EU some way towards solving the conundrum of 
being and doing, although she recognizes that, for the foreseeable future, the 
identity (the “being”) of a large majority of the EU’s citizens will continue to be 
national.  Currently  only  about  5%  of  EU  citizens,  when  polled  by 
Eurobarometer,
3 claim European identity as their primary identity, while roughly 
the same percentages (around 45% each) claim either exclusively national identi-
ty or a mix of national and European identity. 
 
                                                 
3 The Eurobarometer results, while scientifically credible, are nevertheless to be used 
with caution: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htm   
 
152    Howorth 
If we pursue Schmidt’s model in some more detail, we can begin to see 
whether the EU can be compared in any meaningful sense with the other regional 
regimes around the world.  If we take the issue of sovereignty, Stephen Krasner 
has identified four key types:  “international law sovereignty” (recognition by 
other  states);  “Westphalian  sovereignty”  (non-interference  by  outside  states); 
“interdependence  sovereignty”  (control  within  and  across  borders);  “domestic 
sovereignty” (exclusive power within the polity).  The USA and China (as well 
as other consequential nation states) enjoy all of these. The EU per se enjoys 
none of them. Nor is it self-evident that any of the other major regional regimes 
has moved towards the acquisition of any of these forms of sovereignty.  Howev-
er, the EU does in fact share most of these types of sovereignty with its member 
states.  It has gone a great deal further than any other regional regime in pooling 
and sharing all forms of sovereignty.  This is a feature which is still totally lack-
ing in any of the other regimes we are considering. As far as the issue of the 
boundaries is concerned, we find that, in this instance, some other regional re-
gimes have tended to be more comprehensively inclusive than the EU has been. 
The AU, the Arab League and UNASUR simply incorporated from the outset 
every state in the region, while ASEAN, like the EU, has gradually expanded 
membership. Both the latter blocs currently stand on the threshold of even further 
expansion, thus posing the question as to whether there will ever be “fixed bor-
ders”.  In these key respects, the main regional regimes have taken very different 
paths. 
Another area where the EU has been forced to compromise has been in 
introducing arrangements which have produced differential membership of dif-
ferent policy areas.  The borderless space of Schengen currently embraces twen-
ty-five member states, but EU members Bulgaria and Romania are not (yet) in, 
while the UK and Ireland have an op-out. On the other hand, non EU-members 
Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are included in Schengen.  The Common For-
eign and Security Policy excludes Denmark, which has an opt-out (except that 
Denmark has an ambassador on the Political and Security Committee).  The Eu-
rozone is comprised of seventeen member states.  Only the Single Market em-
braces all twenty-seven.  This confused pattern reflects the innovative way in 
which the whole has had to make do with something less than the sum of the 
parts.  But  the  outcome  has  been  what  Stefano  Bartolini  has  called  the  “de-
differentiation of European polities” after centuries of differentiation into nation 
states (Bartolini 2005). This pattern of differential membership of various differ-
ent policy areas is one which is not reflected in other regional regimes. 
Schmidt’s analysis of the EU as a “regional state” goes on to look in 
great detail at the implications of this unique polity’s variable boundaries, com-
posite  identity,  highly  compound  governance  and  fragmented  democracy  (in 
which government by and of the people now largely takes place in the nation 
states while government for and with the people takes place in Brussels). She 
argues that we are witnessing policy without politics in the latter and politics 
without policy in the former. In short, she describes a system which is so unique 
that it defies any meaningful comparison with other regional regimes. The EU is  
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without any doubt the most elaborate and highly developed of all the existing 
regional regimes. But it has developed in response to European issues, to Euro-
pean challenges and to European conditions. Some of the processes it has gener-
ated may be replicable to some extent in other parts of the world. Some of the 
institutions may have (do have) the same or similar names. A theory of diffusion 
could well argue that emulation has taken place.  But the moment one leaves the-
ory aside and examines precisely what the respective institutions actually do and 
how they function and what they represent within the entire system, the less pos-
sible it becomes to claim meaningful comparability.  We still lack the sort of in-
depth studies which will allow us to gauge the extent to which we can make 
meaningful  comparisons  between  the  workings  of  the  different  institutional 
agencies of these different regional regimes.  Can the ASEAN Secretariat be 
meaningfully compared with the European Commission?  Notwithstanding the 
inputs of European jurists to the establishment of the Andean Court of Justice, 
does the Court really carry out comparable functions to those of the European 
Court of Justice?  In what ways is it meaningful to compare the Pan African Par-
liament to the European Parliament? Until we have such studies, the proposition 
that the EU serves as a “model” for regional regimes worldwide will remain an 
untested hypothesis rather than a substantive assertion. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
My own tentative conclusion is that the growth of regional regimes around the 
world affects the international system and international relations in two tangible 
ways.  To the extent to which it constitutes a genuine pooling of sovereignty and 
a robust decision to eschew the use of force in inter-state relations, then it marks 
one more significant step beyond Westphalia. There are, of course, those scholars 
who argue in the European case that the regional regime has amounted to the 
“rescue of the nation state” in that the whole has given the parts both more clout 
and lots of things to do on the international stage (Milward 2000;  Moravcsik 
1998). But the majority of analysts recognize that something new and different – 
and probably important – has emerged. We are not quite sure yet what it repre-
sents in terms of the international system, but we sense that it is significant in 
relativizing the omnipotence of the nation state – particularly if it is spreading all 
across the globe (albeit in forms which are not directly comparable to each oth-
er). The other way in which these regional regimes affect the international system 
is in systematizing a new way of doing international relations – through the rule 
of law, consultation, cooperation and “effective multilateralism” – rather than in 
the manner in which IR has been conducted for the greater part of history. In that 
sense, the EU – and, if its example is followed elsewhere in the world, other re-
gimes – might still make history.  
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Abstract 
 
In this paper the author will outline some essential characteristics about the EU 
designed to assure ‘credible commitments’ and take a look at how other integra-
tion schemes, NAFTA and MERCOSUR in particular, have tried to secure ‘cred-
ible commitments’. The main variables to be discussed include: the degree of 
completeness of the original contract to start an integration process, the degree of 
asymmetry among the main participants, the degree of pooling and delegation of 
authority, and the availability of leadership to overcome collective action prob-
lems.  
 
Introduction 
Scholars often say that the EU is sui generis. There is no other regional organiza-
tion quite like it. Some aspects of it resemble a federal state, with binding deci-
sions reaching individuals. Other aspects are purely intergovernmental coopera-
tion based on consensus or unanimity. Overall the EU is not a state. It does not 
have the monopoly of force that sovereign states are supposed to have. But it is 
more than a typical international organization like the UN. It has created unique 
supranational institutions (For a more extensive discussion, see Laursen 2011).  
  Andrew Moravcsik has seen ‘pooling and delegation’ of sovereignty as 
essential  characteristics  of  the  original  institutions  created  by  the  European 
Communities (EC) in the 1950s (Moravcsik 1998). Pooling is the term used for 
the acceptance of majority voting, in the EU case normally qualified majority 
voting (QMV), in the Council of Ministers. Delegation refers to the autonomous 
powers given to the Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) at the 
outset and subsequently also to the European Parliament (EP). The Commission 
has an exclusive right of initiative in many areas and it represents the EU exter-
nally in a number of policy areas, especially trade. The ECJ makes binding deci- 
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sions. The EP has increasingly become a co-legislator together with to the Coun-
cil starting with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and now becoming the general 
rule after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. The EP is 
directly elected by the people in the member states since 1979. Through these 
institutions a number of common policies have been developed over the years, 
starting with trade and agriculture in the 1960s. In parallel with the expansion of 
the functional policy scope the EC/EU expanded geographically from six to 27 
members. It is therefore fair to say that the policy and decision making mecha-
nisms of the EC, the so-called Community method, has been rather successful. 
According to Moravcsik it created ‘credible commitments.’ It helped the EC/EU 
overcome so-called ‘collective action’ problems, problems that exist if the actors, 
in this case states, are tempted to cheat on agreements or face difficult distribu-
tion problems. 
  It should be admitted that the EU has not always been successful. It has 
used intergovernmental cooperation to try to develop a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and more recently a Common Security and Defense Poli-
cy (CSDP), but with limited success. It invented the so-called Open Method of 
Coordination  (OMC)  to  help  create  jobs  and  a  more  competitive  economy 
through the so-called Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010), again with limited success. 
Further, it created an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), without creating 
‘credible commitments’ in the area of fiscal policy, thereby allowing the current 
sovereign debt crisis to develop. 
  The lesson from the European experience, however, seems rather clear: if 
you want credible commitments, one approach is to pool and delegate sovereign-
ty! This should be contrasted with the fact that none of the other integration 
schemes in the world have used something like the EU’s Community method. 
This then raises the question: Are there other ways of getting ‘credible commit-
ments’ in a regional integration schemes? Walter Mattli, has argued that leader-
ship can assist states in overcoming ‘collective action’ problems (Mattli 1999).  
A third possibility of getting credible commitments has been suggested: a 
relatively detailed and complete contract with dispute settlement mechanisms. 
This is the NAFTA approach. Its contract is relatively complete, while the EU, 
MERCOSUR  and  ASEAN  contracts  are  relatively  incomplete  (Cooley  and 
Spruyt 2009). NAFTA’s rather complete contract may have contributed to its 
relative success, but in limited areas and the institution is static compared with 
some other regional integration schemes. It will take the negotiation of a new 
treaty to deal with new issues. The EU approach with a ‘framework treaty’ is 
more dynamic. It creates the institutions that can develop new policies and re-
form  old  ones  (Laursen  2010).  It  therefore  appears  that  MERCOSUR  and 
NAFTA could have been better off if they had adopted something like the Com-
munity method with pooling and delegation of sovereignty. Why haven’t they?  
  The demand for integration, according to rationalist theories of integra-
tion, is related to the economic interdependence of the countries in question. One 
indicator of demand for regional integration is intra-regional trade. The proposi-
tion is that the higher intra-regional trade, the more economic actors will demand  
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steps toward more integration (Mattli 1999, Moravcsik 1998). Table 1 shows 
what happened to intra-regional trade through the 1990s and the beginnings of 
the 2000s in three regions. In NAFTA and MERCOSUR, intra-regional trade 
increased relatively substantially in the 1990s. Intra-regional trade fell sharply in 
MERCOSUR in 2001 and 2002 – because of the Argentine crisis. After having 
reached 24.8 per cent in 1998, it fell to 11.6 per cent in 2002. No comparable 
decline was recorded in the other regions. Since 2004 the intraregional trade in 
MERCOSUR has increased slightly. In NAFTA it has fallen slightly. In the EU it 
has remained high.  
Table 1: Intra-regional Export Shares, 1970-2008 
 
1980  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2007  2008 
NAFTA  33.6  41.4  43.7  48.0  47.6  51.0  55.7  56.7  55.9  53.9  51.3  49.5 
EU  60.8  59.0  59.5  56.8  62.8  62.5  61.6  60.6  60.7  67.4  67.9  67.3 
MERC
OSUR  11.6   8.9  14.0  19.2  22.7  24.8  20.8  11.6  12.6  13.5  14.9  15.0 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, October 1999, 
Table 5.1, 129; The World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004 and 2005, 
Table 6.5; 2006, Table 6.6; 2009, Table 6.7, and 2010, Table 6.7. 
 
The Case of NAFTA
1 
 
I shall first give a brief overview of NAFTA’s institutions in view of trying to 
compare NAFTA’s institutional capacity and achievements with those of the EU. 
NAFTA’s institutions should be seen against the background of NAFTA being a 
rather complete contract, a long and detailed treaty that requires less ex post im-
plementation than the EU and MERCOSUR based on shorter framework treaties 
or relatively incomplete contracts (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009). 
The main institution created by is The Free Trade Commission (FTC). It 
shall “supervise the implementation of the agreement” and “supervise its further 
elaboration.”  It also gets involved in resolving disputes regarding the interpreta-
tion or application of the agreement and it supervises the various committees and 
working groups established by the agreement. It consists of cabinet-level repre-
sentatives from the three member states or their ‘designees’ and meets normally 
                                                 
1 This section borrows from the concluding chapter in Laursen 2010.  
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at least once a year. Meetings are chaired “successively by each Party” (McKin-
ney, 2000, 24).
2 
The FTC has been able to accelerate tariff reductions in the mid-90s. It has 
also contributed to dispute settlement under Chapter 20 which foresees the estab-
lishment of an arbitral panel as a third step after consultation and a meeting of the 
FTC. Most disputes have been solved through consultation. Chapter 19  – anti-
dumping and countervailing duties – does not foresee consultations or involve-
ment of the FTC before the establishment of an arbitral panel (McKinney, 2000, 
31). 
If we compare the FTC with the EU Commission it is clear that the FTC 
has very limited competences. As McKinney observes, “It has no physical loca-
tion and no staff members of its own.” He goes on to say:   
 
As its name indicates, the Free Trade Commission was established to 
deal primarily with trade facilitation matters as they arise in the con-
text of the NAFTA agreement. It was neither intended nor designed to 
deal with the broader issues of economic integration as those that the 
European commission regularly addresses. The European Union has 
chosen to pursue a deeper level of economic integration than have the 
countries of North America, and a more elaborate institutional struc-
ture is required (McKinney, 2000, pp. 31-32). 
 
In  the  NAFTA  set-up  there  is  also  a  Commission  for  Labor  Cooperation. 
NAFTA was negotiated during the administration of President George Bush in 
1991 and signed on 17 December 1992. During the election campaign that year 
Bill Clinton had expressed some reservations about NAFTA and he promised to 
negotiate supplementary agreements on labor and environmental issues if elected. 
These side agreements were negotiated from March until August 1993, when the 
agreements were signed. After ratification by Canada, USA and Mexico NAFTA 
went into effect on 1 January 1994 (McKinney, 2000, 7-13). 
One of the supplementary agreements was the North American Agreement 
on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). It establishes the Commission for Labor Coop-
eration which is formed of a Council of Ministers and a tri-national Secretariat. 
The Council consists of the three labor ministers or their representatives. It meets 
at least once a year in regular sessions.
3 
Space does not allow a detailed account of the work of the NAALC. Su f-
fice it to give the assessment of a leading scholar: 
 
                                                 
2 The NAFTA Secretariat has a tri-national web site at www.nafta-sec-alena.org (last 
accessed 29 January 2012). It has links to the text of the NAFTA, status reports of panel 
reviews and panel decisions and reports. There are also links to the three national sections 
of the Secretariat where additional information can be found. 
3  The home page of the Commission for Labor Cooperation is: www.naalc.org (last ac-
cessed 29 January 2012)  
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While monetary enforcement assessments and trade sanctions 
exist as possible methods of enforcing the terms of the NAALC 
for some issues, their use for that purpose is highly unlikely. 
The road to having a matter considered by an arbitral panel is a 
long and tortuous one. Multiple opportunities and incentives are 
provided  to  settle  the  dispute  before  that  stage  (McKinney, 
2000, p. 46.) 
 
The established system thus depends on consultations between domestic institu-
tions. Only in exceptional cases, for a narrow range of disputes, can binding arbi-
tration be used and such a step can be decided by a two-thirds majority vote in 
the Council of Ministers. This slight element of ‘pooling of sovereignty’, as men-
tioned, is not very likely to be used. 
The second side agreement negotiated by the Clinton Administration is 
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which 
has established the Commission for Environmental Cooperation. (CEC).
4 Envi-
ronmental groups in the United States were worried because Mexico had lower 
environmental protection than the United States. They feared a ‘race to the bot-
tom’. Labor unions feared that capital might migrate to Mexico because of lower 
environmental standards. Including an agreement on environmental cooperation 
thus was a way to improve chances of ratification (McKinney, 2000, 90). 
The CEC is composed of a Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advi-
sory Committee (JPAC). The Council meets at the ministerial level at least once 
a year. The Secretariat, in Montreal, is an independent body.  
Potentially an important is Part V of the agreement, which allows for com-
plaints from a member state about “a persistent pattern of failure” by another 
“Party to effectively enforce its environmental law” (Article 22). If the Parties 
cannot solve the issue “the Council shall convene.” However, in 2000 McKinney 
concluded: 
 
… The process involved in sanctioning countries for a persistent fail-
ure to apply their environmental laws is by design highly convoluted, 
with  multiple  opportunities  for  the  accused  country  to  escape  the 
sanctions. The clear intent is for environmental disputes among the 
member countries to be settled through consultation and cooperation. 
No disputes have yet been filed under Part V, and the likelihood that 
they will be seems remote. No private party access exists under Part V 
of the NAAEC, that is, consultations that begin the dispute settlement 
process under Part V of the agreement must be initiated by a NAFTA 
member government. Informal consultations among the member gov-
ernments will likely preclude the more formal proceedings of the Part 
V dispute settlement process (McKinney, 2000, 109). 
 
                                                 
4 The home page is at: www.cec.org. (Last accessed 29 January 2012).  
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The decisive difference between NAFTA and the EU appears clearly here. There 
is no delegation of powers to supranational bodies like the European Commission 
and the ECJ. The possibility of delegation to panels under Part V of the environ-
mental agreement has not been used. 
Although the NAAEC foresees votes in the Council by two-thirds majority 
votes, and thus ‘pooling’ of sovereignty, this possibility has not been used. In the 
EU, if a Member States fails to implement the acquis communautaire it is usually 
the  Commission that  starts  proceedings,  not  another  member  state,  although a 
member state could do so in principle. 
 
NAFTA’s achievements 
 
The official view of NAFTA is positive. NAFTA has created the world’s largest 
FTA and created more trade and foreign direct investments (FDI). During its first 
10 years of existence trade among the three member countries doubled, from 
US$306 billion in 1993 to almost US$621 billion in 2002. In the case of Mexico, 
the poorest member country, trade increased even more than for the United States 
and Canada. Mexican exports to the US grew by 234 percent and exports to Can-
ada grew by 203 percent.
5 Also FDI more than doubled between the three mem-
ber countries, from US$136 billion to US$299.2 billion between 1993 and 2000. 
The official view is also that environmental protection and respect for basic labor 
standards  have  been  strengthened  by  NAFTA’s  side-agreements.  Economic 
growth 1993-2003 was 38% for the United States, 30.9% for Canada and 30% 
for Mexico. And it is claimed that productivity rose 28% in the United States, 
23% in Canada and 55% in Mexico.
6  
Some NGOs, however, have been much more critical in their assessment of 
NAFTA. The US Public Citizen for instance says that “NAFTA contained 900 
pages of one-size-fits-all rules to which each nation was required to conform all 
of its domestic laws – regardless of whether voters and their democratically-
elected representatives had previously rejected the very same policies in Con-
gress, state legislatures or city councils”.
7 
Without going further into claims and counter-claims it seems that most 
observers agree that NAFTA has created both trade and investments. However, 
as one should expect, the gains have not been evenly distributed, and there have 
                                                 
5 “NAFTA: A Decade of strengthening a dynamic relationship” downloaded from: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/NAFTA_at_10/Section_Index
.html (Accessed April 2010, no longer available, but available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-
alena/nafta10.aspx?lang=en&view=d , accessed 29 January 2012 ). 
6    NAFTA: A Decade of Success” downloaded from: 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/NAFTA_A_Decade_of_Succe
ss.html (Last accessed 29 January 2012) 
7 Quoted from the organization’s website: www.citizen.org/trade/nafta/  (Last accessed 
29 January 2012). 
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been losers. NAFTA itself has not created mechanisms to deal with distribution 
issues, apart from special programs for the Mexican-US border area. It is also fair 
to say that the records of the side agreements on labor and environment have 
been disappointing. According to Armand de Mestral  “all three governments 
have been hostile and defensive in response to complaints.” And in the case of 
the NAALC “measures were seldom taken following a complaint” (de Mestral 
2011, 656). 
   
Table 2: Descriptive summary of NAFTA 
Nature  of 
agreement 
Institutional  ca-
pacity 
Leadership  Achievements 
 
Law treaty 
(relatively  pre-
cise  and  com-
plete contract): 
 
Specific  policy 
rules in the trea-
ties 
 
Under  the  general  
NAFTA: 
 No pooling, some 
delegation  in  re-
spect  to  dispute-
settlement 
 
Under  the  labor 
and  environmental 
agreements:  
Some pooling, but 
not  employed  in 
practice; 
Some  delegation 
of  authority  to 
panels,  but  used 
sparingly 
 
No redistribution 
 
 
Some US leader-
ship at the outset 
 
No  institutional 
leadership 
 
FTA-Plus: 
Goods,  services, 
investments,  com-
petition 
 
Important  increas-
es in intra-NAFTA 
trade and FDI 
 
Cooperation  on 
labor  and  envi-
ronmental issues: 
Relatively  minor 
effects so far 
 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
 
 
 
The Case of MERCOSUR
8 
 
The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was founded by Argentina, Bra-
zil,  Paraguay  and  Uruguay  by  the  Treaty  of  Asunción  of  21  March  1991 
(MERCOSUR, 1991a). The preamble said that expansion of domestic markets, 
through integration, was a vital prerequisite for accelerating economic develop-
ment.  
                                                 
8 This section borrows from Laursen 2010.  
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More specifically, the purpose was to establish a common market. This would 
involve 
 
The free movement of goods, services and factors of production 
between countries through, inter alia, the elimination of customs 
duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and 
any other equivalent measures; 
The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of 
a common trade policy in relation to third States or groups of 
States, and the co-ordination of positions in regional and interna-
tional economic and commercial forums, 
The  co-ordination  of  macroeconomic  and  sectoral  policies  be-
tween the States Parties in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, 
industry, fiscal and monetary matters, foreign exchange and capi-
tal, services, customs, transport and communications and any oth-
er areas that may be agreed upon, in order to ensure proper com-
petition between the States Parties; 
The commitment by States Parties to harmonize their legislation 
in the relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process 
(Article 1).  
 
This can be summarized as first of all adding up to a customs union with a com-
mon trade policy. Beyond that goal was also a common market which would be 
based on coordination of policies in specific areas, including money, as well as 
harmonization of legislation. This might take MERCOSUR towards an economic 
union.  But  were  the  commitments  credible?  Here  we  have  to  remember  that 
MERCOSUR is very incomplete contract compared with NAFTA. At the same 
time, it also aims to go much further than NAFTA. 
   
Institutional Setup 
 
The Treaty of Asunción established two main institutions (Article 9): 
 
(a)  The Council of the Common Market 
(b) The Common Market Group  
 
The Treaty specified that “The Council shall be the highest organ of the common 
market, with responsibility for its political leadership and for decision-making to 
ensure compliance with the objectives and time-limits set for the final establish- 
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ment of the common market” (article 10). As to composition it was specified that 
“The Council shall consist of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers 
of the Economy of the States Parties.” It would meet “at least once a year with 
the participation of the Presidents of the States Parties” (Article 11). A rotating 
presidency was foreseen (Article 12). 
  As for the Common Market Group, it was defined as “the executive or-
gan”  and  it  would  have  “powers  of  initiative.”  It  would  propose  specific 
measures for applying the treaty, monitor compliance and “take the necessary 
steps to enforce decisions adopted by the Council” (Article 13). The treaty also 
established an “administrative secretariat” in Montevideo to service the Common 
Market Group (Article 15). 
  How were decisions to be made by the two institutions, the Council and 
Common Market Group? By “consensus” it was stipulated (Article 16). So there 
was no pooling of sovereignty. 
  Was there delegation of sovereignty? No. The organizational structure 
established by the Treaty of Asunción did not foresee autonomous supranational 
institutions  like  the  European  Commission  or  the  European  Court  of  Justice 
(ECJ). The established organs were purely intergovernmental. 
  The Protocol of Ouro Preto of 17 December 1994 added more institu-
tions and was more specific (MERCOSUR, 1994). The new organs created were 
the MERCOSUR Trade Commission (MTC), the Joint Parliamentary Commis-
sion  (JPC),  the  Economic-Social  Consultative  Forum  (ESCF),  and  the 
MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat (MAS).  
  The new MERCOSUR Trade Commission would be “be responsible for 
considering complaints referred to it by the National Sections of the Mercosur 
Trade Commission and originated by State Parties or individuals, whether natural 
or legal persons” (Article 21). So it would have some functions similar to those 
of the European Commission without getting its independence as well as a judi-
cial function without approaching anything resembling the ECJ. 
  The Joint Parliamentary Commission would represent the parliaments of 
the States Parties. It would have an equal number of members representing each 
State Party, to be appointed by the respective national parliaments. It would be 
able to make recommendations (Article 22-26). It was not given any real politi-
cal, budgetary or legislative powers. 
In the following years there were some additional institutional changes, 
including creation of a Permanent Review Court (Pena and Rozemberg, 2005). It 
was  created  by  the  Olivos  Protocol  in  February  2002  (MERCOSUR,  2002). 
Similarly it was decided in 2004 to create a MERCOSUR Parliament (Parlasur). 
In 2007 it replaced the Joint Parliamentary Committee. But the Parliament has 
not been given legislative, budgetary or control powers (Caetano et al., 2009, 63-
70).  And   in  2005  a  MERCOSUR  Structural  Convergence  Fund  was created  
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(INTAL, 2009). Brazil is the main contributor. The main recipients are Uruguay 
and Paraguay.
9 
The establishment of a Permanent Review Court and a Parliament are 
potentially important innovations. Their powers are not comparable to those of 
the ECJ and the European Parliament, but they can be seen as steps in the dire c-
tion of creating better institutions, where a learning process may eventually lead 
to further changes. 
  Overall it is fair to say that the MERCOSUR institutions have a strong 
intergovernmental bias.
10 Despite the similarity in names they are much weaker 
than EU institutions. MERCOSUR also has a fundamental problem of asy m-
metry. Brazil is by far the biggest country. If weighted vo ting, as it exists in the 
European Union, had been adopted in MERCOSUR, Brazil would be able to 
dominate.  
  Did the politicians and member state governments then succeed in over-
coming the “collective action” problems through leadership? When Mattli wrote 
about MERCOSUR in 1999 he said: 
 
Within MERCSUR Brazil is the dominant economy. It accounts 
for approximately 75 percent of total MERCOSUR GDP and for 
80  percent  of  its  industrial  manufacturers.  Nevertheless,  Brazil 
has been reluctant to use its economic and political position to as-
sume active regional leadership. Whenever short-term national in-
terests have been at stake, Brazil has relegated MERCOSUR to 
second place. (Mattli, 1999, 160).  
 
Arguably this is still the case today. At the same time, however, it should be ad-
mitted that joint presidential leadership has sometimes allowed MERCOSUR to 
move forward (Malamud, 2003). But that kind of leadership is not the most relia-
ble, especially if one of the member states, Brazil, hesitates. 
  Whether  the  recent  institutional  changes  mentioned  above  will  allow 
MERCOSUR  to  improve  its  performance  remains  to  be  seen.  Intra-regional 
trade, which fell drastically after 1999, has not yet reached the levels of the mid-
1990s. Today it is not only much lower than in the EU and NAFTA but also low-
er than in ASEAN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 For 2010 figures, see: http://www.mercosur.int/innovaportal/file/655/1/DEC_016-
2009_ES_Presupuesto%20FOCEM%202010.pdf (Accessed 29 January 2012). 
10 On this, see also Bouzas, 2002, Bouzas et al., 2002; Bouzas et al., 2008, and Gardini 
2011.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Summary of MERCOSUR 
Nature  of 
Agreement 
Institutional  ca-
pacity 
Leadership  Achievements 
 
Framework treaty 
 
Specific require-
ments to establish 
customs union and 
common trade 
policy 
 
Coordination and 
harmonization 
foreseen to estab-
lish a common 
market 
 
Treaty supple-
mented with pro-
tocols 
 
 
No poling or del-
egation 
 
Practically no 
redistribution 
 
Ad hoc dispute 
settlement tribu-
nals 
 
Recent reforms 
may gradually 
improve institu-
tions: 
 
Permanent  Tri-
bunal of Revision 
(2004), opinions 
not binding 
 
Structural Con-
vergence Fund 
created in 2005 
 
Weak parliament, 
PARLASUR cre-
ated in 2006 
 
Weak Brazilian 
Leadership 
 
Weak institu-
tional leadership 
 
 
Incomplete cus-
toms union 
 
Weak implementa-
tion  
 
Major steps needed 
to achieve the de-
clared goal of a 
common market 
Sours: Compiled by the author. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Conclusions based on two or three cases must necessarily be somewhat tentative. 
But n=3 is better than n=1. I have summarized the findings in tables 2-3 above  
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comparing NAFTA and MERCOSUR with the EU. The argument has been that 
‘institutions matter’. But it has to be admitted that the ubiquitous question of 
over-determinations remains (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Apart from looking 
at the institutions I have also, albeit rather superficially, talked about leadership. 
Further, the question of asymmetry emerged as a potentially important variable 
that may explain why MERCOSUR has not chosen a complete contract or supra-
national institutions to deal with collective action problems. 
Among the three integration schemes covered in this analysis the EU and 
NAFTA have been the most successful, albeit at different levels of achievements. 
These two organizations approached the question of ‘credible commitments’ in 
different ways, but, according to Mattli, leadership was available in both. The EU 
included ‘pooling and delegation’ of sovereignty. NAFTA was based on a very 
detailed treaty, a rather complete contract which reduced ex post implementation 
issues, but also made the organization more static. So the question is, was it lead-
ership or the different ways of dealing with credible commitments that were deci-
sive for the relative success?  
 
 
Table 4: (Tentative) Explanatory Conclusions 
Case  Independent  var-
iables 
Intervening  varia-
bles 
Dependent var-
iable 
EU  Moderate power 
asymmetry 
High degree of 
interdependence 
Guiding ideas 
(Monnet) 
Supranational insti-
tutions 
Incomplete contract 
Leadership readily 
available 
High degree of 
achievement of 
objectives (in-
creasing over 
time) 
NAFTA  High power 
asymmetry 
High degree of 
interdependence 
Ideas unimportant 
Intergovernmental 
institutions 
Complete contract 
US leadership 
High degree of 
achievement of 
objectives (sta-
tionary) 
MERCOSUR  High power 
asymmetry 
Low degree of in-
terdependence 
Limited ideational 
inspiration 
Intergovernmental 
institutions 
Incomplete contract 
Limited leadership 
Low to moder-
ate degree of 
achievement of 
objectives (rela-
tively station-
ary) 
Source: Compiled by the author  
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MERCOSUR is an incomplete contract. Nor does it have strong com-
mitment institutions. Further, regional leadership has been weak. It has been less 
successful. Admittedly, demand for integration was also lower in South America 
than in Europe  and North America due to lower degrees of interdependence. 
MERCOSUR and NAFTA further exhibit greater asymmetries than Europe. So 
we have to admit that the differences are over-determined. The analytical find-
ings based on the research design outlined in the introductory chapter in Laursen 
(2010) are summarized in table 4. The main independent variables are power, 
interests and ideas.  The intervening variables are the nature of institutions and 
availability of leadership. The dependent variable is the degree to which objec-
tives are achieved. 
This  leaves  some  important  questions for  our future  research  agenda: 
Why are some regional integration schemes better able to achieve the stated goals 
than  others?  There  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind  that  interdependence  and  power 
asymmetries are important structural factors that must be considered in our ef-
forts to find answers. They affect both demand and supply of integration. Further, 
institutional choice in an integration scheme remains of central importance. Pool-
ing and delegation of sovereignty is the most obvious way of creating credible 
commitments. There may be an alternative in the form of a relatively precise and 
complete contract from the beginning. But such an alternative will be more static 
and less able to adjust to new challenges. 
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Abstract 
 
After 20 years of its foundation, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) 
has failed to meet its declared goals. Far from being a common market and not 
yet a customs union – or even a fully-fledged free trade zone -, it has neither 
deepened nor enlarged. Remarkably, all other regionalist projects in Latin Amer-
ica fare even worse. Yet, they have arguably fostered domestic democracy, eco-
nomic reforms and the consolidation of regional security communities. Aware of 
the growing gap between treaties and facts, regional elites have responded by 
signing additional protocols, building up powerless institutions and voicing rhe-
torical statements, with the EU model often in mind and paper but rarely in prac-
tice. As a result, Latin American regional blocs have lost a shared raison d’être 
and have been attached a different purpose by each of their member states. This 
presentation evaluates Mercosur’s sprawling goals and declining performance in 
the context of Brazil’s global emergence. The aim is to show how the strengthen-
ing of national sovereignty - as opposed to its pooling or delegation - is at the 
heart of most regionalist strategies. Ironically, the setback of regional integration 
and the comeback of national sovereignty in Latin America parallel the develop-
ments that are afflicting the EU. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After 20 years of its foundation, the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) 
has failed to meet its declared goals. Far from being a common market and not 
yet a customs union – or even a fully-fledged free trade zone -, it has neither 
deepened nor enlarged. Remarkably, all other regionalist projects in Latin Amer-
ica fare even worse, albeit they have arguably fostered democracy, economic re-
forms and peaceful regional relations. Faced with a growing gap between treaties 
and facts, regional elites have responded by signing additional protocols, building 
up powerless institutions and voicing rhetorical statements, with the EU model  
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often in mind and paper but rarely in practice. As a result, Latin American re-
gional blocs have lost a shared raison d’être and have been attached a different 
purpose by each of their member states. This paper evaluates Mercosur’s sprawl-
ing goals and declining performance in the context of Brazil’s global emergence. 
The aim is to show how the strengthening of national sovereignty - as opposed to 
its pooling or delegation - is at the heart of most regionalist strategies. The article 
proceeds as follows: first, it introduces integration theories in order to show that 
Latin American regionalism can be explained by existing approaches. Second, it 
analyzes Mercosur’s travails with integration and its current situation. Subse-
quently, it brings forth lessons from the Latin American experiences that may 
shed light over the developments that are currently afflicting the European Un-
ion. The last section concludes. 
 
Application to Latin America of Europe-inspired Theories 
 
Regional integration can be defined as the process of “how and why (nation 
states) voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the 
factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving 
conflicts among themselves” (Haas 1971: 6). To this definition, Malamud and 
Schmitter (2011: 143) add that states “do so by creating common and permanent 
institutions capable of making decisions binding on all members. Anything less 
than this – increasing trade flows, encouraging contacts among elites, making it 
easier for persons to communicate or meet with each other across national bor-
ders, promoting symbols of common identity – may make it more likely that in-
tegration will occur, but none of them is the real thing.” 
This conceptualization stands in contrast with the so called New Region-
alism Approach (NRA), which allegedly “refers to a phenomenon, still in the 
making, that began to emerge in the mid-1980s, in contrast to the ‘old regional-
ism’  that  began  in  the  1950s  and  faded  away  in  the  1970s”  (Hettne  and 
Soderbaum 1998: 6). Malamud and Schmitter (2011: 143) consider a debate with 
the NRA futile, as “its definition of the phenomenon is so broad that it encom-
passes several different species under the same label, and thus cannot be subject 
to standardized comparison.” I will argue here that an old theory developed to 
explain  European  integration  in  the  1950s  and  1950s,  ironically  called  neo-
functionalism,  holds  more  potential  to  grasp  current  developments  in  Latin 
America than newer and fancier ones such as the NRA. This is mainly due to its 
core mechanism: spillover. 
Neo-functionalism was first developed by Ernst Haas around the 1960s. 
It drew on functionalism, an earlier approach advocated by David Mitrany whose 
main pitfalls were the neglect of political and geographical factors. The neo-
functionalist approach argued that “what matters most is a utilitarian calculus on 
the part of actors, and not a dramatic or passionate commitment to a new order” 
(Haas 1975: 12). The theory conceived of integration as an open process, charac-
terized by the spillover from one area to another. Spillover refers to the process 
whereby members of an integration scheme, dissatisfied with the bloc’s perfor- 
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mance, “attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction either by resorting to collabora-
tion in another, related sector (expanding the scope of the mutual commitment) 
or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of 
mutual commitment) or both (Schmitter 1969: 162). The notion is that integration 
in one sector will create incentives for integration in other sectors, in order to 
fully capture the benefits of integration in the sector in which it started. Although 
neo-functionalism was sensitive to the difference between background, initial and 
process conditions, it “had more to say about the ongoing role of institutions than 
about the factors that explain the birth of regionalist schemes” (Hurrell 1995: 60): 
its main accent and stronger predictions were focused on the process. Once inte-
gration had started, neo-functionalism saw it being fostered by two sorts of spill-
over: functional and political, as politicization was considered as initially avoida-
ble but later inescapable. This mechanism predicted that integration would be-
come self-sustaining, as the emerging conflicts of interest would be dealt with by 
enlarging the tasks and expanding the authority of the common institutions. In-
deed, European integration has been driven as much by intergovernmental trea-
ties  as  by  unforeseen,  interstitial  change,  that  is,  structural  transformations 
brought about by the daily operation of EU institutions rather than by the strate-
gic calculations of national executives (Farrell and Heritier 2007). In particular, 
the Court of Justice has been crucial to foster integration, even – or above all – 
during the seeming stagnation ages of the 1970s and early 1980s. It did so by 
establishing the direct effect of community law and its supremacy over national 
legislation  between  1963  and  1964,  and  by  banning  unilateral  restrictions  on 
trade through the establishment of the principle of mutual recognition in 1979. 
Over time, however, spillover did not take place as expected. What first 
appeared as a mechanical process changed afterwards into an extremely contin-
gent phenomenon with several ramifications. Schmitter (1970) conceived of it as 
a member of a more numerous family (see Table 2). According to its two defin-
ing variables, scope and level of authority, spillover meant the simultaneous in-
crement  in  both  indicators.  In  contrast,  the  simultaneous  decline  was  called 
spillback. Retrench meant greater decisional authority along with less coverage 
of issue areas, whereas muddle about named the opposite case. Two extra possi-
bilities were also anticipated: spillaround, that defined an increase in the cover-
age of issue areas with no change in the level of authority, and buildup, which 
implied greater levels of authority irrespective of any increment regarding its 
scope; both spillover and buildup were oriented toward the construction of a po-
litical community. Finally, encapsulation meant the maintenance of the status 
quo. In Latin America, spillover and buildup rarely occurred as regional institu-
tions were continuously created but not given effective powers. Mercosur, in par-
ticular, was to be increasingly characterized by spillaround. 
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Table 1 - Spillover Family 
 
    SCOPE OF AUTHORITY 
    +  =  - 
 
LEVEL  OF 
AUTHORITY 
+  Spillover  Buildup  Retrench 
=  Spillaround  Encapsulation  Spillback 
-  Muddle about  Spillback  Spillback 
Own elaboration based on Schmitter (1970). See also Malamud (2010). 
 
 
 
Diagnosis of Regional Integration in Mercosur and Beyond 
 
Malamud and Gardini (2012: 124) have argued that, “Latin American regional-
ism has never been all-encompassing but rather territorially segmented, therefore 
disintegrating the conceptual Latin American space at the same time as it has 
sought to integrate sub-regions. This trend has only been accentuated more re-
cently, giving birth to new blocs that are tearing South, Central and North Amer-
ica apart. More confusingly, some of these sub-regions overlap.” Following Phil-
lips and Prieto (2011), they claim that “the presence of segmented and overlap-
ping regionalist projects is not a manifestation of successful integration but, on 
the contrary, signals the exhaustion of its potential. This is not incompatible with 
the proliferation of cooperation initiatives. Yet regionalism understood as ‘com-
prehensive economic integration’ in a macro-region is losing ground to regional-
ism understood as ‘a set of diverse cooperation projects' in several sub-regions. 
Recent developments have shown traits such as the primacy of the political agen-
da, an increased role of the state, growing concern for social issues and asymme-
tries and an attempt to escape from broadly neoliberal and US-endorsed dynam-
ics” (Malamud and Gardini 2012: 124). This shift has been addressed by con-
cepts  such  as  post-neoliberal  or  post-hegemonic  regionalism  (Riggirozzi  and 
Tussie 2012; Sanahuja 2009), which seek to overcome the open or new regional-
ism approach. I contest this perspective and argue that Latin American regional-
ism is not evolving towards yet another paradigm but is instead rolling onto it-
self, either spilling around without deepening or going back to standard coopera-
tion  arrangements.  Mercosur  is  the  clearest  example  of  the  former  case, 
spillaround. 
Mercosur has overtly failed to meet its declared goals, as it is neither a 
common market nor a customs union. It does not even work as a free trade zone,  
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as border barriers and obstacles to trade are frequently raised and never fully re-
moved. True, it has achieved other relevant – if tacit – objectives, such as sup-
porting  democracy,  economic  reforms  and  peaceful  regional  relations.  This, 
however,  should  not  be  confused  with  integration.  The  main  reason  for 
Mercosur’s fizzling out is that its underlying formula, i.e. preferential access for 
Argentine goods into the Brazilian market in exchange for Argentine support for 
Brazilian international strategies (Bouzas et al 2002), has exhausted its fuel with-
out being replaced. Consequently, Mercosur has acquired disparate meanings for 
each member state. 
The  external  agenda  has  provided  some  glue  that  is  lacking  indoors 
(Gómez-Mera 2009). Unlike the Andean Community, negotiations with the EU 
are still underway as a bloc, though their prospects are dim – to be optimistic. 
Although it is Brazil, as opposed to Mercosur, that sits at top international fora 
such as the BRICS, IBSA, and the WTO 4-party negotiating table, the possibility 
of signing a bloc-to-bloc agreement with the EU keeps Mercosur sense of being 
alive. However, the signature of a strategic partnership agreement between the 
EU and Brazil – not Mercosur – in 2007 has done little to promote a happy end-
ing in the bi-regional negotiations. As regards enlargement, Venezuela has been a 
“full member in process of accession” (this oxymoron is official-wording) for the 
last five years. The accession protocol has not been ratified by Paraguay, an elo-
quent manifestation of a double phenomenon: the growing inoperability of the 
bloc and the fuzziness of its in-out borders. 
Mercosur  is  a  case  of  supply-side  integration  (Perales  2003). 
Interpresidentialism, its main working mechanism, is the outcome of combining 
an  international  strategy,  presidential  diplomacy,  with  a  domestic  institution, 
presidentialism (Malamud 2003, 2005). Presidential diplomacy is the customary 
resort to direct negotiations between national presidents every time a crucial de-
cision has to be made or a critical conflict needs to be solved. Another way to put 
it is that Mercosur is, from birth, power-oriented rather than rule-oriented. 
The legalization of internal procedures, as well as the judicialization of 
conflicts, have not taken place but in paper. Mercosur’s top dispute settlement 
institutions have been called on only 15 times in 20 years. Formal institution-
building was not due to functional needs but to the pressure of epistemic com-
munities and transnational networks (i.e. jobs for lawyers and judges). A standing 
case in point is the Permanent Review Tribunal, established in 2006, which has 
been said not to be permanent or a real review instance - and not even a tribunal 
(Perotti  2008).  Likewise,  the  development  of  a  parliamentary  institution 
(Parlasur) is an outcome of professional and political lobbying (national legisla-
tors and academic sectors), but also a legitimizing resource born out of mimesis 
(Dri 2010). The marketplace of ideas regarding regional integration is substan-
tially limited to one successful source, the EU. In fact, Parlasur has no legislative 
competences, no oversight capacities, no popular representation, and hardly any 
transnational party politics. 
  The consequence of Mercosur’s sprawling institutions and declining per-
formance has been the diversification of expectations that member states attach  
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to it. For Brazil the bloc has become an instrument to administer its relations with 
Argentina, long considered the only country important for Brazil to which Brazil 
is also important. Symmetrically, Mercosur’s main function for Argentina is now 
to bind Brazil and prevent it from making unilateral decisions or going global 
alone. for Paraguay Mercosur is not an option but a doom (paraphrasing Celso 
Lafer, who once said that, for Brazil, the FTAA was an option while Mercosur 
was destiny): it is unavoidable – as exclusion costs would be higher than perma-
nence - though not necessarily good. In the case of Uruguay, exclusion costs and 
political inertia explain the decision to stay in the bloc, although in this case the 
ruling coalition’s ideology also plays a role. 
  In sum, Mercosur is not what it is purported to be in the official dis-
course. Albeit its balance sheet is marginally positive, the divergence of words 
and deeds has damaged its reputation and jeopardized its usefulness. Regionalism 
is still a compelling foreign policy but its goals and outcomes are no longer inte-
gration but cooperation, in line with the revitalized will of the larger states and 
dependent status of the smaller ones. 
 
 
 
Lessons from Latin American Integration
1 
 
How useful is the Mercosur – and, more generally, Latin American - experience 
to test hypotheses drawn from EU case? There are at least five dimensions in 
which this can be evaluated: the generalizability of the theories outside the EU, 
the different dynamics of origin and operation, the impact of domestic institu-
tions, the timing of institutionalization, and the nature of politicization. 
 
Generalizability outside the EU 
 
To speak of theories of European integration is as inappropriate as to speak of 
theories of German politics or of American parties: theories are not case studies 
but systematic explanations of general phenomena. However, the singularity of 
the EU development have led analysts to discuss the problem of n=1 – i.e. the 
possibility of crafting a theory that only applies to one case (Caporaso et al. 
1997). A way to avert such situation has consisted of moving away from integra-
tion to governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) – and from international relations 
to comparative politics (Hix 1994), approaching the EU by comparison with fed-
eral states (Majone 2005; Sbragia 1992). However insightful this may be, it only 
solves half of the problem: it puts the adjective – European – in comparative con-
text, but it leaves the noun – integration – in the dark. Comparative regional inte-
gration, not comparative governance, is the only way to deal with the root phe-
nomenon. And, outside Europe, nowhere but in Latin America have integration 
attempts and thinking developed so extensively across space and so consistently 
                                                 
1 This section is based on, and contains fragments from, Malamud (2010).  
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over time. Without Latin America, n=1 would not be a research problem but a 
fact of life. 
 
The different dynamics of origin and operation 
 
The first approaches that promoted or sought to explain European integration 
were not fully sensitive to the contrast between birth and growth of integration. 
Federalism focused on founding events and functionalism on ongoing processes. 
Only with the advent of neofunctionalism in Latin America was the distinction 
between  background  conditions, conditions  at  the  time  of  union, and  process 
conditions  made  (Haas  and  Schmitter  1964).  However,  neofunctionalism  re-
mained more able in accounting for integration dynamics after union, while lib-
eral intergovernmentalism shed more light on the initiation or relaunching of a 
regional organization. The analysis of the Latin American experiences has con-
firmed the validity of this division of labor among theories, showing that they are 
not rival but rather complementary, depending on context and timing. 
  More recently, Warleigh-Lack (2010) has advanced an analytical frame-
work that focuses on four dimensions: genesis, functionality, socialization and 
impact of regional organizations. Genesis asks why states join – and stay within – 
an  integration  process.  Functionality  investigates  how  a  regional  organization 
functions once it is established. Socialization and impact, in turn, study the out-
come of the process, whether at the ideational or material levels. This typology 
suggests that the factors that account for origin (and resilience), operation (and 
evolution), and outcomes (either ideational or material) are not necessarily the 
same;  therefore,  no  single  theory  of  integration  is  capable  of  explaining  the 
whole process. This finding is consistent with research results such as those col-
lected by Laursen (2010: 14). Indeed, the structural model he develops in order to 
explain comparative regionalism allows for two values of the dependent variable: 
cooperation and integration, depending on the weight of three causal variables 
(power, interests, and knowledge or ideas) and their interaction with two inter-
vening variables (institutions and leadership). If interests are not convergent and 
supranational developments are missing in both institutions and leadership, inte-
gration is out of reach. 
 
The impact of domestic institutions 
 
Direct presidential intervention has played a crucial role in both the start and the 
development of every integration process in the continent, while no equivalent 
figure  to  such  supranational  bargainers  as  Jean  Monnet,  Robert  Schuman  or 
Jacques Delors is to be found. The capacity of presidential intervention to ad-
vance integration was not evident from the outset. In CAN, the Andean Presiden-
tial Council was belatedly established in 1990 but only consolidated in 1994. In 
CACM, Wynia (1970: 331) early suggested exploring “the effects of the national 
political roles of presidents on their implementation of regional commitments”. 
However, decades of political instability put into question this insight. Since the  
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1990s, though, democratization led to an increase in the impact made by chief 
executives. 
  In the history of European integration, the most noteworthy interventions 
of chief executives were those of De Gaulle in the 1960s and Thatcher in the 
1980s, and both were detrimental to integration. However, the necessity to insti-
tutionalize the influence of national executives led to the belated creation of the 
European Council in 1974, twenty years after the EEC was founded. The Latin 
American cases show that, given certain institutional settings, chief executives 
were the only available driver of integration. Presidentialism, alongside power-
oriented rather than rule-oriented political traditions, has made a difference that 
EU pioneers could not have predicted. Yet, there is not enough evidence to tell 
whether these developments challenge the neofunctionalist low-politics argument 
or, instead, support its political spillover hypothesis. 
 
Timing of Institutionalization 
 
The timing and sequence of institution-building can alter the effects produced by 
institutions. For example, the early introduction of executive summits is likely to 
reflect, but also feed, stronger intergovernmental procedures. In the EU, the role 
played by the Court of Justice has been recognized as crucial in pushing integra-
tion forward into unexpected, and often unintended, developments. The option 
for triadic (judicial) rather than dyadic (diplomatic) institutionalization of dis-
pute-settlement mechanisms distinguishes the EU from Mercosur and has shown 
greater  spillover  potential.  However,  apparently  similar  institutional  outlooks 
may conceal huge differences: even though CAN established a sophisticated in-
stitutional architecture since its origins, member-states’ reluctance to relinquish 
sovereignty prevented the precocious regional institutions from generating spill-
over effects. As Dominguez (2007: 127) stresses, “institutional design features 
have explained little about the efficacy of organizations.” Although he adds that 
the key exception has been automaticity, the greatest transformations of sub re-
gional organizations took place after the establishment of decision-making bodies 
involving the national presidents. 
As CAN shows, regional integration may suffer from excessive or, at 
least, precocious institutionalization – and not only from institutional deficit, as 
some believe to be the case in the EU. Mercosur performed reasonably well in its 
first years precisely because it chose not to replicate the strategy of the Andean 
Pact, which had tried to emulate the EU form instead of function. Had Mercosur 
done alike, its ineffectiveness could have eroded the legitimacy of the integration 
project as a whole. The under-development of common institutions cannot persist 
for long if integration is to move ahead, but reforms in their scope and authority 
must be timed with regard to needs and perceptions (Malamud and Schmitter 
2011). The promoters of the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
could have benefitted from this lesson. 
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The nature of politicization 
 
In the EU, politicization is understood as a process opposed to technical man-
agement. Caporaso argues that power has been downplayed because “integration 
studies, as a field, has a ‘technicist’ orientation,” but also because of “the nature 
of the EC itself” (Caporaso 1998: 347). The mechanism through which political 
leaders agree on general principles and leave the drafting of the detailed rules to 
leading national and supranational technicians is known as the “Messina meth-
od.” Both neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists agreed on this definition, 
notwithstanding the focus of the former on technical management and of the lat-
ter on political preferences. In Latin America, though, this conceptualization was 
only valid during the first theoretical surge; afterwards, the technicians that had 
driven integration in LAFTA and CACM waned and top politicians took charge. 
Since then, politicization has been understood as opposed to institutional checks 
rather than to technical management. Whereas in Europe politicization meant 
democratizing and taming regional agencies, in Latin America it meant not estab-
lishing them. Nye (1965: 872) had early on alerted about the risks of “premature 
overpolitization,” echoing Haas’s suggestion that high politics was inimical to 
integration. Although Haas later withdrew this argument, the Latin American 
experiences have vindicated his earlier claims. EU students and practitioners may 
want to take this issue into account when considering proposals regarding such 
questions as common defense or joint representation in international organiza-
tions. 
  A last lesson can be drawn. Several scholars fail to appreciate the nature 
of the phenomenon by focusing on the adjective, regional, rather than the noun, 
integration. The former indicates scope, not substance. The conventional usage of 
the word Europe to refer to the EU tends to misdirect observers from politics to-
ward geography, culture or identity: this is a mistake, especially when applied to 
“regions” that are not organizations. For, as Latin America teaches, “natural” 
regions can be dysfunctional for regional integration. 
  All the above further suggests three areas of research that EU studies 
could profit from. The first regards disintegration; to date the EU has only seen 
Greenland off, but never has a member state left. This might change, and the 
CAN experience demands a better understanding of the conditions under which it 
could happen and the effects it may produce. The second area concerns informal-
ity and non-compliance; as the Greek tragedy shows, deceit could be more harm-
ful than open rejection of common rules. Scrutinizing any Latin American bloc 
would have sent an earlier wake-up call to those who interpret rules at face value. 
The final research avenue leads to actorness: EU officials have long fantasized 
about a world built on regions, in which the EU would be both demiurge and 
role-model.  After  analyzing  the  evolution  of  Latin  American  regionalism, 
though, it seems wiser to recalibrate downwards the potential of interregionalism. 
This calls for more realism and less complacency when studying integration from  
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Europe, in line with similar recommendations from insiders that have gone un-
heard (Torrent 2005). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Integration is a potentially global phenomenon, and therefore it should be recog-
nized whenever it appears. This requires standard definitions and theory that can 
travel. Malamud and Schmitter (2011) compare this concept with a similarly con-
tested one in political science, i.e. democracy: They argue that “there are as many 
types thereof as there are countries in which citizens are formally equal and rul-
ers are accountable; yet, lacking these characteristics, we do not call it a democ-
racy. The same applies to regional integration: either there are sovereign states 
that voluntarily transfer parcels of sovereignty to joint decision-making or there 
are not, and in this case we do not call it integration. We have resisted the temp-
tation to stretch conceptual definitions or dispose of working theories when a 
given phenomenon does not turn out as expected, as long as those concepts and 
theories are capable of explaining why this happened. EU lessons are useful to 
understand South American travails with regional integration precisely because 
they can also make sense of non-integration – instead of calling it otherwise and 
pretending that it is a new animal” (Malamud and Schmitter 2011: 155). In other 
words, non-integration and disintegration are phenomena that can be grasped by 
theories developed to understand European integration. The EU may be leading 
the way once again – this time only backwards. 
The setback of regionalism is accompanied, if not led, by the return of 
big regional powers to central stage. In the case of Brazil, “its ambitions are in-
creasingly defensive (...) The main goal is no longer to integrate South America 
into a regional bloc (…) but rather to limit damages. Now, it seems sufficient to 
stabilize the region and prevent political instability, economic turmoil and border 
conflicts. The name of the game is to keep quiet rather than lead the neighbor-
hood, since preventing trouble in its backyard seems to be a necessary condition 
for Brazil to consolidate its global gains” (Malamud 2011: 20). The role of Ger-
many in the EU is still to be seen, but what is already clear is that the European 
decision-making center has moved from Brussels to Berlin – or Frankfurt at best. 
National sovereignty, not the pooling thereof, is giving cards again. 
Regionalism is still a (regional) process and a (national) foreign policy. 
However, too many scholars tend to overstate the former and overlook the latter. 
In this article I have claimed that Latin American efforts at regionalism are nei-
ther based on a shared identity nor aimed at common goals but are rather national 
strategies to maximize the foreign policy goals of the contracting governments. 
These goals differ: in the case of the smaller states, they regard visibility, redis-
tribution, and the avoidance of exclusion costs; in the case of the larger states, 
they aspire to safeguard regional stability and to line up a followership that helps 
them gain recognition out of the region (cf. Nel 2010; Malamud 2011). Unlike 
Europe, the pooling of sovereignty has never been regarded as either a means or  
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an end, and national sovereignty has always been more valued than any potential 
gains from integration. The conclusion is that regionalism in the Western Hemi-
sphere is about multilateral dialogue, political cooperation, and public diplomacy, 
but no longer about integration. 
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Febrero/ Consejo Argentino de Relaciones Internacionales, 2005. 
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